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 Abbreviations and Terms 
Used in the Text
Abbreviations
AFSC:   American Friends Service Committee (Quakers)
AOGG:  Administration Offi ce of the Governor of Gaza 
AUC:  American University in Cairo
CAPMAS:   Central Agency for Public Mobilization and 
Statistics, the Egyptian government agency 
responsible for census data.
£E:  Egyptian pound
FMRS:  Forced Migration Refugee Studies Program
GAP:  Government of All Palestine 
GBP: British pound (pound sterling)
GUPS:  General Union of Palestinian Students 
GUPW:   General Union of Palestinian Workers (generally 
referred to as “Labor Union”)
GUPWom:   General Union of Palestinian Women (generally 
referred to as “Women’s Union”)
IDF:  Israel Defense Forces
NGOs:  Nongovernmental organizations
PLO:  Palestine Liberation Organization 
PA:  Palestinian Authority
PLA:  Palestine Liberation Army
PRCS:  Palestine Red Crescent Society
PSU:  Palestinian Student Union
UAR:  United Arab Republic
UNCCP:   United Nations Conciliation Commission for 
Palestine
UNHCR:   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA:  United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
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Interview Codes
(See the section “Conducting the Interviews” in Appendix 1 for 
details)
PP:  Pilot visits/interviews by the author
P:   Pilot visits/interviews by research team (author and 
assistants) in Cairo Governorate
AP:   Visits/interviews conducted after termination of 
fi eldwork
7:   Regular interviews conducted in Sharqiyyah 
Governorate
8:  Regular interviews conducted in Qalyubiyyah 
Governorate
Note: Throughout the text, each quotation from an interview is 
followed by a code indicating the category of visit, the governorate, 
the number of the household visited within the category, the name 
of the town or district within the governorate, and the date the 
interview was conducted. “P12, ‘Izbit al-Nakhal, 29 May 2002,” for 
example, indicates the twelfth household visit by the research 
team in Cairo Governorate, the district of ‘Izbit al-Nakhal, on 29 
May 2002; “7/43, Hehya, 15 July 2002” indicates the forty-third 
regular interview conducted by the research team, in Sharqiyyah 
Governorate, the district of Hehya, on 15 July; “PP9, Port Said, 18 
June 2002 indicates the ninth pilot visit by the author, in Port Said 
Governorate, the city of Port Said, on 18 June; and so on. It should 
be emphasized that the number refers to the household visited, 
and in many cases a number of persons were interviewed within 
the household. The same household number, then, may be used 





‘ashwa’iyyat: unplanned urban settlements, built without proper 
permits
azhari: religious schools
basta or farsha in the Egyptian dialect: the pushcart of street 
vendors





ishash: simple houses made of hay
kafi l: guarantor 
Maktab Wafi din: general administration for foreign students
markaz: the administrative division below the level of governorate 
(plural: marakiz); the governorate comprises marakiz
Mugamma‘: the administrative body that processes bureaucratic 
documents and papers
Muhafazah: Governorate 
qism: the administrative division below that of markaz within a 
governorate (plural: aqsam)
tawtin: permanent resettlement of Palestinians in Arab host 
countries
tijarat shanta: bag trade
wafi d: immigrant, foreigner
Other Information
Land is measured in dunams and feddans; 1 feddan = 4,074 square 
meters; and 1 dunam = 1,000 square meters.
During the period in which this research was conducted (2001–3), 
the value of one Egyptian pound (£E) fl uctuated between $0.15 
and $0.22. In 1960, £E 1 = $2.00.
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Timeline
September 1918: Palestine is occupied by British forces following the 
Ottoman defeat in World War I.
July 1922: The League of Nations approves Britain’s Mandate over 
Palestine, incorporating the Jewish National Home project, without the 
consent of the Palestinian inhabitants. The Mandate offi cially comes into 
force in September 1923.
October 1922: The fi rst British census of Palestine shows the population 
distribution as 78 percent Muslim, 11 percent Jewish, and 10 percent 
Christian.
August 1929: Militant Zionist demonstrations at the Wailing Wall 
precipitate Palestinian rioting in Jerusalem that spreads to other towns, 
especially Hebron. (This episode is known as the Buraq crisis.)
November 1931: The second British census of Palestine already shows 
the effect of unrestricted Jewish immigration, with the population now 73 
percent Muslim, 17 percent Jewish, and 9 percent Christian.
May 1936: An Arab general strike is called to protest Britain’s pro-
Zionist policies. The strike, which lasts six months, evolves into the Arab 
rebellion.
1936–39: The “Great Arab Rebellion” continues, during which the British 
authorities ban the Arab Higher Committee (the highest Palestinian 
political body), exile the Palestine leadership, and totally disarm the 
Palestinian population.
May 1939: Britain issues a White Paper restricting Jewish immigration 
and land sales.
1945–47: As World War II ends, Zionists escalate their campaign (including 
military) against Britain to lift restrictions on Jewish immigration.
February 1947: Britain turns the Palestine problem over to the United 
Nations; the date for the end of the Mandate is later set for 14 May 1948.
29 November 1947: UN General Assembly Resolution 181 recommends 
the partition of Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state. Skirmishes 
begin between Zionist forces and Arab irregulars.
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2 April 1948: The Haganah, the fi ghting force of the Yishuv (the Jewish 
community in Palestine), launches Plan Dalet, a series of thirteen military 
operations, to conquer those parts of Palestine assigned to the Jewish 
state under UN General Assembly Resolution 181.
24 April 1948: Massive shelling of Jaffa by the Irgun, a militant offshoot of 
the Haganah, is followed by an all-out offensive by the Haganah, triggering 
the fi rst wave of Palestinians to Egypt in boats. Jaffa falls to the Zionists 
on 10 May.
9 May 1948: The Egyptian government creates the Higher Committee 
for Palestinian Immigrant Affairs to handle the infl ux of Palestinians 
into Egypt; temporary refugee camps are set up in ‘Abbasiyyah (a Cairo 
suburb), Qantara Sharq in Sinai, and Azarita near Port Said.
14 May 1948: The British Mandate over Palestine ends; Israel declares 
statehood.
The UN General Assembly creates the position of UN Mediator for 
Palestine, tasked with promoting a truce between the parties and working 
toward “a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine.” Count 
Folke Bernadotte, named to the position, arrives in Palestine shortly 
thereafter.
15 May 1948: Arab state armies enter those parts of Palestine assigned 
to the Arab state under the UN partition plan, marking the start of the 
“regular” phase of the 1948 war. Egyptian forces cross into Gaza and 
deploy up the coast to Isdud, with lesser force sent through the Negev and 
Hebron to the Bethlehem area.
September 1948: The Government of All Palestine (GAP) is established 
to govern the parts of Palestine remaining in Arab hands (and as a counter 
to Transjordanian ambitions). The GAP effectively becomes a shell under 
Egyptian control.
Palestinian refugees housed in ‘Abbasiyyah and Azarita camps are moved 
to Qantara Sharq.
17 September 1948: UN Special Mediator Count Bernadotte is 
assassinated by the Zionist “dissident” Stern gang, one day after presenting 
his Progress Report to the UN General Assembly calling, inter alia, for the 
right of the refugees to return to their homes.
Mid-October 1948: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF; replacing Haganah) 
launch Operation Ten Plagues against Egyptian troops holding Gaza.
October 1948–February 1949: 4,000 Egyptian troops (including 
the battalion in which Gamal Abd al-Nasser was a staff offi cer) are 
surrounded by the IDF in the “Faluja pocket” but manage to hold out until 
the armistice.
Timeline  xvii
11 December 1948: UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), based 
largely on Bernadotte’s recommendations, is passed. Paragraph 11 calls 
for the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and for the 
establishment of the UN Conciliation Commission (UNCCP).
January 1949: Under an agreement with the United Nations, the American 
Friends Service Committee (AFSC, also known as the Quakers) assumes 
responsibility for relief operations in the Gaza Strip.
24 February 1949: An Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement is signed at 
Rhodes; Article IV places the “Gaza Strip,” a small part of the Gaza district 
(1.3 percent of Palestine) held by Egyptian forces at the end of the war, 
under Egyptian military and administrative rule.
August 1949: The Clapp Commission (the Economic Survey Mission) 
of the UNCCP is formed to tour the Arab countries (including Egypt) to 
investigate ways to alleviate refugee suffering.
September 1949: Some 7,000 Palestinian refugees still remaining in 
Qantara Sharq camp in Sinai are transferred to the Maghazi camp in the 
Gaza Strip.
December 1949: The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 
is created on the recommendation of the Clapp Commission; it takes over 
responsibility for Gaza refugees from the AFSC in mid-1950.
December 1950: The United Nations establishes the Offi ce of the High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), mandated to represent refugees 
with state governments to assure their protection.
July 1951: The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the most 
comprehensive document on refugee rights, is adopted by the United 
Nations in Geneva. Palestinian refugees are implicitly excluded from its 
purview under Article 1D.
1952: The League of Arab States, based in Cairo, establishes the 
Administrative Offi ce of Palestine.
23 July 1952: The Free Offi cers, led by Gamal Abd al-Nasser, overthrow 
the Egyptian monarchy in the July Revolution. General Muhammad Naguib 
becomes the fi gurehead president of the Egyptian republic.
September 1952: Yasir Arafat is elected president of the Palestinian 
Student Union (PSU) in Cairo, the only Palestinian organization at the time 
having free elections. Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) is elected vice president.
23 February 1954: President Naguib is forced to resign; Gamal Abd al-
Nasser becomes president of Egypt.
1954: Nasser opens Egyptian universities to qualifi ed Palestinian students 
tuition-free; relaxes restrictions on Palestinian ownership of businesses in 
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Egypt; passes regulations allowing licensed Palestinian refugee doctors, 
dentists, veterinarians, and midwives to practice in Egypt; and loosens 
restrictions to allow some Gazans to work as teachers in Egypt. These are 
the fi rst measures relaxing the Egyptian ban on Palestinian employment.
28 February 1955: An Israeli raid on Egyptian military posts in Gaza 
kills thirty-nine Egyptian troops, marking a turning point in Egyptian 
foreign policy and the beginning of Nasser’s focus on the wider Arab-
Israeli confl ict. Mustafa Hafi z commando units in the Strip are authorized 
to conduct cross-border raids into Israel.
September 1955: Egypt concludes the “Czech arms deal,” alarming 
Western powers and Israel.
26 July 1956: Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal Company, in which 
France had been the majority shareholder.
29 October–2 November 1956: The Suez war begins with the tripartite 
(Britain, France, and Israel) invasion of Egypt; Israel occupies the Sinai 
Peninsula and Gaza Strip.
February–March 1957: Israel withdraws fi rst from the Sinai Peninsula 
and fi nally from the Gaza Strip under strong U.S. pressure.
September 1958: Egypt and Syria form the United Arab Republic (UAR). 
The union is seen as the fi rst step toward wider Arab unity and the 
liberation of Palestine.
1959: The General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS), a diaspora-wide 
Palestinian organization whose nucleus was the PSU (led by Arafat and 
Khalaf from 1952 to 1957), is established in Cairo with Nasser’s support. 
The GUPS becomes part of the PLO in 1969.
Fatah is established as a secret organization in Kuwait by Yasir Arafat, 
Salah Khalaf, and others.
The Egyptian Foreign Ministry orders that Palestinians in Egypt be given 
access to jobs.
February 1961: Syria secedes from the union with Egypt; Egypt retains 
the name UAR (until the Sadat period).
March 1962: Law 66 permits the recruitment of Palestinians in the 
Egyptian public sector and government bodies and treating them on equal 
footing with Egyptian nationals. This law is considered the beginning of 
the “Golden Era” for Palestinians in Egypt.
1963: The diaspora-wide General Union of Palestinian Workers (GUPW) 
is established in Helwan, Egypt, becoming part of the newly created PLO 
in 1965. Also in 1963, the Palestinian Women’s League is established in 
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Cairo and is absorbed into the PLO’s General Union of Palestinian Women 
(GUPWom) in 1965.
January 1964: The Arab League Summit in Cairo, acting at the behest 
of Nasser, charges Palestinian diplomat Ahmad Shuqayri with initiating 
contacts aimed at establishing a Palestinian entity.
2 June 1964: The fi rst Palestine National Council meeting in (East) 
Jerusalem formally proclaims the establishment of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) under the auspices of the Arab League and Nasser’s 
patronage. In the months that follow, Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) 
units are established in Syria, Jordan, and Gaza (‘Ayn Jalut Brigade).
11 September 1965: The Arab League adopts the Casablanca Protocol 
on the treatment of Palestinian refugees in the Arab host countries. Egypt 
(along with Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, North Yemen, Sudan, and Syria) ratifi es 
the protocol without reservation.
5 June 1967: Israel launches a surprise attack fi rst on Egypt and then on 
Jordan and Syria, occupying the remaining Palestinian territories (Gaza 
Strip and West Bank), Syria’s Golan Heights, and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. 
Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians are displaced. Several thousand 
Palestinian fi ghters are captured by the IDF (along with Egyptian forces) 
and deported to Egypt as part of the second major infl ux of Palestinians 
into the country.
The massive defeat of the Arab armies discredits Arab nationalism and 
spurs the popularity of Palestinian guerrilla organizations, especially 
Fatah.
November 1967: Nasser meets with Fatah leaders in Cairo and begins 
supplying the movement with training facilities and arms.
December 1967: Shuqayri is ousted as head of the PLO and an interim 
leadership is established.
February 1969: Arafat becomes chairman of PLO, which is now 
dominated by the Palestinian guerrilla organizations led by Fatah.
November 1969: Nasser brokers the “Cairo agreement” between Yasir 
Arafat and the Lebanese army, legitimizing the Palestinian fedayeen’s 
foothold in Lebanon.
July 1970: Nasser accepts the second Rogers plan for an Israeli-
Arab settlement based on the implementation of UN Security Council 
242 (rejected by the Palestinians), prompting massive anti-Nasser 
demonstrations in Jordan and elsewhere. Nasser closes down PLO and 
Fatah radio stations broadcasting from Cairo.
September 1970: Civil war (“Black September”) between the Palestinian 
guerrilla organizations and the Hashemite forces breaks out in Amman. 
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The confrontation ends with the expulsion of the fedayeen from Jordan 
in July 1971.
28 September 1970: Nasser dies of a heart attack after negotiating a 
truce between Arafat and Jordan’s King Hussein. Vice President Anwar 
Sadat succeeds him as Egypt’s president.
January 1972: GUPS joins student demonstrations protesting the no-
war, no-peace stalemate of President Sadat, who singles out Palestinians 
for censure.
6 October 1973: Egypt and Syria launch a war against Israel to recapture 
their territories occupied in 1967; the PLO’s ‘Ayn Jalut Brigade participates 
under Egyptian command.
28 October 1974: At the Arab League Summit in Rabat, Morocco, Egypt 
co-sponsors a resolution recognizing the PLO as the sole, legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people.
September 1974: Egypt and Israel conclude the “Sinai I” disengagement 
agreement brokered by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
March 1975: Civil war breaks out in Lebanon, with heavy involvement of 
PLO fi ghters.
September 1975: Egypt and Israel conclude the Sinai II disengagement 
agreement, effectively removing Egypt from the Arab-Israeli confl ict. 
Palestinian students of GUPS hold protest demonstrations; many are 
deported.
19 November 1977: Egyptian president Anwar Sadat visits Jerusalem 
and addresses the Israeli Knesset, launching a peace plan and exacerbating 
tensions with the PLO. In Cairo, widespread student demonstrations are 
held to protest the government’s moves; the PLO-affi liated GUPS is closed 
permanently. Sadat launches the “Egypt First” slogan.
December 1977: The PLO joins the anti-Egyptian “Steadfastness and 
Confrontation Front” with Syria, Algeria, Libya, and South Yemen at the 
Arab summit in Tripoli.
18 February 1978: Egyptian Minister of Culture Yusif al-Siba‘i is 
assassinated in Cyprus by the renegade Palestinian Abu Nidal faction; 
Egypt launches an anti-Palestinian media campaign and new laws affecting 
Palestinians.
Spring 1978: Laws 47 and 48 annul all regulations treating Palestinians on 
a par with Egyptian nationals. Palestinian access to public sector jobs and 
to free public education at all levels ends. Severe restrictions on private 
sector employment follow.
Timeline  xxi
17 September 1978: Israel and Egypt sign the Camp David framework 
for peace.
17 March 1979: Israel and Egypt sign a peace treaty. The PLO “freezes” 
relations with Egypt; all PLO offi ces and affi liates are closed except the 
Labor Union and two offi ces handling routine business.
6 October 1981: President Sadat is assassinated by Egyptian Islamists in 
Cairo; Husni Mubarak assumes the presidency. Egypt’s Emergency Law, 
in force intermittently since 1958, is reimposed and remains in force to 
this day.
1981: Egypt ratifi es the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, with reservations concerning a number of articles that 
effectively absolve it from obligations concerning the rights to residency, 
education, work, and public assistance to refugees within its borders.
6 June 1982: Israel invades and occupies Lebanon up to and including 
Beirut; Beirut is under siege throughout the summer, provoking outrage in 
Egypt. The events in Lebanon lead to a PLO-Egyptian thaw.
September 1982: PLO/PLA forces are expelled from Beirut under a deal 
brokered by the United States to end the siege of Beirut; some Palestinian 
fi ghters return to Egypt. Lebanon’s president-elect is assassinated days 
after the PLO departure, triggering massacres of Palestinian civilians in 
Beirut’s Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by Christian rightist militias 
under Israeli watch.
Late 1982: The headquarters of the Palestine Red Crescent Society is 
transferred from Lebanon to the Cairo suburb of Heliopolis; construction 
of the Palestine Hospital begins.
December 1983: The PLO-Egyptian thaw is consecrated by a meeting 
between Arafat and Mubarak.
Summer 1985: Law 104 bars foreign (including Palestinian) ownership of 
agricultural properties or fertile lands in Egypt.
December 1987: The fi rst intifada breaks out in the Israeli-occupied Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank.
2 August 1990: Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces occupy Kuwait. In the 
ensuing crisis, the PLO makes statements in support of Iraq; the Gulf states 
cut off funding to the PLO, precipitating a fi nancial crisis. The PLO budget 
in Egypt is slashed, and activities and welfare programs are reduced.
February 1991: A U.S.-led coalition that includes Egypt launches the 
Gulf war, ousting Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinians are expelled from Kuwait and other Gulf states. Some holders 
of Egyptian travel documents return to Egypt, but tens of thousands of 
others are stranded.
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12 September 1991: An amendment to a resolution passed at the 46th 
Session of the Arab League Conference of Supervisors of Palestinian Affairs 
held in August allows member states to observe the 1965 Casablanca 
Protocol in accordance with their national laws.
30 October–1 November 1991: The Madrid Conference, aimed at 
achieving Arab-Israeli peace, is launched. Palestinians from inside the 
occupied territories (under the unoffi cial direction of the PLO) begin 
negotiations with Israel.
1992: In a move related to the ongoing peace negotiations, Egyptian 
Ministerial Decision No. 24/722/92 reduces university fees paid by the 
children of PLO and Palestinian public sector employees to 10 percent of 
the full amount.
January 1993: Direct secret negotiations between the PLO and Israel 
begin in Oslo.
13 September 1993: The Oslo Declaration of Principles between the 
PLO and Israel is signed in Washington, DC.
May 1994: The PLO and Israel sign the Gaza-Jericho agreement, which 
formally establishes the “Palestinian Authority” in the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho (in the West Bank). The jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority is 
later expanded under subsequent agreements.
1995: The Palestine National Fund shifts its focus to state-building. 
The PLO budget in Egypt is further reduced; the Palestine Red Crescent 
Society and a number of health facilities are transferred from Egypt to 
Gaza. Thousands of Palestinians, mainly with PLO connections, begin to 
relocate to Gaza.
September 1995: Libyan president Muammar Qadhafi  calls on Arab 
states to expel Palestinian residents to areas under PA control; expels 
1,000 Palestinian holders of Egyptian travel documents to no-man’s land 
on Libyan-Egyptian border. Stalemate lasts until 1997.
28 September 2000: The second intifada breaks out in the occupied 
territories.
October 2002: The UNHCR issues a “Note on the Applicability of Article 
1D of the 1951 Convention on Refugees” in an effort to clarify circumstances 
under which Palestinians can be eligible for UNHCR coverage.
July 2004: The Egyptian National Assembly passes Law 154 amending 
Egypt’s 1975 Nationality Law. The revised law allows Egyptian women 
married to foreigners to pass their citizenship on to their children, 
automatically for those born after the law’s adoption and upon formal 
application for those born before. With regard to Palestinians, the law has 
been implemented only for children born after 2004; under an unwritten 
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policy, the great majority of applications fi led on behalf of persons born 
to Egyptian mothers and Palestinian fathers before 2004 have been 
rejected.




































































































































































































































The interviews were conducted in the shaded governorates 
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Although much has been written about Palestinian refugees in general, the origins and history of the Palestinian refugee problem, and the conditions of Palestinians living in what is 
known as the Arab “host countries,” little has been written about the 
Palestinians in Egypt. This is perhaps not surprising: Egypt never 
hosted anything like the huge infl ux of refugees that poured into 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, or the Gaza Strip during the 
1948 war. The Palestinians who entered Egypt in 1948 probably did 
not exceed 13,000, many of whom did not remain, and a similarly 
small number entered in 1967 from Gaza. The community today 
remains small, probably not more than 75,000 persons dispersed 
among 15 of Egypt’s 27 governorates.
Furthermore, the Palestinians of Egypt were never served by 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), a body 
that has become virtually synonymous with Palestinian refugees. 
They do not live in camps and have not been a subject of study 
by social researchers. Finally, the scholarly attention paid to the 
political relationship between Nasser’s Egypt and the Palestine 
issue overall completely overshadowed the social and economic 
conditions of the small community of Palestinians actually living 
in the country.
Yet a study of the Palestinian community in Egypt not only fi lls 
a gap in the literature on the Palestinian refugees, it also provides 
insights into the survival strategies of a vulnerable group in a host 
country that itself faces daunting poverty, overpopulation, and 
enormous pressures on scarce employment opportunities and 
resources—in other words, a host population scarcely better off 
than the refugees. The difference, of course, is that although the 
Egyptian hosts are citizens with all the rights available to citizens, 
even those Palestinians who were born in Egypt and have spent all 
their lives there face tight restrictions on their access to education, 
to work, to own land or property, to benefi t from government 
services, and to secure residency.
This was not always the case. From the late 1950s up to the late 
1970s, the community enjoyed a special legal status whereby its 
members were treated like Egyptian nationals in most domains. 
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These privileges were abruptly canceled in 1978, following the 
assassination in Cyprus of a close associate of Egyptian president 
Anwar Sadat by a renegade Palestinian faction. Although the 
assassination was the trigger, however, the sudden policy change 
in fact had more to do with the peace process that was unfolding 
at the time between Egypt and Israel. At all events, the Palestinians 
in Egypt were overnight subjected to all the restrictions applicable 
to foreigners, and from then on Egypt’s pledges under Arab League 
protocols to protect Palestinian rights have been largely ignored. 
Thus, with the community not covered by any international agency, 
the Palestinians in Egypt have been left virtually unprotected.
The Arabic word for stranger is “gharib,” from which is derived 
the word “ghurba,” meaning exile, a place where one is made to feel 
a stranger. Since the tightening of regulations and the curtailment 
of their rights, Palestinians in Egypt are acutely aware of living in 
the “ghurba,” a key concept that underpins this entire project. 
Refugees, Displaced Persons, and Migrants
This study was carried out under the auspices of the Forced 
Migration and Refugee Studies (FMRS) Program at the American 
University in Cairo (AUC), with funding from the International 
Development Research Centre—Canada (IDRC). The FMRS 
Program has also analyzed the livelihoods of other refugee 
groups in Egypt, such as Sudanese and Somalis. These projects, 
like this one on Palestinian refugees, explore social networks, 
grassroots associations, legal protection, income generation, and 
all aspects of coping strategies refugees have adopted in Egypt. 
With such research, FMRS hopes to have an impact on improving 
the refugee policies of government agencies and nongovernmental 
organizations while the refugees await the day they can return to 
their homelands.
Most refugee groups in Egypt are entitled to seek protection 
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), which the Egyptian government has charged with the 
task of determining the refugee status of asylum seekers under 
a 1959 bilateral agreement. Political and economic defi nitions 
and categories are important for such purposes, as well as in 
international law. For the Palestinians in Egypt, who, as mentioned, 
are not covered by any UN agency, and who are unlikely to be part 
of any refugee negotiations that may eventually be held between 
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the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority (PA), such 
categories have little practical relevance.1
Nevertheless, the majority of the Palestinian refugees living in 
Egypt would qualify as “refugees” under the defi nition devised by 
UNRWA for the purpose of determining eligibility for its assistance 
programs.2 According to UNRWA, Palestinian refugees and their 
descendants “shall mean any person whose normal place of 
residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 
1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result 
of the 1948 confl ict.”3 This defi nition obviously applies to the 
Palestinians who entered Egypt in 1948 and remained there; it also 
applies to most of those who entered in the wake of the 1967 war 
from the Gaza Strip, which had been under Egyptian administration 
since 1949. Indeed, the majority of the Palestinians who entered 
in 1967 were already registered with UNRWA, having been among 
some 200,000 refugees who had crowded into the Strip after fl eeing 
or being driven out of their homes during the 1948 war.
As a general rule, however, the hundreds of thousands of 
people who left or were pushed out of the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank in the 1967 war are not accorded an unqualifi ed “refugee” 
classifi cation. Rather, under established UN defi nitions, they 
fall into two groups: “refugees-displaced” and “displaced.”4 The 
“refugees-displaced” are those who had been forced to fl ee twice—
the fi rst time in 1948 to Gaza or the West Bank, and the second 
time in 1967 to neighboring countries. The “displaced,” on the 
other hand, are original inhabitants of these territories uprooted 
for the fi rst time by the 1967 war. Initially, “displaced persons” did 
not qualify for UNRWA assistance, but because of the magnitude 
of the humanitarian crisis following the 1967 war, the UN General 
Assembly expanded the defi nition of eligibility for UNRWA relief 
to include “other persons in the area [served by UNRWA] who 
are at present displaced and are in serious need of immediate 
assistance as a result of the recent hostilities.”5 Because UNRWA 
did not operate in Egypt, however, neither the already-registered 
“refugees-displaced” nor the “displaced persons” entering the 
country were eligible to receive the assistance they would have 
received elsewhere.6
Finally, while the great majority of the Palestinians in Egypt 
came as a result of war (especially the 1948 and 1967 wars), 
thousands entered during the 1950s and 1960s who could be 
categorized as “socioeconomic migrants.” The Gaza Strip, which, 
as mentioned, was administered by Egypt following the 1949 
4 Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948
Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement, suffered daunting economic 
problems and unemployment under the strain of a refugee infl ux 
that outnumbered the indigenous population almost three to one. 
Starting from the late 1950s, Egyptian president Gamal Abd al-
Nasser, in an attempt to alleviate the hardship conditions, began 
calling on Palestinians from Gaza with high school diplomas or 
college degrees to apply for work in Egypt’s public sector, relaxing 
government regulations accordingly. Meanwhile, Nasser also 
opened Egyptian universities to qualifying Palestinian students 
on an unprecedented scale, and large numbers of Gazans took 
advantage of the opportunity. When the 1967 war broke out and 
Israel occupied the Gaza Strip, an unknown but signifi cant number 
of students, teachers, employees in various Egyptian government 
departments, and small businessmen and traders were unable to 
return to Gaza and remained in Egypt permanently.
Project Aims
The primary research data on which this monograph is based 
derive from in-depth interviews with Palestinian families and 
individuals in rural and urban areas of Egypt. These interviews 
focus in particular on the multiple survival strategies they 
deployed to secure or renew legal residency, obtain an education 
or vocational skills, fi nd employment, hold on to property that 
had been acquired before land ownership by Palestinians in Egypt 
was prohibited, and in general to support themselves in adverse 
socioeconomic conditions and the increasing legal constraints 
after 1978. These strategies encompassed reliance on social and 
family networks, partnerships, and close relations with the host 
community, including intermarriage, as well as a range of specifi c 
tactics and stratagems. Field research foregrounded conditions 
prevailing at the time, but the interviews revealed information 
from across time, shedding light on how the Palestinians arrived 
in Egypt, what determined where they settled, the impact of shifts 
in government policies, and the fallout of larger regional and local 
events and how that fallout affected their lives and relationships.
The study as conceived therefore had two broad aims. The 
fi rst was to provide a window on how Palestinians mobilized 
their tangible and intangible assets to pursue income-generating 
opportunities, secure education and services, and generally plan 
for the future. The second was to provide a sense of the shape of 
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the community, its broad history, and the general setting in terms 
of host country policies, laws, and public attitudes.
Whereas the ultimate aim of the interviews was to convey a 
cross-section of the community, it was my conscious decision 
to focus on the “hidden Palestinians”—the poor and vulnerable 
segment that struggles to get by, eking out a living, scrambling for 
residencies and schooling. Contrary to a widespread myth in Egypt 
that the Palestinian community is wealthy,7 the great majority of the 
community is in fact poor and highly vulnerable. Though offi cial 
data are not available, a study dating to 1997 put forward estimates 
that are consistent with anecdotal evidence and our own research 
fi ndings: 78 percent of the community was estimated to be living 
under the poverty line, 18 percent was classifi ed as having average 
salaries, and 4 percent was seen as wealthy.8 The vast majority of 
the Palestinians in Egypt are found among the lower-middle, lower, 
and poorest classes.
A few general defi nitions are in order. Livelihood in this study 
refers to the means, activities, entitlements, and assets used 
to make a living. Assets in this context are natural and physical 
(housing and/or land tenure, common property resources, schools, 
health clinics), social (community, family, social networks), 
political (participation in civil society, associations, and community 
organizations), human (e.g., education, labor, health, skills), 
or economic/fi nancial (e.g., jobs, savings, regular remittances, 
pensions).9 In examining the livelihoods of a population, especially 
a refugee population, vulnerability is a key consideration. Assessing 
vulnerability requires identifying the various resources (physical, 
economic, and social) needed to maintain the adequate provision 
of shelter, health, education, social services, and legal protection. 
With such a baseline, the impact of changes in resources, economic 
performance, and socio-political conditions can be assessed.10
Looking at the coping strategies and networks on which the 
Palestinians relied to “reconstruct” their lives in the ghurba, I 
consider livelihoods and vulnerabilities from the viewpoint of the 
Palestinians themselves. Rather than reducing refugees to mere 
victims of political circumstances and an economic burden, I see 
them as dynamic agents capable of making a real contribution to 
the host society if the legal framework allows them to do so, and 
of fending for themselves and generating their own resources even 
if it does not.
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Research Methodology
The research for this project was conducted over two years, 
from 2001 to 2003. (Details about the research methodology are 
provided in Appendix 1.) Published material on the Palestinians 
in Egypt is limited to a relatively small number of articles, 
monographs, and chapters of books, many of which are several 
decades old. The present monograph used the available published 
resources as well as archived articles from the Egyptian press. For 
the general context, literature on the Palestinian exodus, Arab host 
state policies relating to the Palestinians, Arab League positions on 
the issue, and Palestinian status under international refugee law 
was reviewed in libraries in Jordan, Egypt, and Britain. Egyptian 
government administrative and legislative regulations relating to 
Palestinians in the Jaridah Rasmiyyah (Offi cial Gazette) were 
also collected and reviewed.
Finding authoritative statistical data on the Palestinians in 
Egypt was far more diffi cult. While in the case of the Sudanese 
and Somali refugees in Egypt, at least partial population data 
exist with the UNHCR, no reliable statistics can be found for 
the Palestinians. The Egyptian government either does not have 
records on Palestinians, as some offi cials have claimed, or (what is 
more likely) it considers the disclosure of such data to impinge on 
state security. Off the record, I was told by offi cials in the Foreign 
Ministry that there were approximately 70,000 Palestinians in Egypt 
in 2000; the population had been larger several years earlier, but 
tens of thousands of Palestinians, mainly associated with the PLO, 
left for Gaza after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 
1994. Indicative of the imprecision concerning population data, the 
World Refugee Survey 2002 Country Report of the U.S. Committee 
for Refugees stated that the Palestinian population in Egypt “was 
believed to number 50,000 or more persons at the end of 2001, 
with some estimates placing the number as high as 70,000.”11 The 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the number to 
be 57,000 for the same year.12
Given the dearth of reliable population data, which ruled out 
statistical sampling and quantitative data collection, the project 
was designed as a qualitative study based on the interviews. 
Preparatory work involved the identifi cation of the areas and 
governorates where signifi cant numbers of Palestinians live, the 
selection and training of research assistants, and the design and 
testing of an open-ended questionnaire to serve as a guide for 
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conducting the interviews. As the principal researcher, I visited—
sometimes with a member of the research team—various regions 
where Palestinians were known to live in order to map out an 
interviewing strategy. I also conducted pilot interviews, mainly in 
the Cairo area. In light of the pilot interviews, the questionnaire 
was reviewed and some adjustments were made.
It bears mention that locating Palestinians outside Cairo, where 
certain quarters are known to have Palestinian residents, is not 
always easy. The fact that they are not registered with UNHCR 
and are not served by any of the faith-based or other humanitarian 
groups assisting other refugee groups in Egypt complicates the 
task. Palestinians are dispersed among most of Egypt’s northern 
governorates (see Map 2). Only very rarely does one fi nd a largely 
Palestinian village or neighborhood. Palestinians are mostly 
scattered in small towns or in mixed urban neighborhoods. 
They are intermingled with middle-class and poor Egyptians, in 
‘ashwa’iyyat (unregulated urban settlements, built without proper 
permits), and even in prosperous residential quarters. Finding 
them is made more diffi cult by the fact that they are often virtually 
indistinguishable physically and culturally from Egyptians, and 
most have adopted the Egyptian dialect. Generally, our research 
team located Palestinians by word of mouth. After fi nding the fi rst 
Palestinian household in an area, we used a snowball method to 
locate other households in the vicinity.
Project Redirection by Force Majeure
Conducting fi eld research on any refugee or minority population 
in Egypt is politically sensitive, but this is particularly so in the case 
of the Palestinians. Palestine and Palestinians remain volatile and 
high-profi le issues, arousing passions and fi erce debate to this day. 
Egypt’s long and intense political engagement with the Palestine 
problem and the PLO, and its ongoing mediating role between the 
Palestinians and Israel, make the topic even more sensitive, with 
justifi able concerns that data could be politicized or used in ways 
that could confl ict with Egypt’s national interests. Emergency 
laws are still in force in Egypt, requiring security clearance for all 
social research. Even with such clearance, fears and insecurities 
can lead to suspicions, even when the fi eld research is conducted 
completely in the open.13
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In May 2002, the team—consisting of fi ve research assistants 
and myself—began our visits and interviews in Palestinian 
households. Working in pairs, we conducted one-on-one, face-
to-face interviews with as many members of each household as 
was possible, using as a guide the above-mentioned open-ended 
questionnaire (Appendix 2). Our plan envisaged that the process 
would continue until mid-December, by which time we hoped to 
have covered 15 of Egypt’s 27 governorates and to have conducted 
interviews in some 300 households.
In mid-July, however, after only two and a half months of 
interviews, our fi eld work was abruptly halted for “security 
reasons,” in spite of the fact that we had obtained all the necessary 
documentation and clearance and had in no way strayed beyond 
the limits of the study. By the time the team was stopped, we had 
visited 80 households and interviewed 401 persons, mainly in the 
governorates of Cairo, Qalyubiyyah, and Sharqiyyah, with a small 
number in Port Said, Isma‘iliyyah, and Northern Sinai.14
The premature interruption of the fi eld research, which left us 
with less than a third of our intended sample, raised a number of 
problems. The sample could no longer be regarded as representative: 
No members of the tiny wealthy segment of the population had 
been interviewed, and the middle class was underrepresented. 
Most of the interviews we conducted had been with the struggling 
segment of the community. Even though, as already noted, this 
group represents the majority of the Palestinians in Egypt, the 
smaller number of interviews meant that we had fewer examples, 
and therefore far less detail than we had anticipated, of the range 
of strategies and coping mechanisms employed.
These issues caused us to reconsider the presentation of the 
fi ndings. Certainly, the social networks and livelihood strategies 
of the Palestinians in Egypt still form the core of the monograph; 
its primary purpose remains to highlight the precariousness of the 
community in general and the struggle of individuals to navigate 
their lives within a shifting framework. However, it was decided 
to expand the historical setting and overall context beyond what 
we had initially envisaged, and beyond what is normally required 
or expected in a social science project of similar scope. This 
made particular sense given the fact that little has been written 
about the Palestinian community in Egypt as a whole in recent 
years. No additional on-site research into regulations and relevant 
conditions was possible in light of the decisions and rulings taken 
by the security apparatus,15 but the original material has been 
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supplemented through an array of secondary sources. All of the 
chapters are illustrated, where relevant, with material from our 
interviews.
It should be emphasized that while the historical and background 
sections have been expanded, this monograph by no means 
pretends to be a history of the Palestinian community in Egypt or 
of the Egyptian government’s Palestine policies or relations with 
the PLO. Neither is it a comprehensive survey of the changing 
laws and regulations that shaped their lives, or of their status 
under international refugee law. Still, I hope that the monograph 
succeeds in providing a broad, useful overview of the community, 
and that it perhaps (if only indirectly) may suggest areas worthy of 
further study.
 Finally, while recognizing that the interviews that form the core 
of the monograph are now more than fi ve years old, I am assured by 
my friends and colleagues in Egypt that the material is as relevant 
today as it was when it was collected. I very much wish that this 
were not the case.
Notes
1. The importance of refugee defi nitions for fi nal-status negotiations was 
demonstrated in 1993, when eligibility rules for registration with UNRWA were 
expanded. Initially, only persons in need of assistance could apply to UNRWA. 
The reformulation of the rules allowed previously unregistered persons who had 
left Palestine during the requisite time period to apply for refugee status. This 
constituted an acknowledgment of the political implications of refugee status for 
the right of return in eventual fi nal-status negotiations. The amended rules applied 
only to Palestinians residing in areas served by UNRWA, and therefore did not 
apply to Palestinian refugees in Egypt or elsewhere. See Lex Takkenberg, The
Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998).
2. UNRWA’s fi ve areas of fi eld operations are Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West 
Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The West Bank having been annexed by Jordan in 1950, 
the two areas were both served by UNRWA’s Jerusalem Offi ce. The exclusion of 
the Palestinian community in Egypt from its mandate is discussed in chapter 2. 
3. UN document, Consolidated Eligibility Instructions, document Rev. 7/83, 
January 1984, quoted in Elia Zureik, Palestinian Refugees and the Peace Process
(Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996), p. 9. 
4. Population displacement is defi ned as the process of collective dislocation 
and/or settlement of people away from their normal habitat by a more powerful 
force; see Seteney Shami, “The Social Implications of Population Displacement 
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and Resettlement: An Overview with a Focus on the Arab Middle East,” 
International Migration Review 27, no. 101 (1993), pp. 4–33.
5. UN General Assembly Resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967. It should be 
noted, however, that although UNRWA expanded its assistance to those displaced 
by the 1967 war, it never changed its working defi nition of a Palestine refugee.
6. Between 1982, when Israel completed its withdrawal from the Sinai 
Peninsula, and 2000, UNRWA provided “hardship assistance” to up to 4,500 
Palestinian residents of “Canada Camp,” established by Israel on the Egyptian 
side of the border with Gaza in the early 1970s.  The last of these refugees were 
transferred to Gaza in 2000. The Canada Camp is not dealt with in this study, but 
for a brief background of how it came about, see Appendix 1 under the section 
“Locating Palestinians—Northern Sinai.”
7. According to a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Country 
Report for Egypt in 2004, “Egyptians say there are many rich Palestinians. There 
may be a few rich Palestinians, but much of this is myth” (http://hdr.undp.org/
en/reports/nationalreports/arabstates/egypt/name,3282,en.html). This myth was 
propagated by the Egyptian press at times of political tension, sometimes at the 
clear instigation of the government.
8. Quoted in al-Ahram Hebdo, 22 October 1997.
9. See http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/hdi/.
10. André Le Sage and Nisar Majid, “The Livelihoods Gap: Responding to 
the Economic Dynamics of Vulnerability in Somalia,” Disasters: The Journal of 
Disaster Studies, Policy and Management 26, no. 1 (2002), pp. 14–15.
11. See www.refugees.org/countryreports.
12. See www.pcbs.gov.ps. 
13. Emergency Law 162 of 1958. The law gives the authorities extensive 
powers to suspend basic liberties. Authorities can arrest suspects at will and 
detain them without trial for prolonged periods; refer civilians to military or state 
security courts whose procedures fall far short of international standards for fair 
trials; and prohibit strikes, demonstrations, and public meetings.
14. Twenty-six households were visited in the Cairo Governorate (the 
neighborhoods of ‘Ayn Shams, Dar al-Salam, Wailey, Madinat al-Salam, Faysal), 
44 in Qalyubiyyah and Sharqiyyah, and 5 in Port Said, Isma‘iliyyah, and Northern 
Sinai.
15. I was allowed to remain in Egypt until the end of my contract with AUC, 




The Palestinian presence in Egypt is largely the product of trauma and war, expulsion and dispossession. Apart from those who arrived in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
and the several thousands who entered during the 1950s and 1960s 
as part of President Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s efforts to alleviate the 
dire economic situation of the Gaza Strip (then under Egyptian 
administration), those who came to Egypt from Palestine did not 
come seeking a better life. Rather, they came as refugees fl eeing 
their country in 1948 in boats, or on foot or camelback across the 
desert, or as part of the wave pushed into Egypt in the wake of 
the 1967 war, often as captives trucked to the border by Israeli 
troops.
This fi rst chapter focuses on the successive waves of Palestinian 
refugees1 and the political context of each. It also sets out the 
political situation of Gaza from 1948 to 1967, which had a crucial 
impact both on Egyptian policy and on the nature of the infl ux 
following the 1967 war. Particular attention will be paid to the 1948 
war and its background, not only because the war triggered the 
fi rst large wave of refugees, but especially because it constitutes 
the defi ning event of the entire Palestinian experience.
Before the Nakba
Palestine and Egypt, although separated by desert, have been 
linked by millennial trade routes, shared history, and culture. 
Palestine historically served as Egypt’s gateway to the Arab 
East, and at various times it fell within Egypt’s political sphere of 
infl uence. In the late 19th century, when Egypt was experiencing an 
economic boom fueled by the cotton trade, the opening of the Suez 
Canal, and other factors, Shawam (inhabitants of Bilad al-Sham,
the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, including present-day 
Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine) gravitated to Egypt to seek their 
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fortunes. In 1927, some 8,000 Shawam, many of them Palestinians, 
were living in Egypt and engaged in commerce2; a number of these 
had their own businesses. Meanwhile, the Palestine railway system, 
which had been linked to Egyptian cities in the fi rst decades of the 
20th century, facilitated still further travel and trade between the 
two countries.
Although some earlier migrants to Egypt were well-off and 
indeed did make their fortunes there, many had only modest 
economic means:
My father-in-law worked in the railway station. He often 
traveled to Suez City, where he married an Egyptian. When 
the war started in 1948, he went with his wife to stay with her 
family in Egypt. (P14, ‘Ayn Shams, 1 June 2002)
A considerable number of Egyptians also lived in Palestine, 
particularly the Jaffa region. The commercial back and forth 
served to strengthen social networks linking the two peoples. In 
the northern and eastern parts of Egypt, intermarriage between 
Palestinians and Egyptians had been common since the beginning 
of the 20th century:
My grandparents [mother’s side], who are Egyptian, lived in 
Bataynah Sharqiyyah, near Jaffa, in Palestine. My grandfather 
was a camel trader and worked between Jaffa and Sharqiyyah 
[Egypt]. When the war broke out, the Jews invaded their house 
and attacked them. They fl ed on foot along with many others 
in a mass exodus toward Gaza. (7/30, Bilbays, July 2002)
Beyond economic and family ties as factors in pre-1948 
Palestinian emigration to Egypt, politics began to intrude after 
World War I and the Ottoman defeat, when Great Britain assumed 
the Mandate over Palestine. Given Britain’s imposition on Palestine 
of its Jewish National Home policy, which facilitated Jewish 
immigration and land transfers to Jews, tensions were inevitable. 
The most important outbreak of violence in the early years of the 
Mandate was the 1929 Buraq Rebellion (“the Wailing Wall incident”), 
when Zionist demonstrations at the Western Wall of the al-Aqsa 
mosque triggered Arab rioting targeting Jewish communities, 
which spread well beyond Jerusalem. As a result of the clashes, 
during which 133 Jews and 116 Arabs were killed, a number of 
Palestinian families left for neighboring countries, including Egypt. 
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As soon as the fi ghting stopped, most returned to their homes. Far 
more serious was the 1936–39 Palestinian Arab rebellion against 
British rule, which began as a general strike protesting Britain’s 
pro-Zionist policies and demanding a representative government 
that refl ected the country’s overwhelming Arab majority. The 
turmoil during that period, and the brutal British suppression of 
the revolt, caused additional numbers of Palestinians, especially 
from the Hebron region, to seek refuge in Egypt.3 A number of 
these acquired Egyptian citizenship,4 but many others returned 
to Palestine. Egypt was also favored by a number of Palestinian 
political fi gures as a place of exile during and after the Mandate 
period.
The 1948 War and the First Wave of Refugees
Following World War II, tensions between the Arab and Jewish 
communities in Palestine mounted. Already in 1942, the Zionist 
movement had approved the Biltmore program, which openly 
declared the establishment of a Jewish state in all Palestine 
as the Zionist goal. As soon as the war ended, Zionist groups 
launched a major campaign of violence against the British aimed 
at forcing them to lift the restrictions on Jewish immigration into 
Palestine imposed by the 1939 White Paper.5 Unable to resolve 
the contradiction between its promises to the Jewish minority 
under its Jewish National Home policy and its obligations to 
the Arab majority, Britain in February 1947 decided to refer the 
Palestine problem to the United Nations and to end its Mandate 
over Palestine. The result was that on 27 November 1947, the UN 
General Assembly passed a resolution recommending the partition 
of Palestine into two states, a Jewish state comprising 55.5 percent 
of the country (including almost all the rich coastal area) and a 
Palestinian state on the remainder, at a time when Jews constituted 
less than a third of the population and owned less than 7 percent 
of the land.6
In light of the demographic and land ownership realities, the 
Zionists had long recognized that a Jewish state could not be 
secured without force of arms. Thus, starting from the late 1930s, 
the Haganah, the fi ghting force of the Yishuv (the Jewish community 
in Palestine), was built up, trained, and armed. As soon as World 
War II ended, a massive arms acquisition program was launched.7
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With the passage of the UN partition resolution, the outbreak of 
war between Jews and Arabs was just a matter of time.8
Almost immediately after news of the UN partition resolution 
spread, skirmishes broke out between the Haganah and Arab 
irregular forces and volunteers. A number of Palestinians, 
especially those with economic resources and family or other ties in 
neighboring countries, began to leave the country until the situation 
clarifi ed. As had been the case for those who left in 1936–39, they 
viewed their exile as temporary and fully expected to return. This 
fi rst “exodus” of mainly upper and middle-class Palestinians from 
the cities took place between December 1947 and March 1948, and 
is estimated at approximately 75,000 people.9
A number of these Palestinians went to Egypt, mainly to 
Alexandria or Cairo, renting hotel rooms or apartments or staying 
with relatives or friends. Hala Sakakini, the daughter of the well-
known Palestinian historian and educator Khalil Sakakini, wrote 
in her diary on 16 May 1948 that Heliopolis, the middle-class Cairo 
suburb where she was staying with her family, “has become a 
Palestinian colony. Every other house is occupied by a Palestinian 
family.”10 While this is certainly an exaggeration, there is no doubt 
that many Palestinians of means made their way to Egypt on their 
own before the fi rst big wave of refugees.
The Palestine war began in earnest in early April 1948, when 
the Haganah launched its massive Plan Dalet, a series of thirteen 
operations aimed at militarily securing the areas designated for 
the Jewish state. After the fall of the mixed Arab-Jewish city of 
Haifa on 22 April, the Jewish forces prepared to launch Operation 
Chametz (Operation “Passover Cleansing”) to conquer the villages 
surrounding Jaffa.11 On 25 April, the eve of the Haganah’s planned 
assault, the Zionist “dissident” group Irgun began a massive mortar 
assault on the city of Jaffa itself, triggering the fi rst important wave 
of Palestinian refugees into Egypt. According to Israeli historian 
Benny Morris, over 1,100 refugees arrived in Port Said from Jaffa 
and Haifa between 25 and 29 April, mostly in small steamers and 
fi shing boats, some in open row boats without sails.12 Another wave 
arrived in Port Said by boat between 2 and 8 May13 as the Haganah 
and Irgun tightened the siege of Jaffa, completely surrounding it 
by land, with only the sea route open for escape. When the city 
fi nally fell on 10 May, the remaining civilians fl ed, many to Egypt. 
In all, at least 3,000 Palestinians arrived in boats from Jaffa during 
April and May, disembarking in Port Said and Alexandria.14 Many 
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of the Palestinians in Egypt today are descendants of refugees 
from Jaffa.15
Many of those we interviewed mentioned the 1948 exodus, 
mostly in passing, within the context of where they settled or how 
they arrived in Egypt (see chapter 3). Others, however, dealt with 
the exodus more directly:
We are originally from Jaffa. My father used to own a fi sh 
market. [When the fi ghting started,] my father’s family fl ed to 
Gaza. There, they had a summer house overlooking the sea. 
When his family left, my father refused to leave and remained 
in Jaffa to fi ght with the other shabab [young men]. Their 
dignity prevented them from leaving. Some weeks later, when 
the shelling intensifi ed throughout the city, my father was 
forced to leave and joined his family. They left with a friend 
of the family and arrived in Fayid, Egypt. (7/26, Abu Hammad, 
10 July 2002)
Immediately following the withdrawal of the last British troops 
from Palestine and the offi cial end of the Mandate, Israel declared 
statehood on 14 May 1948. The next day, the regular armies of 
Transjordan, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt entered Palestine in an attempt 
to save what was left of the areas allotted to the Arabs under the 
UN partition plan. By that time, over 300,000 refugees had already 
fl ed or been driven out, and important areas earmarked for the 
Arab state by the United Nations had been seized, including (as 
already mentioned) Jaffa and the Arab villages of the Jerusalem 
corridor. The Haganah launched an assault on the Arab town of 
Acre, also allotted to the Arab state, on 14 May, and the town fell 
on 17 May.
Egypt, though woefully ill-prepared for war (the fi nal decision 
to enter had not been taken until 14 May16), initially sent only nine 
battalions (probably not more than 5,000 men) into Palestine. The 
main force was deployed up the Gaza coast as far north as Isdud, 
while a smaller, lighter force moved across the Negev through 
Beersheba and Hebron to Bethlehem. Suffering from long lines 
of communication across the Sinai desert, inadequate supplies, 
and poor central command,17the Egyptians fought bravely under 
the circumstances18 but were progressively dislodged from their 
positions as the Israeli forces turned in earnest to the southern 
front with the launch of Operation Ten Plagues in mid-October. 
As the Israelis advanced, thousands of refugees poured into the 
shrinking areas held by the Egyptians from the more than 40 
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villages occupied and destroyed by the Israeli forces in the Gaza 
district alone, as well as from the occupied villages of the adjacent 
Hebron and Ramla districts. The following testimony of a refugee 
from Yibna (also called Yubna) in the Ramla district gives a sense 
of how the refugees tried to keep one step ahead of the fi ghting:
We are originally from Yubna. When the 1948 war started, 
Yubna inhabitants, including my own family, fl ed to Isdud. We 
had to leave all of our belongings [and property], including 
wheat fi elds. We later arrived in Majdal and then Khan Yunis.19
As the fi ghting approached, we moved to another area. We 
bought camels and left Khan Yunis for Faqus [in Egypt], 
where my cousins were living. When crossing Sinai, people 
either walked or traveled on camels to Faqus and lived in 
tents. (7/35, Faqus, 14 July 2002)20
By the time the armistice agreements between Israel and the 
warring Arab states were signed in Rhodes during the fi rst half of 
1949, Israel was in possession of 78 percent of Palestine (compared 
to the 55.5 percent allotted by the UN partition plan). The great 
bulk of what was left in Arab hands was the West Bank, held by 
Transjordan, with a tiny band along the southern coast of Gaza 
held by Egypt. Into this minuscule territory, a mere 1.3 percent of 
Mandate Palestine, at least 200,000 refugees—over 25 percent of 
the total refugee population of the 1948 war—had crowded. The 
refugees thus vastly outnumbered the indigenous population of 
that area, estimated at some 75,000, most of whose agricultural 
lands had been seized by the Israeli forces and incorporated into 
the new state.21 This was the territory—now offi cially known as 
the Gaza Strip—that was placed under Egyptian administration in 
Article VI of the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement signed on 24 
February 1949.22
Under the terms of the armistice, the Egyptian force trapped 
in the “Faluja pocket,” which had withstood an Israeli siege for 
more than three months,23 was given safe conduct; a number of 
Palestinians who had fought alongside them in the enclave withdrew 
with them and were allowed to enter Egypt. Before the armistice, 
in the late stages of the war, other Palestinians had entered Egypt 
with retreating Egyptian forces.24 Notable among these were 
Palestinian fi ghters from Abdel-Qadar Husseini’s guerrilla force, 
al-Jaysh al-Muqaddas, who had been trapped with Egyptian 
irregulars in Hebron and cut off from retreat since October, and 
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who withdrew with the Egyptians when they were fi nally allowed 
to leave.25 In both these cases, some of the Palestinian fi ghters 
entering Egypt were accompanied by their families.
Between the infl ux from Jaffa in April–May 1948 and the entry 
into Egypt of Palestinian fi ghters in the late stages of the war, 
additional refugees, especially after the fi rst and second truces of 
summer 1948, crossed the Sinai by camelback, taking the road from 
Gaza to Zaqaziq or Faqus (in Sharqiyyah Governorate).26 No offi cial 
fi gures on the size of the 1948 infl ux are available, but credible 
estimates range from 11,000 to 13,000 people.27
The Government’s Immediate Response
Compared to the refugee fl ow into the other Arab countries 
bordering Palestine, the infl ux of refugees into Egypt was very 
small, the numbers limited by the natural barrier of the Sinai desert, 
population distribution in Palestine, and Egyptian government 
policies. Even so, the Egyptian government, like the other Arab 
governments, had been as ill-prepared for the arrival of the 
refugees as it had been for its own military participation in the war. 
When large numbers began to arrive in April 1948, the Ministry 
of Social Affairs prepared an emergency camp at a former British 
army barracks in ‘Abbasiyyah, Cairo. A number of our interviewees 
speak of this camp:
We left Jaffa when the war started and went to Lydda. We 
rested at the mosque there, washed, slept, and ate. We then 
walked through the hills to Gaza, where we stayed in a camp. 
Later, we decided to go to Egypt. We went to Rafah, then to 
Sinai, and arrived in ‘Abbasiyyah, near the “English camp” and 
the rails in Cairo. The authorities gave out tents divided with 
sheets and delivered food to us. (Um Ahmad, PP1, Madinat 
al-Salam, Cairo, 17 January 2002)
As the infl ux of refugees swelled with the intensifi cation of the 
fi ghting in Palestine, the Egyptian government on 9 May created 
the Higher Committee of Palestinian Immigrant Affairs to take 
responsibility for the health and the social, religious, and cultural 
welfare of the newcomers.28 That same month, two additional 
camps were created to accommodate the fl ow: Qantara Sharq, in 
northeastern Egypt, on the east (Sinai) side of the Suez Canal, and
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Azarita (also known as Mazarita) at the southeast end of Port Said. 
Qantara was the main camp, and in September 1948 the refugees 
who had been housed in the ‘Abbasiyyah camp were moved there; 
by this time, Qantara alone housed some 11,000 refugees.29 The 
camp even provided military training for young men who wanted 
to join the army to liberate Palestine.30
Conditions were harsh, even prisonlike, and many refugees 
tried their utmost to get out.31 The following describes the ordeal 
of a refugee who ended up in Kuwait:
Khayriddin Abuljubayn, a teacher who was forced out of Jaffa, 
took refuge in Egypt on 27 April 1948. To his total dismay, he 
and his family, his fi ancée and her family, and many friends, 
relatives, and acquaintances were all put in an Egyptian 
“concentration camp” called ‘Abbasiyyah. His father, who 
traveled to Egypt by sea, was incarcerated in another camp 
called Qantara. Almost all the Palestinians coming from the 
Jaffa area and south Palestine were placed in such camps 
under the pretext that they need not go to Cairo, since they 
could return to their villages and cities [in Palestine] shortly. 
The actual reason rested in the government’s fear of an angry 
reaction if the refugees reached Cairo and told the Egyptians 
there of the events in Palestine.
While in the camp, Abuljubayn realized certain facts. First, 
he was now a refugee, and his return to his native city was 
blocked by the victorious Israelis. From now on, he had to 
cope with statelessness and exile. His fi rst priority in camp 
was to get out. After ten days, he escaped and was able to fi nd 
help that resulted in the release of his family. Once free, he 
received a letter from a friend, Nijim . . . who was in the Qantara 
“concentration camp.” In the letter, he asked Abuljubayn “to 
go to the director of the Kuwaiti house in Cairo” and tell him 
that Nijim needs help to get out of the camp and wants to go 
to Kuwait. Through this contact Nijim was released. When he 
arrived in Kuwait in fall 1948, he immediately sent visas to 
Abuljubayn and other Palestinian teachers.32
At the time of the Palestine war, Egypt was already beset 
with population pressures and economic problems, and the 
determination of King Farouk’s government to limit the refugee 
infl ux (to the extent this was possible) only hardened as the scope 
of the Palestinian disaster became apparent. In late summer 1949, 
the Clapp Commission (offi cially the Economic Survey Mission) 
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was established by the United Nations Conciliation Commission 
of Palestine (UNCCP) to investigate ways to improve the situation 
of the refugees, including by resettlement in the region.33 When the 
commission arrived in Cairo for discussions, the government stated 
its position unambiguously: According to al-Ahram (21 May 1950), 
“The Egyptian government was keen to abide by the resolutions 
of the United Nations concerning repatriation and the mandate of 
the Conciliation Commission of Palestine (CCP), and has informed 
the Clapp Commission that Egypt is too crowded with its own 
people and cannot receive the refugees on its territories.” Indeed, 
in September 1949, just over six months after the signing of the 
armistice agreement that put Gaza under Egyptian administration, 
the government issued a decree to send the some 7,000 residents 
still remaining in the Qantara camp to the Gaza Strip,34 where the 
Maghazi camp, near Dayr al-Balah, had been built to house them.35
Already, Egypt’s policy of concentrating the Palestinians to the 
extent possible in Gaza, and of maintaining a strict separation 
between Egypt proper and the Gaza Strip under its administration, 
was clear.
Meanwhile, a special committee had been formed in Egypt 
proper to consider the applications of people who had the fi nancial 
means to support themselves outside the camps and who had an 
Egyptian guarantor (kafi l) to sponsor their stay. Most of those who 
had neither an Egyptian guarantor nor proven fi nancial means 
were transferred to Gaza. At the same time, the refugees were 
openly encouraged to leave for other countries, especially if they 
had family elsewhere. In some cases, Egypt paid their fare.36
Through these various means, of the thousands of Palestinians 
who had entered Egypt in the wake of the 1948 war, only a few 
thousand remained by 1950.37
The Gaza Strip, 1948–67: Setting the Stage for 
the 1967 Wave
Egypt did not witness another large infl ux of Palestinians until 
the 1967 war, when Israel seized the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, 
thousands of Palestinians entered Egypt from Gaza between 1948 
and 1967.38 Some of the refugees who had been sent from Qantara 
Sharq to the Gaza Strip in 1949 managed to slip back into Egypt 
early on,39 and a small number entered in the wake of the tripartite 
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Suez invasion of 1956 (see below). But by far the largest infl ux of 
Palestinians, who would have been classifi ed as “socioeconomic 
migrants,” entered as a result of policies adopted by the new regime 
established by the Free Offi cers who overthrew the Egyptian 
monarchy in 1952. Even while maintaining the old regime’s strict 
separation between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, the new government 
enacted measures that allowed for a certain back-and-forth 
movement between the two areas. These included the creation of 
a free trade zone for industrial and consumer goods in Gaza, where 
many luxury and other items unavailable in the now-socialist Egypt 
of the late 1950s could be purchased.40 More important, in the early 
1960s, the new regime also adopted liberalizing policies concerning 
education and employment that resulted in a signifi cant infl ux of 
Gazans into Egypt as students, workers, teachers, government 
employees, and traders. While many of these, especially those who 
came to study, did not remain, and many others had no intention of 
immigrating to Egypt permanently, many did end up staying, either 
because of marriage or because they were there during the 1967 
war and were unable to return.
Gaza’s main importance for the present study, however, does 
not derive from the immigration that took place in the 1950s and 
1960s. Rather, its importance lies in the political events unfolding 
there—as well as its place in the Arab-Israeli confl ict during 
those years—which were crucial to shaping the next big wave 
of Palestinian migration to Egypt during and after the June 1967 
war. Indeed, Gaza early on became an important “fl ash point” in 
growing tensions between Egypt and Israel.
One of the principal sources of Egyptian-Israeli tensions was the 
“infi ltration” of Palestinians from Egyptian-administered Gaza into 
Israel that began even before the end of the 1948 war. According 
to reports from Gaza by UN offi cials and relief workers with the 
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC, the Quakers), which 
had taken over refugee relief efforts in the Strip in January 1949,41
the refugee population in the aftermath of 1948 was virtually 
starving and for several years did not have shelter beyond tents. 
Yet within view, just across the border in the newly established 
State of Israel, lay the lands and ruined villages of the destitute 
refugees now crammed together in intolerable conditions in the 
tiny Strip. It was in such circumstances that the “infi ltrations” from 
Gaza into Israel began, with refugees sneaking across the border 
back to their villages to reclaim possessions, harvest crops, or just 
for a “glimpse of their abandoned houses.”42 In the early 1950s, 
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according to Benny Morris, some 10,000 to 15,000 instances of 
“infi ltration” occurred annually, and between 1949 and 1956 (mostly 
in 1949–51), the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed between 2,700 
and 5,000 Arab infi ltrators, the “vast majority” of them unarmed.43
But increasingly, there were also armed infi ltrators—revenge 
operations in response to IDF actions, as well as cross-border raids 
organized by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communists. This 
guerrilla activity had been strongly discouraged by the Egyptian 
government, fi rst by the monarchy and then by the Free Offi cers, 
which both sought to avoid confrontation with Israel at all costs. 
The Israeli government, while well aware of Egyptian opposition 
to the raids, used the guerrilla activity as an excuse to launch 
disproportionately deadly retaliatory strikes.
On 28 February 1955, the IDF carried out an attack on Egyptian 
forces stationed in Bir al-Safa near the Gaza city railway station, 
killing 39 Egyptian soldiers. According to Moshe Sharrett, Israel’s 
prime minister at the time (at odds with preeminent Israeli leader 
David Ben-Gurion, then defense minister, and his deputy, Moshe 
Dayan), the attack was largely unprovoked.44 Morris calls the 
raid a “clear watershed,” after which the Egyptian authorities not 
only ended their opposition to the guerrilla raids, but themselves 
became involved in sponsoring them.45
These new government-sponsored activities were organized by 
Mustafa Hafi z, chief of the Palestine branch of Egyptian military 
intelligence in Gaza, who formed a commando unit whose nucleus 
was a group of Palestinians who had been utilized by the Egyptians 
to conduct unarmed reconnaissance missions inside Israel since 
1949.46 Following the February 1955 raid, Hafi z was authorized by 
the Egyptian high command to transform his fedayeen—who were 
paid out of the Egyptian administration in Gaza—into a formal 
military unit called the 141 Battalion.47 The special force, which 
was commonly known as the Mustafa Hafi z Brigades,48 fi gures in 
a number of our interviews, especially those relating to the 1967 
refugee wave (as described in the next section). In addition to the 
Mustafa Hafi z fedayeen, other Palestinian battalions were formed 
as part of the Egyptian forces in Gaza. Palestinians also made up 
the Palestine Border Guard.49
Although the infi ltrations and growing tensions on the Sinai/Gaza 
front were undoubtedly a factor in setting the stage for the Suez
war—the October–November 1956 “tripartite” invasion of Egypt by 
Britain, France, and Israel—it was Nasser’s conclusion of the Czech 
arms deal in September 1955 and his nationalization of the Suez 
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Canal Company in July 1956 that constituted the most immediate 
triggers. On 29 October 1956, Israeli forces occupied the Sinai and 
the Gaza Strip, and several days later a combined Anglo-French 
force launched an attack along the Suez Canal. Contemporary 
UNRWA reports described the “screening operations” throughout 
the Gaza Strip conducted by the Israeli military “to fi nd persons 
who were members of the so-called ‘Palestine Brigade’ or who 
participated in fedayeen operations.”50 During these screening 
operations, close to 500 Palestinian civilians were killed.51
Thousands of fedayeen, Palestinian border guards, and Palestinian 
and Egyptian soldiers were taken prisoner by the IDF,52 and scores 
of Palestinian fi ghters were summarily executed.53 Hundreds 
managed to escape to Jordan, and subsequently either returned 
to Gaza following the Israeli withdrawal or went to Egypt. A 
Palestinian woman now living in Cairo recounts:
My husband was the fi rst to arrive in Egypt. During the 1956 
tripartite invasion, he was arrested by the Israelis because he 
was part of Mustafa Hafi z’s 141 forces in Gaza. Eventually, 
he managed to escape to Jordan and from there he came to 
Egypt. (P25, al-Zawiyyah al-Hamra, 25 June 2002)
A number of fedayeen managed to escape through the Sinai and 
the Canal Zone into Egypt proper with the retreating Egyptian 
troops, though Morris adds that some of these, “like thousands of 
Egyptian troops,” must have “died of thirst and hunger on the trek 
westwards.”54 Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip only in March 
1957, and then only under very strong U.S. pressure.55
The next chapter explains how the Suez invasion provided 
the fi nal element in the crystallization of Nasser’s pan-Arabist 
policies, an important component of which was the Palestine 
issue. As part of these policies, Nasser in May 1964 presided over 
the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
headed by Palestinian lawyer Ahmad Shuqayri, as a means of 
maintaining control over the Palestinian national movement that 
was beginning to emerge. The signifi cance of this move with regard 
to Gaza and the subsequent (1967) infl ux of Palestinians into Egypt 
is that the PLO’s regular armed forces, the Palestine Liberation 
Army (PLA), were also established in 1964: The PLO’s Egyptian-
sponsored ‘Ayn Jalut Brigade was set up with its headquarters in 
Cairo, but most of its manpower was in Gaza. The new organization 
soon opened training camps, recruiting especially among refugee 
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youth, where support for the PLO was strongest.56 A great many 
of these fi ghters, along with the men associated with the Mustafa 
Hafi z Brigades, the Palestine police, and the Palestinian personnel 
of the Gaza administration, ended up in Egypt after the 1967 war.
In the Wake of the 1967 War
Israel’s surprise attack on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan was launched 
on 4 June 1967 in response to Nasser’s insistence on the withdrawal 
of the UN Emergency Force stationed in the Sinai and his closure of 
the Straits of Tiran to Israeli navigation in May. The war resulted in 
the capture in six days of the entire Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the 
Golan Heights from Syria, and the last areas of Mandate Palestine 
not taken by Israel during the 1948 war: the West Bank, seized from 
Jordan, and the Gaza Strip, seized from Egypt.
The 1967 war probably produced the largest single wave of 
Palestinian immigration into Egypt; many if not most of those who 
immigrated were originally 1948 refugees and thus twice displaced.57
A substantial number of the 1967 infl ux had some relationship to 
the Egyptian military. In the debacle of the war, some 6,000 PLA 
offi cers, soldiers, and reservists fi ghting under Egyptian command 
were captured by the Israelis58 along with tens of thousands of 
Egyptian soldiers. (Some PLA forces fought until the surrender 
of Gaza City on 7 June, with 120 dead.) According to the Israeli 
commanding offi cer of the southern front, 5,000 of the captured 
PLA fi ghters were deported to Egypt, with the remaining 1,000 
being imprisoned at Atlit, in Israel proper.59 The usual procedure 
was for the captives to be turned over to the Red Cross:
I was then part of the PLO’s Liberation Army and was taken 
hostage until being released to the Red Cross. The other 
hostages and I were interned in Isma‘iliyyah before being 
taken to Fayid to join the Egyptian army. (P9, Wailey, 24 June 
2002)
Of the 5,000 PLA personnel deported to Egypt, 2,000 were 
reorganized by the Egyptian command and deployed under its 
direct authority to Bitter Lakes (al-Buhayrat al-Murra) bordering 
on the newly occupied Sinai Peninsula. According to Palestinian 
military expert Yezid Sayigh, the remaining PLA personnel—some 
3,000 or 4,000 men—were “diverted into a ‘surplus’” or reserve and 
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allowed to resettle in the Tahrir district (province) northeast of Cairo 
on the road to Alexandria.60 An undetermined number of Mustafa 
Hafi z fi ghters also entered Egypt. Operating underground, these 
men were not so much captured en masse as hunted down, with 
hundreds managing to escape to Egypt or Jordan.61 Many people 
in our interviews refer to family members who entered Egypt with 
the Mustafa Hafi z forces, often without details concerning how 
they arrived:
We originally come from Abraj, and my family used to work 
in agriculture. In 1948, we were expelled to Gaza. I was four 
[years old] then. We moved from one place to the other until 
staying in Shati refugee camp [Beach Camp] in Gaza. My 
father joined the Mustafa Hafi z 141 fedayeen. After 1967, he 
came to Cairo with the Egyptian army. (P9, Wailey, 24 June 
2002)
In addition to the Palestinian forces fi ghting with the Egyptians, 
members of the police forces in Gaza were also allowed to settle, as 
were the Palestinian employees of the various departments of the 
Egyptian Administrative Offi ce of the Governor of Gaza (AOGG).
In line with Egyptian policy, arrangements were subsequently 
made for the families of these men to be brought to Egypt to join 
them.62 The following quote recounts the role played by the Red 
Cross in some of these family reunifi cations:
Several years after the 1967 war, the Red Cross provided buses 
to take some families, mainly women and children, from Gaza 
to Egypt. We rode a bus with red-curtained windows that had 
a curtain between the driver and the passengers to prevent 
them from seeing the Israeli military bases on the road. At the 
Suez Canal, we rode a boat to cross the canal. The Egyptian 
forces received us and took us to clinics to be vaccinated. 
(P10, ‘Ayn Shams, 23 May 2002)
The 1967 war resulted in massive dislocation. According to 
UNRWA, which had taken over responsibility for the refugees 
from the AFSC in 1950 and which was “on the ground” in most of 
the occupied areas during and after the hostilities, at least 350,000 
persons were newly displaced from the West Bank, Gaza, the 
Syrian Golan Heights, and the Sinai, some 175,000 of them made 
refugees for the second time.63
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While Israel wanted to retain both the West Bank and Gaza, 
it was not keen to inherit their large refugee populations.64 In 
the aftermath of the war, Israel “encouraged” several hundred 
thousand Palestinians to leave the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Some of our interviews allude to Israel’s policy of requiring exiting 
individuals to sign forms stating that they were leaving voluntarily 
and understood they would not be allowed to return.65 A Gaza 
woman whose husband, a truck driver, had been trapped in Egypt 
when the war broke out, had this to say about leaving Gaza with 
her three children to join him:
I came to Egypt from Gaza via Jordan. When leaving Palestine, 
the Jews [i.e., the Israeli forces] made us sign/fi ngerprint a 
blank white paper to let us pass. I had to sign. All I wanted was 
to run away with my children to a safe place. (31/7, Bilbays, 
11 July 2002)
The most signifi cant infl ux of nonmilitary personnel into Egypt 
in 1967 resulted from Israel’s massive sweep of the Gaza Strip in 
search of men with possible connections to Palestinian resistance 
groups. Israel soon set about rounding up men of fi ghting age, 
loading them onto buses or trucks, and transporting them to 
the Egyptian border. A number of the interviews describe the 
process:
On one of the nights following the Israeli invasion of Gaza 
City in 1967, the [Israeli] forces called on all men between the 
ages of 16 and 50 to go out to the playground of a school. To 
my knowledge, no one responded. Later, a masked man with 
several Israeli soldiers came to my family’s house and pointed 
at me, so I had to go with them to the schoolyard, where I saw 
many men from the city. We were taken to a military camp 
at Beersheba. Some of us were taken to be interrogated. We 
were then taken in a truck to Qantara West. There, the Red 
Cross registered our names and permitted us to enter. (P16, 
‘Ayn Shams, 8 June 2002)
The same scene was re-enacted repeatedly throughout Gaza. A 
number of our interviews refer to Egypt’s reluctance to go along 
with Israel’s forced transfer by accepting the “hostages.” Some 
testimonies, as the one below, tell how Israel compelled Egypt to 
allow the men to enter by threatening to kill them. A number of 
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the interviews also allude to the Red Cross being called upon to 
facilitate the process:
On 18 June 1967, I was 20 or 21 years old, and the Jews 
were going around the houses in Khan Yunis calling on men 
between the ages of 12 and 40 to go to Cinema al-Hurriyyah.
“Those who do not respond or run away will be killed.” I 
went to the cinema with my brother-in-law, who was an old 
man. Soldiers asked us to hurry to the center. The leader 
was selecting people, and whoever did not respond was 
killed. I was selected among many. We were put in buses with 
curtained windows. We expected them to ask us to dig our 
own graves and then bury us alive, like they did in the 1956 
war. On the bus, we were given dry bread, which made us 
thirsty. In the Muthalath area, buses stopped and the Jews 
asked the Red Cross to negotiate with Egyptian forces to take 
us. Egypt at that time was opposed to receiving Palestinians. 
The Israelis threatened to kill us because they did not want us 
to go back to Palestine. Israeli soldiers forced the passengers 
on the fi rst bus to step off of the bus in order to be executed. 
In response, Egypt permitted us to enter the country. We were 
taken to Ramda and were asked to walk on a sandy road to 
the canal. There, we were received by an Egyptian lieutenant. 
(23/7, Salhiyyah, 7 July 2002)
Forced to accept the refugees, the Egyptian government decided 
to induct able-bodied young men suitable for military service into 
their armed forces, which had been seriously depleted by the war, 
during which tens of thousands had died. Processing the “hostages” 
took place at several temporary camps that were set up, including 
Qantara on the western side of the Suez Canal. A number of our 
interviewees referred to the selection process:
Thousands of other Palestinians and I were taken hostage 
during the 1967 war. The Israeli forces took us to Beersheba. 
From there, after Egypt accepted us, we were taken to the 
Red Cross, which was waiting for us. We were taken in 
buses to Qantara. The Egyptian security forces divided the 
Palestinians into military and civilian groups. Civilians were 
transferred to Mudiriyyat al-Tahrir to work in agriculture. 
Soldiers were transferred to the Tal al-Kibir military camp to 
verify their military numbers with the PLO offi ce at Nasr City. 
There, we were divided into sub-groups (kata’ib) and trained 
by Egyptian forces. Our group was later taken to A‘miriyyah, 
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where we took part in the War of Attrition [1969–70]. (P5, Dar 
al-Salam, 18 May 2002)
Another person captured by the Israelis and sent to Egypt, also 
classifi ed as suitable for recruitment into the military, recounts the 
following:
A Palestinian friend of mine lived in Shubra, Cairo. I stayed 
with him until I was called to join the army at Tal al-Kibir 
military camp. We were later taken to A‘miriyyah and then to 
al-Buhayrat al-Murra [Bitter Lakes] military bases. (P16, ‘Ayn 
Shams, 8 June 2002)
The camp mentioned most often in our interviews was 
Mudiriyyat al-Tahrir,66 where the men classifi ed as “civilians” 
remained temporarily. Some worked in agriculture in the area and 
eventually self-settled, while others were hired for government 
service:
I was among those Palestinians taken hostage by the Israelis 
on 20 June 1967. In Egypt, we arrived in Mudiriyyat al-Tahrir, 
where we stayed for three weeks in a village called Abd al-
Salam Amir. There were 6,000 of us. Some members of the 
group with whom I was staying were asked to take jobs in the 
government, so we went to Cairo and lived in a fl at together. 
When each of us took his post, and some were posted 
around the republic, we lost contact with each other. (AP3, 
Alexandria, August 2002)
Hadi, a young man from Bayt Hanun in Gaza who was among those 
classifi ed as a civilian at Mudiriyyat al-Tahrir, described how he 
was hired from the camp for the legal and administrative affairs 
department at the Ministry of Interior (8/5, Bahtim, 3 July 2002).
Needless to say, not all those who were captured by the Israeli 
forces and expelled to Egypt in 1967 were connected with the 
Egyptian military or were men of fi ghting age. It is clear from a 
number of our interviews that some families simply took advantage 
of the chaos of the situation to cross into Egypt:
My husband’s family arrived with masses of other Palestinian 
families in 1967. They came walking to Abu Za‘bal [city in 
Qalyubiyyah Governorate]. My father-in-law became a truck 
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driver. His wife and children soon left Gaza to join him with 
the help of the Red Cross. (8/3, Abu Za‘bal, 30 June 2002)
As mentioned earlier, Gaza’s status as a free trade zone under 
Nasserist socialism had fostered extensive commercial ties, and a 
number of people who had business interests in Egypt or who had 
been involved in transport or trade were able to enter the country. 
These included wealthy Gaza businessmen, who transferred not 
only their capital but also their businesses to Egypt.67 This category 
also included traders of far more modest means:
My husband arrived in Abu Kabir in 1967 with his family. They 
had been involved in the tijaret shanta [bag trade] between 
Gaza and Egypt. (7/29, Abu Kabir, July 2002)
Numbers, once again, are elusive. The Gaza section of UNRWA’s 
report on the 1967 war quoted the offi cial Egyptian estimate that 
some 13,000 refugees and displaced persons had entered Egypt 
during and in the wake of the confl ict.68 This number did not include 
the thousands of Gazan students, teachers, or other employees 
hired under Nasser’s liberalization and other persons stranded in 
Egypt who were allowed to stay. According to Egyptian government 
estimates, the number of Palestinians in the country by 1969 had 
reached 33,000, compared to its 1960 estimate of 15,500.69
Post-1967 Immigration and Emigration
Although the infl ux of 1967 was the last major wave of 
Palestinians into Egypt, the size of the community has continued 
to ebb and rise.
After Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and siege of Beirut in 1982, 
the PLO apparatus and fi ghters in the Israeli-occupied areas of 
Lebanon were forced to leave the country under a deal brokered by 
the United States. Egypt was not among the countries where PLO 
fi ghters were sent as units, although the ‘Ayn Jalut Brigade still 
had its headquarters in Egypt, and a good number of PLA fi ghters 
who had previously been stationed there did return.70 Again, it is 
impossible to offer fi gures with any confi dence, but according to al-
Ahram (16 July 1985), there were more than 100,000 Palestinians 
in Egypt in 1985.71
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The largest post-1967 infl ux of Palestinians into Egypt followed 
the Gulf war of 1991. An estimated 450,000 Palestinians had been 
living in Kuwait at the time it was occupied by Iraq in August 1990, 
and an estimated 70–80 percent of these were either expelled in 
the wake of the war or had fl ed after the Iraqi invasion as the crisis 
heated up.72 Most of these had originally come from Jordan or 
the West Bank, or were descendants of those who had. Tens of 
thousands, however, held Egyptian travel documents, and many 
had never had Egyptian residence permits (see chapter 4). The 
number of those with valid residency permits who were allowed 
back into Egypt is unknown, but certainly there were many. Far 
greater numbers, however, did not even attempt to enter, knowing 
that their travel documents excluded the possibility of residency.
Finally, a substantial outfl ow—estimated by the PLO ambassador 
to Egypt in 2001 at 45,00073—followed the establishment of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza in 1994 
as a consequence of the September 1993 Oslo accords signed by 
Israel and the PLO. Throughout this study, numerous interviews 
refer to those who left for Gaza in the 1990s; this emigration will 
be discussed in chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Politics, Policies, and Attitudes in the 
Host State
In the previous chapter, we dealt with the successive waves of Palestinian refugees into Egypt in their political context, with the discussion of government policy largely confi ned to the 
immediate response to the infl ux in terms of emergency measures 
and efforts to limit the numbers allowed entry. The present chapter, 
by contrast, deals with the host government’s broad policies toward 
the Palestinian community that remained—whether in Egypt proper 
or, up to 1967, in the Gaza Strip—as refl ected in its legislation or 
administrative orders. These policies have undergone changes 
according to the regime in place, the evolving political situation, 
and developments in the Arab-Israeli confl ict. Thus, regulations 
concerning the Palestinians in Egypt, as announced in the Jaridah
Rasmiyyah (the Offi cial Gazette), fl uctuated over time, refl ecting 
a constellation of factors both international and local.
Palestinians in Egypt were vulnerable not only because of 
changing policies and legislation, but also because of swings in 
public opinion most often entirely beyond their control. Thus, 
the present chapter, in addition to providing an overview of 
government policy from the monarchy to the “Golden Era” under 
Nasser, through the low ebb during Sadat’s last years, and fi nally 
to the uneasy stalemate under Mubarak, will also look at the shifts 
in public attitudes toward the Palestinians that both refl ected and 
infl uenced government policy.
Egyptian Policy under the Monarchy
While doing its best to provide emergency aid to the refugees, 
the Egyptian government was determined to keep to a minimum 
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the number of Palestinians allowed to remain in the country. This 
was primarily a practical response to Egypt’s own overpopulation 
and poverty, but the proposition of Palestinian “separateness” 
implied in the policy dovetailed with a political justifi cation fully 
embraced by the refugees themselves: the Palestinians were soon 
to return to their homes, as called for by UN General Assembly 
Resolution 194 (III) of December 1948.
Thus, starting from the signing of the armistice agreement in 
February 1949, Egypt had two “distinct” Palestinian populations 
under its control: the small population that had managed to remain 
in Egypt proper, and the population of the Egyptian-administered 
Gaza Strip, massively expanded by an infl ux of more than 200,000 
refugees from elsewhere in Palestine. The premise of separateness 
was to have considerable infl uence on Egyptian policy toward 
both communities.
The Refugee Community in Egypt
In line with the government’s preoccupation with limiting the 
Palestinian presence in the country, there was never any question 
of granting them citizenship (as Jordan had done for its own 
purposes in 1954) or of absorbing them in any way, though the 
government did fl irt with international projects to settle some of 
them in the Sinai Peninsula. Unlike the other states bordering 
Israel, Egypt had not requested UN relief when the refugees began 
to arrive in signifi cant numbers in April 1948. Not wanting to create 
conditions suitable for the refugees to remain, the government had 
also not wanted assistance in Egypt proper from UNRWA when 
it began operations in 1950. Instead, it transformed the Higher 
Committee for Palestinian Immigrants that had been created to 
take charge of the refugees in May 1948 (see chapter 1) into an aid 
agency, which classifi ed Palestinians according to economic need 
and established strict eligibility criteria for assistance.1
To receive aid (limited though it was), Palestinians had to 
prove their status as refugees, defi ned by the Higher Committee as 
persons who sought refuge in the country from 1948 to 1950. They 
did this by showing the residency cards recording refugee status 
that had been issued by the Egyptian Department of Passports and 
Nationality. Those who did not have proof of refugee status, or 
who lacked the other qualifi cations required to obtain temporary 
residency permits (i.e., proven fi nancial resources and an Egyptian 
sponsor), were left to fend for themselves when the temporary 
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camps were dismantled in 1948–49. A ministerial decision 
concerning the issuance of temporary residence identity documents 
to Palestinian refugees stipulated that the documents could not be 
renewed for more than one year and should indicate the material 
assistance being received by the holder. Subsequently, as of 1950, 
travel documents (as well as birth certifi cates) for Palestinians in 
Egypt became the province of the Government of All Palestine 
(GAP), the Cairo-based shadow government sponsored by Egypt 
(see section below). The GAP passports, or travel documents, 
required the same proof of refugee status as the residence cards 
issued by the government. Holders of GAP passports could obtain 
one-year residence permits provided they could meet the other 
requirements.
The consequences of not having a residence permit were dire: 
Without legal residency, there was no access to government 
assistance or services. In the realm of education, for example, 
the Higher Committee had provided schooling in the temporary 
camps set up for Palestinians in 1948, but after the camps were 
dismantled in 1949 and Palestinians began moving to Egyptian 
towns, a ministerial decision was issued stating that
non-Egyptians are not to be admitted in Egyptian schools 
unless their passports indicate possession of a residence 
permit from the Ministry of the Interior. Those who do not 
have residence permits are required to apply to the Ministry of 
the Interior. The school will renew the residency accordingly. 
(al-Ahram, 13 April 1949)
Even with legal residency, however, life for the refugees was 
harsh. Travel was extremely diffi cult, especially because the GAP 
documents were recognized by practically no other state. But the 
restriction that caused the greatest hardship was the prohibition 
on work. Written directly on the residence permit were the words 
“work for or without wages is forbidden.”2 As a result, even those 
Palestinians who had some money when they arrived in Egypt 
soon saw their savings depleted. Unemployment was rife among 
Egyptians as well, but Egyptians at least could seek work without 
fear of deportation.
The Gaza Strip and the Refugees
Just as there had been no question of granting Egyptian 
citizenship to Palestinians, so there was never any question of 
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Egypt’s annexing the Gaza Strip, as Jordan had done with the 
West Bank. Although Egypt maintained a very tight grip on the 
territory, with military rule and an extensive intelligence network, 
ideologically, for the Egyptian regime, the Gaza Strip was Palestine,
the part of the country that had been preserved pending Palestine’s 
liberation as promised by the rhetoric of the Arab regimes.
During the 1948 war, Egypt had been the prime mover behind 
the Arab League Political Committee’s creation in September 1948 
of the GAP, initially headed by Hajj Amin al-Husseini, which was
declared the offi cial government of Palestine.3 Though the GAP had 
offi cially rejected the 1947 UN partition plan, it was in fact set up 
to govern those parts of Palestine assigned to the Arab state under 
that plan, or, more accurately, the parts of Palestine that would 
remain in Arab hands when the war ended. After Jordan’s King 
Abdallah annexed the West Bank in 1950, however, the GAP’s only 
“sovereign territory” was the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, by that time, 
its “rule” was already a façade: From the signing of the Egyptian-
Israel armistice in February 1949, the Gaza Strip was run entirely 
by the Egyptian Military Government established there. With 
its headquarters transferred to Cairo, the GAP became a largely 
fi ctional body whose main function was to represent Palestine 
on the Arab League Council and to issue travel documents to 
Palestinians in Egypt and Gaza. The GAP continued its virtually 
paper existence until the death of its president, Ahmad Hilmi Abd 
al-Baqi, in 1963.4
As already noted, Egypt had not requested UNRWA assistance 
for the Palestinian refugees in Egypt proper. The Gaza Strip, 
however, was another matter: There was no way that Egypt could 
have provided for the Gaza Strip’s more than 200,000 refugees.5 In 
January 1949, the AFSC (the Quakers) had assumed responsibility 
for organizing relief in the Strip under an agreement with the United 
Nations, which had charged them with this task pending more 
permanent arrangements. The Quakers, in coordination with the 
Egyptian government, had set up camps and provided other forms 
of relief until mid-1950, when UNRWA took over.6 In September 
1950, UNRWA signed an agreement with Egypt setting the terms 
for its operation in the Gaza Strip. Under the agreement, UNRWA 
and its personnel were granted freedom of movement inside 
Egypt and the Gaza Strip and between the two areas, diplomatic 
immunity for the UNRWA director and members of its Advisory 
Commission, and exemption from customs duties and taxes of all 
goods and equipment imported into Gaza in connection with its 
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mission; the Egyptian government also agreed to provide without 
charge services relating to the goods and equipment in transit 
through Egypt for the refugees (including loading and unloading, 
transport, storage, and safe conduct).7 The task of providing food, 
health care, housing, and education to this destitute population 
was staggering. Although UNRWA (and the Quakers before them) 
performed admirably in terribly diffi cult conditions—by 1953, 
it had moved most of the refugees out of tents and into more 
permanent shelters in some eight camps and created twenty-six 
UNRWA schools8—the refugees long remained suspicious of the 
Agency and of the UN in general, believing that the international 
community intended to settle them rather than promote their right 
under UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) to return to their 
homes.
These same suspicions also applied to the Egyptian government, 
which in fact had been exploring development schemes from 
early on, especially in the Sinai, where refugees might be settled. 
Offi cially, the Egyptian government, like the other Arab states, 
rejected the idea of permanent refugee resettlement on the grounds 
that Israel, having created the refugee problem, now had an 
obligation to permit the refugees to return to their homes as called 
for in UN General Assembly Resolution 194. In practice, however, 
the government could hardly ignore the dire situation in the tiny 
Gaza Strip, which had by far the highest refugee concentration in 
the Arab world and few land resources to sustain them. The gap 
between declared and actual policy is implicit in a 5 June 1950 
letter sent from Beirut to the Foreign Offi ce by Sir Henri Knight, 
the United Kingdom Delegate to the UN Advisory Commission on 
Refugees: “Would there be any fear that the Egyptian government 
may wish to hold to Gaza refugees as a bargaining counter in 
peace negotiations [it should be noted that] the suggestion that 
something may be done for the refugees in Sinai came from the 
Egyptians themselves and the problem is how to get the Egyptians 
to revert to this tentative suggestion and to translate it into a more 
positive form.”9 Knight elsewhere mentions that the Middle East 
representative of the AFSC reported that the Egyptian foreign 
minister had “spoken in general terms of resettling a number of 
refugees in Sinai, particularly along the coastal strip.”98 Long-term 
projects discussed included the Sinai Irrigation Project, which was 
intended to resettle 50–60,000 refugees in agricultural settlements 
through the construction of an irrigation system diverting water 
from the Nile through irrigation channels.11 Funds for the projects 
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were to be raised by UNRWA in order to settle and provide 
employment for Palestinian refugees and thereby (it was believed) 
foster peace in the region.
As for Egypt’s actual policies toward the population of Gaza, 
military rule was strict, the border between Egypt and Gaza was 
closely monitored, and little if anything was done to alleviate their 
plight in any way.12
Nasser and the Golden Era
Points of Continuity with the Old Regime
On 23 July 1952, the monarchy was overthrown by the “Free 
Offi cers,” led by Nasser. Though the July revolution, and the 
popular enthusiasm it generated, was at least partly the result of 
Egypt’s humiliating defeat in Palestine,13 the policies of the new 
republic toward the Palestinians under its rule initially changed 
little. General Muhammad Naguib, whom the Free Offi cers had 
chosen to be the fi rst president of the Egyptian republic, sent a clear 
message that he would not accept refugees from the Gaza Strip in 
Egypt, including even the Sinai (although in fact the new regime, 
like the old, discreetly pursued resettlement projects there). The 
bureaucracy set up to deal with the Palestinians remained in place: 
The Higher Committee of Palestinian Immigrant Affairs continued 
as an aid agency; residency continued to be strictly controlled and 
was based on the same criteria established under the monarchy; 
and travel between Gaza and Egypt, and between Egypt and 
abroad, continued to be subject to diffi cult-to-obtain permits. At 
no time under Nasser was the requirement for an entry permit into 
Egypt lifted.
Even after the policies began to be liberalized, bureaucratic 
issues such as passports and residence permits did not signifi cantly 
change. In 1960, for example, Egypt, by then called the United 
Arab Republic (UAR) to refl ect the establishment of the Egyptian-
Syrian union in 1958,14 issued its fi rst major decision (number 28) 
concerning the provision of travel documents for Palestinians. 
Under the decision, the same proof of refugee status and legal 
residence as under the monarchy was required to obtain the travel 
documents. Furthermore, the continuing diffi culty of travel is 
shown in Article 2 of the decree, which bars the travel document 
holder from traveling even between the northern and the southern 
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regions (i.e., Syria and Egypt) of the “united” republic without 
both a visa and a return visa. Similarly, Decision 181 of 1964, while 
stipulating that Palestinian refugees should be given temporary 
travel documents upon request, required exactly the same proof of 
refugee status and possession of valid Egyptian residence permits. 
It also specifi ed that the travel document did not permit entry into 
or transit through Egypt without a transit visa or a visa and return 
visa.
Indeed, two basic premises of monarchical Egypt were never 
to change. First, the separate Palestinian identity was to be 
safeguarded. The aforementioned Decision 28 of 1960 concerning 
travel documents, for example, was accompanied by instructions 
from the Interior Ministry to the Department of Immigration, 
Passports, and Nationality emphasizing the need to preserve 
the Palestinian nationality for Palestinian residents of the UAR 
because they would be returning to their original homeland after 
its liberation (al-Ahram, 20 April 1960). Second, the notion of Gaza 
as an entirely separate, Palestinian entity—however illusory in 
practice, given Egypt’s total control over the territory—was strictly 
adhered to and remained a mainstay of Egyptian policy until Israel 
seized the Strip in 1967.
Finally, despite Naguib’s opposition to refugee resettlement 
projects, the new regime also continued to explore such projects: 
The British embassy in Beirut reported that the “younger offi cers 
concerned with the matter had spoken of UNRWA producing large 
projects to settle them in Egypt.”15 At the same time, Nasser, from 
the beginning the strong man of the regime and as of February 
1954 the president of Egypt after having pushed Naguib aside, 
had demonstrated sympathy with the Palestinians and had 
already initiated projects and increased the provision of services 
to refugees in the Gaza Strip. According to a British diplomat 
in Cairo, “His [Nasser’s] principal concern was to improve the 
feeding of the refugees, which he thought was deplorable and 
demoralizing. To this end, he hoped to get more money devoted to 
relief and if necessary to divert to this purpose some funds from 
the UN resettlement programme.”16 None of these projects reached 
fruition, however, at least partly because of refugee hostility or 
suspicion of any plans that could be seen to compromise their 
right of return.
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“Nasserism and Palestinianism: Two Sides of the 
Same Coin”
As mentioned in chapter 1, Israel’s raid on the Gaza Strip in 
February 1955 had marked a turning point in the new government’s 
foreign policy in general and its Palestine policy in particular: It 
was this raid that convinced President Nasser to shift his priorities 
from the domestic arena to inter-Arab politics and the wider 
confl ict with Israel. The policy shift was greatly accelerated by the 
autumn 1956 Israeli-Franco-British tripartite invasion of Egypt, 
after which the country’s “raison d’être, as Nasser defi ned it, was, 
for practical and ideological reasons, linked to its mission as 
leader of the Arab nation. Thus, Arabism and the Palestinian issue 
became inseparable—they were natural allies in Nasser’s quest for 
a special role for Egypt to play.”17 In the words of Maha Dajani, 
from that time forward “Nasserism and Palestinianism became 
two sides of the same coin.”18
There is no doubt that the main thrust of Nasser’s “Palestine 
policy” concerned the Palestinian political problem and was aimed 
at the wider Arab world. It was within that framework that Nasser 
opened Egyptian universities to qualifying Palestinian students 
from all Arab countries, waiving fees and offering subsidies and 
grants to help defray their living costs. Egyptian universities had 
always been a magnet for Arab students, but as of 1954 the number 
of Palestinian students studying in Egyptian institutions of higher 
learning surged dramatically; medicine and engineering faculties 
were especially favored. Nasser also allowed the Palestinian 
student organization, which not infrequently participated in and 
even led demonstrations against his regime, to thrive.19 It was also 
within that framework that he sponsored the creation of the PLO 
in 1964.
With Palestine a central plank in Nasser’s pan-Arabism, it 
was only natural that he should take a more active interest in 
the welfare of Palestinians both in the Gaza Strip and at home. 
Accordingly, Nasser in 1958 approved a budget of £E 100,000 to 
create work opportunities in Gaza, mainly in agricultural projects 
and the packaging and export of oranges.20 As for Palestinians in 
Egypt proper, given the enormous hardship imposed on resident 
Palestinians by the prohibition against work, the fi rst changes 
he introduced involved an easing of restrictions on employment 
(though Egypt itself continued to suffer economic instability and 
high unemployment). However, the initial changes concerned only 
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a very small class of professionals, mainly in the medical fi eld. Thus, 
in July 1954, Laws 415 and 416 permitted, respectively, licensed 
refugee doctors and veterinarians to practice in Egypt. These 
laws were followed in September by Law 481 permitting certifi ed 
midwives to practice, and in October by Law 537 authorizing the 
licensing of Palestinians with degrees in dentistry.21 Far more 
important for the Palestinian community as a whole was the gradual 
relaxation of the no-work regulations for resident Palestinians that 
began in the mid-1950s.22
The real watershed, however, concerned employment in the 
public sector, without doubt the most important in the Egyptian 
economy. Responding to poor economic conditions in the Gaza 
Strip, in 1954 President Nasser loosened restrictions so as to allow 
some Gazans to work as teachers in Egypt, although he issued no 
offi cial regulation to formalize the policy. In 1959, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs required the Ministry of Social Affairs to make 
jobs accessible to Palestinians in Cairo and other Egyptian cities,23
and in the early 1960s Nasser called upon high school graduates 
and diploma holders in Gaza to apply for work with the Egyptian 
government.
But it was not until March 1962 that the Egyptian president 
formalized these new employment practices by issuing Law 66, 
which permitted the recruitment of Palestinians in government 
bodies and gave them the same employment options as Egyptian 
nationals. Article 1 of Law 66 reads as follows:
Article 1—As an exception to Section 1 of Article 6 (Law 210 
of 1951), concerning public sector employees, it is permitted 
for Palestinians to work in government and public sector jobs 
and to be treated as nationals of the United Arab Republic. 
(Jaridah Rasmiyyah, No. 58, 10 March 1962)
Law 66 marked the beginning of what Palestinians in Egypt con-
tinue to this day to call the “Golden Era.” The law was followed by 
a May 1963 decision exempting Palestinians from the requirement 
to obtain work permits issued by the Egyptian Minister of Labor.24
Further confi rmation of the “new era” came with Law 46 of 
1964, concerning civil servants in government, which explicitly 
reasserted the exemption of Palestinians from “foreign status.”25
The importance of these laws cannot be overstated. Their impact 
is made clear in a number of our interviews:
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I am originally from Khan Yunis. When the 1948 war started, my 
family and I were living in Jaffa. We were forced to move back 
to Khan Yunis. My family used to travel quite often to Egypt 
when Gaza was under Egyptian rule and the road was open 
for travel. After I fi nished my high school exams in agriculture 
in 1962, Abd al-Nasser called on young Palestinians to work 
in Egypt. I went to Cairo and I started working as a teacher 
of science at a government school in Ataba. (P21, Giza, Cairo, 
11 June 2002)
Some of those who came from Gaza under this provision also 
took advantage of new regulations concerning the ownership of 
businesses that had been passed in 1954, when Palestinians with 
suffi cient capital were granted commercial licences and franchises 
to start their own businesses. Palestinians came to have a major 
presence in the tertiary sector, opening barbershops, restaurants, 
and sweet shops. The easing of ownership restrictions is refl ected 
in a number of the interviews:
I arrived in Cairo in the 1960s to work as a teacher of science. 
I also had shares in an auto repair shop with two Egyptian 
friends. At that time there was no regulation preventing 
Palestinians from owning businesses. Soon after, I put my 
wife’s name on the ownership shares of the shop. After I 
left my job with the government, I was able to open another 
branch. (P21, Giza, 11 June 2002)
Most important, the laws that were amended during that period 
did not apply the word “foreign” to Palestinians in administrative 
matters. Not only were they able to move far more easily (albeit 
with the requisite entry permits) between Gaza and Egypt, thereby 
bolstering Gaza’s economy, but, treated as nationals, they also had 
better access to state services. The following interview refl ects 
both the impact of the new policies on employment and the free 
medical services from which Palestinians could now benefi t:
My husband came from Gaza to Hurgada via the Red Sea in 
1962, when President Abd al-Nasser permitted Palestinians 
to work in the [Egyptian] government. He worked in the 
legal affairs section of the Ministry of Education. He met 
my [Egyptian] family while he was living there and we got 
married in 1968. While we were living together, he came 
down with epilepsy and was hospitalized for two months at 
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no charge in Khanka public hospital in Greater Cairo. (P12, 
‘Izbit al-Nakhal, 29 May 2002)
Many Palestinians were hired by the government, especially 
after the mass deportations in the wake of the 1967 war. They 
were permitted to work in administrative jobs and were posted 
throughout Egypt in rural and urban areas such as Samalut, Minya, 
and Matruh. Other Palestinians, too, were able to take advantage 
of new employment options in Egypt’s public sector.
I worked in 1971 after I fi nished nursing college in the 
[Egyptian] Ministry of Health. I had a very comfortable 
situation since I had all the advantages given to government 
employees, including medical insurance and pensions. This 
is added to the incentives and allowances. (7/43, Hehya, 15 
July 2002)
Even before the legal changes were enacted, the Free Offi cers 
had made education, health, and other services available to Palesti-
nians. Almost from the beginning, Nasser opened government 
schools to Palestinians on the same basis as Egyptians. Public 
education for them became free of charge from primary school 
onwards, including university for qualifying students. While no 
fi gures were found concerning university enrollment for Palestinian 
residents of Egypt, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, 5,642 
Palestinian university students from Gaza were educated in 
Egyptian universities.26 Even with regard to such issues as land 
ownership, where restrictions had always applied to foreigners, 
an exception was made for Palestinians. Thus, while Nasser’s 
Law 15 of 1963 tightened traditional land ownership restrictions 
by preventing foreigners27 from owning any kind of land in Egypt, 
its very fi rst article exempted Palestinians “until the Palestinian 
territories are liberated from the occupiers and Palestinians return 
to their homeland.”
Sadat and the Aftermath of the al-Siba‘i
Assassination
The Golden Era, however, was not to last. On 28 September 1970, 
Nasser died suddenly of a heart attack immediately after mediating 
between PLO President Yasir Arafat and King Hussein of Jordan, 
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who had been locked in the bloody “Black September” civil war in 
Jordan. Nasser was succeeded by Vice President Anwar Sadat, who 
had been one of the Free Offi cers. As had been the case when the 
Free Offi cers took power in 1952, policies toward the Palestinians 
initially remained unchanged under Sadat, who indeed seemed to 
follow the political course set by Nasser.
Meanwhile, popular sentiment against Israel ran high. With 
growing dissatisfaction with the “no war, no peace” situation, 
including strong anti-regime student demonstrations in January 
1972, Sadat repeatedly vowed to fi ght “when the time was ripe.” 
In October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack 
against Israel aimed at recapturing the territories it seized during 
the June 1967 war. Although the initial successes, especially the 
Egyptian army’s crossing of the Suez Canal, were soon reversed by 
Israel (with the help of a U.S. airlift of military supplies), the war 
proved to be a watershed, providing the psychological boost that 
enabled Sadat to pursue diplomacy to recover the Sinai Peninsula. 
Central to Sadat’s approach was rapprochement with the United 
States, under whose auspices Egypt signed two disengagement 
agreements with Israel in 1974 and 1975.
It was not until November 1977, when Sadat traveled to 
Jerusalem to address the Israeli Knesset (he had announced his 
impending visit at a special session of Egyptian parliament to 
which he had specially invited Yasir Arafat), that Egyptian-PLO 
relations began seriously to sour. After the visit, Sadat launched 
his “Egypt First” slogan. It was around this time that references in 
the press to Egyptian sacrifi ces and Arab (especially Palestinian) 
ingratitude were stepped up, thus laying the ground for the vicious 
anti-Palestinian campaign that was soon to follow.28
For the Palestinian population in Egypt, the turning point—
repeatedly cited in our interviews—was the 18 February 1978 
assassination in Nicosia, Cyprus, of Egyptian culture minister Yusif 
al-Siba‘i29 by the notorious Palestinian Abu Nidal faction.30 Though 
Abu Nidal had been expelled from Fatah and the PLO with much 
fanfare in the early 1970s and was widely known to be their sworn 
enemy, the Egyptian government and media did not hesitate to 
stigmatize the Palestinians in general for the assassination. At al-
Siba‘i’s funeral, Egyptian prime minister Mustafa Riyad declared, 
“No more Palestine after today.”31 The fallout of the assassination 
was immediately felt within Egypt’s Palestinian community, 
with a fl urry of arrests, surveillance, and detentions. Although 
the research for this book did not yield specifi c information on 
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the number of Palestinians arrested after al-Siba‘i’s death, some 
interviewees reported that Palestinian houses were regularly 
searched for young men to bring in for questioning.
The police made intensive arrest campaigns against Palesti-
nians after the death of al-Siba‘i. That day, the police came to 
the building where I live and asked about a Palestinian offi cer 
in the army, which was my rank then. My Egyptian neighbors 
spoke highly of me and I was lucky that they did not come 
again. (P1, Giza, Cairo, 10 May 2002)
By the time of the al-Siba‘i assassination, almost fi ve years had 
passed since the October 1973 war, and prospects for a brighter 
economic future were as distant as ever, disappointing the hopes 
raised by the disengagement agreements. The Egyptian public 
had thus had time to begin measuring the costs of long confl ict, 
making them vulnerable to the propaganda already underway 
about Egyptian sacrifi ces and Palestinian ingratitude. A number of 
interviewees alluded to the backlash against them in the wake of 
the assassination:
After the killing of al-Siba‘i, Egyptians considered Palestinians 
as Jews [an allusion to Palestinian perceived economic 
power], although we are Arabs like them. One day the front 
window of my shop was broken. Of course, it was an Egyptian 
who did it. Why? What have I done to them? Is it only because 
I am Palestinian, like those who killed al-Siba‘i? (P9, Wailey, 
24 June 2002)
The al-Siba‘i assassination triggered a spate of anti-Palestinian 
editorializing, which further infl amed popular opinion. “Disloyalty” 
became a trait frequently attributed to Palestinians.32 Another 
endlessly repeated charge—mentioned by a great number of 
our interviewees as a standard and deeply ingrained idea about 
Palestinians—is that they “sold their land to the Zionists” of their 
own accord and therefore got what they deserved. Not atypical is 
the following passage from the popular Egyptian daily al-Akhbar:
Each one of the thousands of people who participated in the 
funeral asked himself: Is this what we get for having waged 
four wars for those who killed him? For having deprived 
ourselves of bread in order to recover their lost land? . . . for 
having deprived our children of the places in the university 
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that were their due so they [Palestinians] could have them? 
. . . for having tasted death so they could live? Are those 
the words we sacrifi ced ourselves for so that Gaza and the 
West Bank would be liberated before Sinai? Our people do 
not deserve such ingratitude. (Mustafa Amin, al-Akhbar, 20 
February 1978)
It was also during the period following the assassination 
that reports of Palestinian wealth increased, which sharpened 
resentments among poor Egyptians and fueled the Palestinians’ 
reputation for having “taken over” the Egyptian economy. As an 
example of the kind of journalistic writing that encouraged such 
notions, a 13 May 1979 article headlined “All These Fortunes for 
Palestinians Living in Egypt!!!” appeared in Egyptian Weekly 
Magazine. Among the article’s claims were that 60 percent of the 
shops in Central Cairo and Port Said were Palestinian-owned and 
that 12,000 private import-export offi ces and 40 farms were run 
by Palestinians. Exaggerating Palestinian economic power in this 
way suggested to the local population that the Palestinians in their 
midst were vampires sucking the blood of the Egyptian people.33
Of far more lasting practical consequence, however, were the 
legal changes that followed al-Siba‘i’s killing. On 28 February 1978, 
a mere ten days after the assassination, the authoritative al-Ahram
reported the prime minister’s announcement that the government 
would “reconsider all procedures that treated Palestinians as 
nationals. The purpose [was] to rank Palestinians with other Arab 
nationals and to safeguard national rights for Egyptians.” Indeed, 
the threat was soon carried out, with President Sadat issuing 
administrative regulations 47 and 48 of 1978 decreeing that all 
regulations treating Palestinians as nationals were to be annulled. 
Ministries hastened to apply the regulations: “The Ministry of Labor 
warned against issuing foreigners, including Palestinians, permits 
for business or for creating offi ces for export/import. Exceptions 
[were] made for those who had been married to Egyptian women 
for the past fi ve years” (al-Ahram, 7 August 1978). More specifi cally, 
Law 48 concerned work in the public sector. Section 1 of Article 16 
of the law stipulated that employment of Arab nationals should be 
on a “reciprocal basis.” This meant that the government of Egypt 
would hire citizens only of countries that hired Egyptian nationals. 
Needless to say, the stateless Palestinians were excluded under 
this law.
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The dismantling of Nasser’s legislation favoring the Palestinians 
continued for the remainder of Sadat’s regime, further tightening 
restrictions on employment and extending the restrictions to other 
spheres, especially education, where Palestinians saw themselves 
progressively deprived of their access to free education and to 
university study. Details of this legislation are discussed in chapters 
4 and 5.
An often overlooked aspect of the cancellation of the regulations 
treating Palestinians as nationals is that it did not concern 
solely the Palestinians in Egypt. The measures had far-reaching 
consequences for Palestinians across the Arab world, at least with 
regard to education. For more than twenty years, Palestinians 
could be educated in Egyptian universities free of charge, and 
tens of thousands took advantage of the offer: From the mid-1960s 
until 1978, an average of 20,000 Palestinian students per year 
were enrolled in Egyptian universities.34 In this sense, then, what 
ended with the legislation following the al-Siba‘i assassination was 
the lingering legacy of Nasser’s “sponsorship” of the Palestinian 
people. By enacting these measures, Sadat was signalling that 
Egypt was no longer the patron of the Palestinians nor the primary 
Arab defender of their cause.
Even as the local Palestinian community was stripped of its 
privileges, however, the formal break with the PLO did not occur 
for another two years, though the relationship became increasingly 
strained as Israel and Egypt moved closer to concluding a peace 
agreement. In September 1978, the Camp David accords were 
signed, followed by the signing of the fi nal Egyptian-Israeli peace 
treaty in March 1979, when PLO-Egyptian relations were frozen. 
They were still “frozen” two and a half years later, when Sadat was 
assassinated on 6 October 1981, the eighth anniversary of the start 
of the October war, by members of the Egyptian fundamentalist 
organization al-Gamiat al-Islamiyyah. One of their major grievances 
was Sadat’s separate peace with Israel.
The Mubarak Era
Sadat was succeeded by Husni Mubarak, who has been 
president of Egypt ever since. The fi rst few years of the Mubarak’s 
government witnessed a continuation of the policies of Sadat’s last 
years, with employment restrictions confi rmed and tightened, and 
new prohibitions further limiting Palestinian access to education, 
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albeit at a slower pace. Meanwhile, relations with the PLO began 
to improve gradually in the aftermath of Israel’s 1982 invasion of 
Lebanon, and diplomatic ties were restored in 1983.
But as a weak and vulnerable community, the Palestinians 
remained at the mercy of shifts in government policy and public 
opinion triggered by external events in which they had no role. 
In general, sympathy for the Palestinians coincided with Israeli 
actions against them in an inverse relationship: the more brutal 
the action, the greater the sympathy. Thus the 1982 invasion 
of Lebanon and the siege of Beirut triggered an outpouring of 
solidarity, reaching a peak at the time of the Sabra and Shatila 
massacres. Support for the Palestinians also increased during the 
fi rst intifada that broke out in 1987, when Israel’s “iron fi st” policies 
sparked widespread indignation. Political parties, unions, actors, 
and ordinary Egyptians participated in demonstrations expressing 
their solidarity with the Palestinian people under occupation.
On the other hand, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 
and the February 1991 Gulf war, in which Egypt participated as a 
member of the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, provided the occasion 
for a strong backlash against the Palestinians. Though many poor 
Egyptians, resentful of Kuwait’s great wealth, had shown support 
for Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein following his occupation of Kuwait, 
the Egyptian media (with the clear assent of the government, if 
not at its prompting) seized upon the PLO’s statements in support 
of Saddam and the pro-Saddam demonstrations by Palestinians 
in the occupied territories and elsewhere to launch another full-
blown propaganda assault on the Palestinians. One of the most 
vicious attacks appeared on 22 September 1990, about six weeks 
after the Iraqi invasion, in the popular daily Akhbar al-Yawm.
In a long open letter to President Mubarak, Egyptian journalist 
Ibrahim Saada referred to the Palestinians as “opportunistic 
cowards,” “thieves,” and “killers.” He also harped on the well-worn 
theme of Palestinian ingratitude toward those who had done so 
much for them. Although many of the Palestinians who went to 
the Gulf states were highly educated, he wrote that Kuwait had 
given “everything” to “hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who 
came to it destitute and illiterate.” Specifi cally with regard to the 
Palestinian community in Egypt, Saada replayed the myths about 
Palestinian privilege and wealth, affi rming that they “live in much 
better and more refi ned conditions” than Egyptians. He also vastly 
exaggerated their numbers, claiming them to be in the “hundreds 
of thousands” at a time when their numbers in all likelihood did 
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not reach 100,000. As to what should be done about the resident 
Palestinians, Saada advised President Mubarak as follows:
I do not ask for Palestinians in Egypt to be deported, but I 
ask you to prevent any more Palestinians from coming in. We 
already have hundreds of thousands of them in a country that 
suffers from overpopulation. I ask you to stop this Palestinian 
penetration of businesses in our economy and to end their 
declared and hidden monopoly on trade of consumer goods 
in our country.
He had fi ve specifi c recommendations:
1.  Prevent Palestinians from being active in the commercial, 
agricultural and industrial sectors of this country . . .
2.  Give an ultimatum to Palestinians to liquidate their assets in 
agricultural, industrial, commercial, and vocational domains. 
They should be required to deposit their money in Egyptian 
banks and when the money runs out, the PLO should fund 
them.
3.  Let no Palestinian student study in our schools, colleges or 
universities . . .
4.  Allow no Palestinian graduate to work in Egypt.
5.   Prevent political asylum seekers from being politically active. 
(Ibrahim Saada, Akhbar al-Yawm, 22 September 1990)
Well over a quarter of a million Palestinians were expelled from 
Kuwait and the other Gulf states during and after the war, including 
tens of thousands of Palestinians with Egyptian travel documents. 
Many of those who attempted to enter Egypt were turned back. 
Stories appeared in the Egyptian press about Palestinians detained 
at the airport and then deported, especially to the Sudan35; this 
included long-time Palestinian residents of Egypt.36 Egyptian 
newspapers also published reports about Palestinian students 
registered at Egyptian universities being prevented from entering 
Egypt from abroad (al-Sha‘b, 9 October 1990). Some students 
returning to Egypt from studying abroad suffered the same fate:
My son, who was studying in Poland, graduated in 1991 and 
tried to come back to Egypt. In the airport, he was prevented 
from entering. That was a result of the Palestinian position 
on the Gulf war. He was forced to go to Sudan and then to 
Yemen, where he is now. (P16, ‘Ayn Shams, 8 June 2002)
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Harassment was not limited to Palestinian travellers trying to 
return to Egypt. Reports of petty measures taken in retaliation 
for the PLO position included actions against students inside the 
country. For example, as PLO-Egyptian tensions mounted during 
the Gulf war, Palestinian students in Mansura University were 
surprised to fi nd themselves shut out of the examination halls 
with their seat numbers deleted. They were unable to persuade the 
president of the university, who claimed he was acting on order 
from the Ministry of Higher Education, to allow them to sit for the 
fi nal exams.
On the “up” side of the opinion swings, the al-Aqsa intifada that 
erupted in September 2000 triggered enormous support for the 
Palestinians, with almost daily street demonstrations at particularly 
crucial junctures and the collection of funds to be sent to Palestine. 
Committees against Zionism and in support of the Palestinians 
were formed.37 Newspaper headlines refl ected the support of the 
Egyptian government and people for the Palestinians, and daily 
media programs reported on those injured and killed by Israeli 
forces. The outpouring of public sympathy, however, was directed 
primarily at Palestinians in the occupied territories; for the most 
part, it did not have a noticeable impact on Egyptian attitudes 
toward the Palestinians living in their midst.
As for government policy, in September 2003, hopes were 
raised within the Palestinian community when President Mubarak, 
responding to pressures from the Egyptian women’s movement 
(supported by the National Council for Women), appointed a high-
level committee to study a redrafting of the Egyptian Nationality 
Law of 1975. Under the old law, Egyptian men married to foreign 
women could pass their nationality on to their children and, after 
a certain period of time, to their wives, but the reverse was not 
true. One of the major reforms expected of the new law was that it 
would end this gender discrimination and grant Egyptian women 
married to foreigners the same right to transmit citizenship as 
Egyptian men. Given that an estimated third of all Egyptian women 
married to nonnationals are married to Palestinians,38 the passage 
of such a law promised to be the most signifi cant development 
for Palestinians in Egypt since the Nasser era, if not since their 
arrival.
 In July of the following year, the Egyptian National Assembly 
did in fact pass “Law No. 154/2004 Amending Certain Provisions of 
Law No. 26/1975 Concerning Egyptian Nationality,” which granted 
Egyptian women the same rights as Egyptian men with regard 
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to conferring nationality on their children. Thus, Article 2 of the 
law states that an Egyptian national is a person born either to an 
Egyptian father or an Egyptian mother; in accordance with this 
law, any person born after the passage of the law automatically 
becomes an Egyptian national. As for persons born to an Egyptian 
father or mother before the activation of the new law, Article 3 
states that those who wish to obtain Egyptian nationality must 
apply to the Interior Ministry; citizenship will be granted either by 
decision of the minister or one year after receipt from the ministry 
of the application stamped with the words “no objection.” The law 
further stipulates a one-year grace period during which to apply.39
According to a high offi cial in the Justice Ministry quoted by al-
Ahram Weekly, those who do not apply within this one-year period 
will “forever lose their right to be Egyptians.”40
Implementation of the law with regard to Palestinians has been, 
to say the least, mixed. Children born to Egyptian mothers and 
Palestinian fathers since the law was passed have indeed received 
Egyptian citizenship automatically, without diffi culty. But the 
situation is more complicated for the children of such marriages 
born before the law’s passage. Although no exception is spelled 
out in the law, widespread inquiries confi rm that Egyptian women 
attempting to fi le applications on behalf of their children—or indeed 
older Palestinians born of mixed marriages attempting to fi le for 
themselves—have consistently been turned away. The explanation 
given (orally) is that granting Egyptian nationality to Palestinians 
contradicts state policy, which advocates their return to their 
homes as mandated by UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) 
and which therefore opposes permanent resettlement (tawtin)
in the host countries. A 1959 Arab League recommendation that 
prohibits granting Palestinians citizenship of other countries so 
as to preserve their Palestinian identity is sometimes specifi cally 
cited.41
A number of disappointed applicants have challenged this 
unwritten policy by fi ling suits at the Egyptian Council of State 
on the grounds of equality before the law; because no specifi c 
exception is made for Palestinians, challengers demand the same 
right enjoyed by Sudanese, Syrians, and all other nationalities who 
have been granted Egyptian citizenship under Article 3. According 
to our informants, applications on behalf of small children under 
the age of 10 are generally approved, whereas applications for 
older persons, especially those over 16, are most often rejected. 
Our inquiries have found no cases at all of qualifying mature adult 
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Palestinians winning such a suit. One of our informants, though 
his young child won his suit with the Council of State and was 
granted citizenship, has received no response to his own suit fi led 
four years ago, at the same time as that of his child.42
Administrative Overview
A word of clarifi cation may be useful for what follows concerning 
the administrative or bureaucratic bodies with responsibility for 
the Palestinian community. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the 
Cairo-based “Government of All Palestine” had an almost entirely 
paper existence, but it did have one real function: It issued travel 
documents to Palestinians both in Egypt and in the Gaza Strip 
from 1949 until 1960. In 1960, Law 28 ruled that the GAP passports 
for Palestinians residing in Egypt proper be withdrawn and 
replaced by Egyptian travel documents issued by the Department 
of Immigration, Passports, and Nationality.43 Travel documents for 
the Palestinian residents of Gaza were henceforth issued by the 
Egyptian administration in the Strip (the AOGG), which since the 
Egyptian-Israeli armistice had already been in charge of all other 
bureaucratic matters pertaining to Gaza residents.
The duality between the two bodies continues to this day. 
After the Gaza Strip was seized by Israel in the 1967 war and the 
Egyptian administration in Gaza was dismantled, a much-reduced 
AOGG was relocated to Cairo. This offi ce, located in Madinat 
Nasr, continues to handle the passports and residency permits of 
those who entered Egypt from Gaza and their descendants, as well 
as all those who entered the country after 1967. Meanwhile, the 
Department of Immigration, Passports, and Nationality continues 
to handle these matters for all the pre-1967 arrivals and their 
descendants.
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Settling and Surviving in Egypt 
In the fi rst two chapters, we provided a general context for the Palestinian community of Egypt, examining the successive waves of refugees into the country and the broad government 
policies and public attitudes that affected them. This chapter 
addresses another part of the overall context: Where did the 
refugees settle in the absence of permanent refugee camps, and 
what determined their choices? And, once settled, given the 
constraints facing them and deprived of the safety net provided by a 
dedicated aid agency, what strategies did they use to survive? How 
did the characteristics of their community affect their situation 
compared to that of their compatriots who went to Jordan, Syria, 
or Lebanon? In other words, what are some of the factors—beyond 
state policies and legislation outlined in the previous chapter—that 
shaped the construction of the community and set it apart from 
those in other host states? And fi nally, how did the Palestinians, 
mainly Muslim Arabs, integrate into Egyptian society, especially 
given the longstanding ties between Egyptians and Palestinians?
The fi rst section of this chapter will explore settlement patterns, 
with special attention given to how they were shaped by the 
differing circumstances of the two principal waves of refugees. The 
second section will focus on the social networks that constituted 
their most valuable coping tool (indeed, social capital, or social 
networks, is an underlying theme of this chapter and those that 
follow). The pressures of the uncertainties of life in Egypt, and 
the community’s overall lack of protection, inevitably affect 
individuals in different ways, pushing some to ever-greater efforts 
to assimilate, others to withdraw. These differing responses, partly 
generational, are dealt with in the last section on the impact of life 
in the ghurba, a place of exile.
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Settlement Patterns
Broadly speaking, with regard to the two main “waves” 
of Palestinian infl ux into Egypt, those arriving in 1948 came 
independently, mainly as individuals or in small groups, while 
many of those arriving in 1967 had been deported en masse by the 
IDF from the newly conquered Gaza Strip and already had some 
connection with the Egyptian government, either as fi ghters or as 
employees of the Gaza administration. These differences strongly 
affected how and where they settled.1
Self-Settlement in 1948
By 1949, the Egyptian government had already closed down the 
emergency camps established in ‘Abbasiyyah in Cairo and Azarita 
near Port Said, dismantled the last camp at Qantara Sharq, and 
transferred its residents to newly created camps in the Gaza Strip. 
From then on, except for the temporary camp of Mudiriyyat al-
Tahrir set up in 1967 to process the incoming refugees from Gaza, 
no Palestinian refugee camps remained on Egyptian soil.
The absence of refugee camps profoundly shaped the 
Palestinian community in Egypt. Traditionally, refugee camps have 
permitted people to group together and relate to each other based 
on their common experience of dispossession and exile. Camps 
or exclusively Palestinian neighborhoods make it possible for 
refugees in the host country to replicate the settlement patterns of 
their home village and clan. In the Baqa‘a refugee camp in Jordan, 
for example, sections or neighborhoods have been named after the 
parts of Palestine where residents lived before the exodus, such 
as Hayy Nablus (the district of Nablus) or Hayy Hebron.2 In some 
cases, individuals coming to the host country were able to locate 
family members simply by looking for sections of the camps where 
others from their village were known to be concentrated.
In Egypt, where areas of dense Palestinian concentration 
are extremely rare, reconstruction of this kind was the exception 
and occurred exclusively in rural areas. The village of Jazirat Abu 
Fadil, 4 kilometers from Abu Kabir in the Sharqiyyah Governorate, 
is a good example. There, the research team found a marginalized, 
largely agricultural village of some 150 Palestinian families 
from Beersheba living much as they had lived in Palestine, with 
little infrastructure and without electricity, telephone, or water 
services. The village ‘umdah (the Egyptian term for mukhtar, or 
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village head) was the son of the previous mukhtar in Beersheba 
and had been nominated by the villagers to take over when his 
father died. Seen very much as the father of the community, 
the ‘umdah regulates internal matters, represents the village in 
government meetings to lobby for services for the village, and 
reports any problems to the Palestinian Labor Union,3 which has 
a presence in many such rural areas and which coordinates with 
the government to make sure things run smoothly.4 A number of 
villages around al-‘Arish in northeastern Sinai, also populated by 
refugees from Beersheba, likewise have replicated social patterns 
from Palestine, with traditional mukhtars retaining their positions 
and serving as mediators with the Egyptian authorities. In the 
case of these villages, it is important to mention that the refugees 
arrived together and often belonged to extended families or clans, 
as in the following testimony from Qanayyat, a small town in the 
Sharqiyyah Governorate.
All of the Palestinians who live here are from one family—
the al-Nawasrah. Some are from the Abu Nusayr family 
or descend from the Husayniyyah family. They came from 
Beersheba in the aftermath of the 1948 war. They fi rst lived in 
mud houses and then built homes in Hayy al-Arab. Today we 
have more than 20 families with at least eight members each. 
(7/40, Qanayyat, 15 July 2002)
In some cases, the choice of where to settle was infl uenced by 
Egyptian land ownership laws, such as Law 874 of 1949, which 
stipulated that agricultural land without established owners 
belonged to the state but could be used with state permission. It 
was under this law that some of the refugees entering in 1948 were 
able to settle:
This land is for the government. When the al-Nawasrah fi rst 
arrived from Bir al-Sab‘ (Beersheba), they stayed on this land 
in Qanayyat and they divided the land among themselves 
and each paid £E 25 yearly as rent to the government. (7/41, 
Qanayyat, 15 July 2002)
The refugees’ social networks in Palestine, their socioeconomic 
and geographical background, and the nature and direction of their 
fl ight all infl uenced decisions about where and how they settled. 
As indicated above, proximity to Palestine as well as the landscape 
itself played an obvious role in many settlement decisions: Some 
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of our interviewees expressly said they had wanted to fi nd areas 
that ressembled the land they had been forced to leave. Al-‘Arish, 
the closest region to Palestine, is a good example of the proximity 
factor: It has been estimated that at least 15 percent of Egypt’s 
Palestinian community is concentrated there.5
Others settled near the temporary camps where they fi rst took 
refuge:
We chose to remain in ‘Abbasiyyah, not far from the camp 
where we fi rst stayed near al-Muhammadi mosque in an 
empty space. The Palestinian men went to talk to the shaykh
al-hara [the representative of the families in that area] to 
get permission to settle on the land near the mosque and the 
cemetery. Men started collecting bricks from roads and built 
the ishash (simple houses made of hay) in which we lived. 
Ever since then we were called ‘Arab a-Muhammadi.’ (Um 
Ahmad, PP1, Madinat al-Salam, Cairo, 17 January 2002)6
Not surprisingly, people tended to go to areas where other 
Palestinians had already settled or where they had contacts. A 
large number of Palestinians settled in the Sharqiyyah Governorate, 
where many reported having a grandparent of Egyptian origin. One 
of our interviewees spoke of longstanding pre-1948 contacts with 
Egyptians from Sharqiyyah:
We are originally from Isdud. My uncle was the mukhtar
there. The Egyptian Free Offi cers used to stay at his house 
whenever they were in Isdud.7 After the war, my family went 
to Sharqiyyah. Before the war, many of the Egyptians from 
Sharqiyyah were working in Palestinian cities, so Palestinians 
had built their contacts with Egyptians while they were there. 
(Husayniyyah, 24 July 2002)
Decisions about settlement were often based on social and 
professional ties from the homeland:
My father left in 1948. He went from Majdal to Gaza and then 
on to Abu Kabir. He chose this region because he knew many 
people through his business relations there. (7/28, Abu Kabir, 
13 July 2002)
Many Palestinians from Majdal now live in Faqus, where the 
predominant profession is that of blacksmith:
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We left Yibna for Majdal when the war started. We went to Khan 
Yunis and to Faqus, where we knew there were Palestinians, 
particularly blacksmiths from Palestine. In addition, my 
brother was married in 1944 to a Palestinian woman who had 
lived in Faqus since 1936. (7/36, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
Palestinians who arrived as individuals mainly settled in larger 
Egyptian cities. There, too, they tended to congregate whenever 
possible in the same neighborhoods, though urban living and the 
inevitability of extensive mixing made it impossible to recreate the 
life patterns that were sometimes possible in the countryside. The 
same held true for the Palestinians, mainly from Gaza, who entered 
the country as “socioeconomic” migrants for work or study during 
the 1950s and 1960s.
Government Assistance in 1967
The situation for those entering Egypt from Gaza in 1967 was 
quite different from that faced by the refugees in 1948, and was 
affected both by their mode of arrival and the composition of the 
group. The fact that large numbers were deported, brought by the 
IDF in trucks and buses and dumped at the Egyptian border, of 
necessity involved the Egyptian military. Moreover, large numbers 
of those who entered were already employed by or on the payroll 
of the Egyptian government, primarily as military personnel (e.g., 
members of the ‘Ayn Jalut Brigade or the Mustafa Hafi z fedayeen), 
as policemen, or as employees of the AOGG.
Consequently, unlike the 1948 refugees, many of the 1967 
entrants received some government assistance in settling and 
in other ways as well. Employees of the AOGG who could not 
be absorbed into the scaled-down Gaza administration that was 
reconstituted in Cairo were provided with jobs elsewhere (but 
paid by the AOGG).8 As mentioned in chapter 1, many of the 
1967 arrivals were hired for government civilian jobs during the 
screening process at the Mudiriyyat al-Tahrir temporary camp. 
The 3,000–4,000 PLA fi ghters who were kept as a “reserve” and 
not deployed on active duty under Egyptian command at the Bitter 
Lakes on the Suez Canal140 were helped to fi nd housing with their 
families near military barracks. In Cairo, many settled in Wailey 
in the Kubri al-Quba area, where a military base was sited; others 
settled near bases in the ‘Ayn Shams or Dar al-Salam areas.
The same held true for those who had been with the Mustafa 
Hafi z forces. One of the young men who had been taken “hostage” 
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by the Israelis in the IDF sweeps of the Gaza Strip in 1967, for 
example, recounts the following:
Because I had been shot in the leg, I did not pass the test [for 
the Egyptian army]. I joined my father [who had been with 
the Mustafa Hafi z 141 fi ghters] later in a fl at in Wailey, where 
many of the people in the Mustafa Hafi z forces were living. 
(P9, Wailey, 24 June 2002)
Though there is no longer a base at Wailey and the barracks are 
long gone, to this day the area—along with ‘Ayn Shams or Dar 
al-Salam—continues to be associated with the presence of large 
numbers of former PLA or Mustafa Hafi z personnel.
As we saw in chapter 1, some of the 1967 “hostages” were 
inducted into the Egyptian army and dispatched to various military 
bases outside Cairo. Their families, however, generally settled in 
the above-mentioned neighborhoods of Cairo, and that is where 
the soldiers returned when on leave.
My father was expelled along with many other people from 
Khan Yunis. He was taken with other young men to Qantara 
to join the Egyptian army. The families of the newly recruited 
soldiers lived in ‘Ayn Shams. (P11, ‘Ayn Shams, 28 May 2002)
The civilians who entered Egypt individually in 1967—and who 
were not family members of the military men, employees of the 
Egyptian administration in Gaza, or given employment in other 
government departments—had to self-settle like the earlier refugee 
waves, generally in towns and cities. A number of these, however, 
were businesspeople, sometimes with connections to the regime, 
and relatively well-off.
Coping Strategies and Mechanisms
Adapting to a new environment inevitably poses great 
diffi culties for an uprooted and dislocated refugee community, 
but the Palestinians in Egypt face unique constraints. In addition 
to the legal and attitudinal obstacles described in the previous 
chapter, they lack many of the assets that have helped Palestinian 
refugees in other host countries. This point is brought home 
indirectly by a 1994 study by the Norwegian research institute 
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Fafo entitled Finding Ways: Palestinian Coping Strategies in 
Changing Environments, which focuses on Palestinian refugee 
families living mainly in camps in the West Bank, Jordan, and 
Lebanon.10 While some of its key fi ndings resonate with ours—for 
example, the crucial role of social networks in determining where 
Palestinian refugees settled and in constructing the community—
the Fafo study takes for granted conditions that not only make 
survival per se far easier but also facilitate the development and 
effectiveness of the social networks essential to coping in a new 
environment. These conditions include dense concentrations of 
Palestinians (both in camps and in almost exclusively Palestinian 
neighborhoods), signifi cant numbers overall, the unfettered ability 
to form social clubs or associations, and the safety net provided 
by UNRWA. Before going into the livelihood strategies deployed 
by the Palestinians in Egypt, it is useful to address briefl y some 
of the characteristics that set this community apart from their 
compatriots in the neighboring host countries and that affected 
their ability to adapt economically, socially, and culturally.
Special Characteristics of the Palestinian 
Community in Egypt
Perhaps the most important characteristics of the Palestinian 
community in Egypt are its extremely scattered nature and its 
minuscule size relative to Egypt’s huge population. Egypt is a large 
country geographically as well, and Palestinians are dispersed 
throughout the northern governorates. Almost invariably they live 
in mixed communities or neighborhoods. Most Palestinians have 
little idea where their compatriots beyond their immediate circles 
are located; even PLO bodies have only approximate notions of 
Palestinian population distribution. The impact of such conditions 
on the formation of social networks is obvious.
The absence of refugee camps affects more than just settlement 
patterns. Refugee camps constitute a focal point for a displaced 
community, or what amounts to a “home base.” In host states such 
as Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, the camps constitute what have 
been called “cultural and national islands,”11 a kind of focus of 
identity even for Palestinians who are well integrated into the host 
society. By grouping Palestinians in a relatively small area, camps 
ensure an umbrella for the refugee community and are an important 
factor in strengthening the cement that binds the community and 
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the social networks. They also provide a measure of protection, 
however limited.
In the Palestinian context, the absence of camps means the 
absence of UNRWA, established in 1949 to provide immediate 
relief for the refugees pouring into the areas surrounding the newly 
created State of Israel. UNRWA fulfi lls many functions, but most 
importantly it provides a safety net. In the host countries where 
it operates, it continues to this day to provide basic foodstuffs, 
education in its schools, health care in its clinics, and a variety 
of social and welfare services to all registered refugees who need 
them, whether or not they reside in camps.12
Such services are not readily available to Palestinians in 
Egypt. The Egyptian government’s aid efforts through the Higher 
Committee of Palestinian Immigrant Affairs were limited after the 
fi rst years, and were restricted to those who possessed not-always-
easy-to-obtain refugee cards.13 The assistance provided by the PLO 
and its affi liated bodies has shrunk considerably over the years, 
especially since the fi nancial crisis that followed the 1990–91 Gulf 
war and the shift in the PLO’s focus to state-building after Oslo.14
Moreover, as we discovered in our fi eld research, many Palestinians 
who live outside Cairo were not even aware of the PLO unions and 
the services they offer.15
In a country where restrictions on Palestinian employment are 
severe and where Palestinian children no longer have free access 
to public education, the absence of such services can have dire 
consequences. A particularly dramatic example, which illustrates 
the lengths to which some Palestinians will go to obtain services 
taken for granted elsewhere, was recounted in al-Ahram Hebdo
(22 October 1997):
Seraj, a father of four children, two of whom attend private 
schools, receives a salary of £E 300 per month. He sold one of 
his kidneys to pay his children’s school fees.
Unusual as this case may be, there is no doubt that lack of basic 
services combined with tight restrictions on the right to work 
have greatly increased the vulnerability of the community in an 
environment that was often not simply neutral but actively hostile. 
Against such a background, the role of social networks and social 
capital becomes all the more vital.
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Social Networks and the Construction of Community
Central to all strategies of adaptation and survival is “social 
capital,” the ability to secure resources through membership in 
social networks or larger social structures. Originally developed as 
a concept in economics to identify the social resources which, like 
physical capital and human capital, facilitate the achievement of 
goals,16 social capital is a useful way of looking at how networks of 
mutual support, reciprocity, trust, and obligation can improve an 
individual’s situation and wellbeing.17 In contrast to human capital, 
which relates to skills and knowledge, social capital is embodied in 
relations among persons as they interact in families, workplaces, 
neighborhoods, local associations, and a range of informal and formal 
meeting places. Quite simply, it is the “the glue that binds.”18 The 
resulting networks provide support, fulfi ll immediate subsistence 
needs, and allow for medium and long-term investments to guard 
against vulnerability. The embedded nature of social institutions 
and kinship is critical for improving the individual’s welfare and for 
providing a coping mechanism in exile.19
Despite daunting political and social constraints, the 
Palestinians in Egypt are managing to get by. At the heart of their 
coping strategies is social capital, and more specifi cally what Ben-
Porath has called the “F-connections”—families, friends, and fi rms 
(or business relations).20 In the case of the Palestinians in Egypt, 
these essential connections are underpinned by an additional 
form of “social capital”: good relations with the host community. 
This is always important to refugee communities in exile, but it is 
particularly vital for Palestinians in Egypt for the reasons discussed 
above. Indeed, this form of social capital is so intertwined with 
the other forms of social capital—the networks made up of family, 
friends, and business acquaintances—that it is impossible to treat 
it separately. Paradoxically, while the attitudes of the Egyptian 
population in general have been notably volatile with regard 
to the Palestinians, perhaps nowhere in the Arab world has the 
degree of interaction and intermingling been as high as in Egypt, 
and Palestinians there probably rely on these relations more than 
anywhere else.
The Family
In all societies, the family represents the nucleus community, 
the basic unit of social organization and the primary source of 
shelter and protection against the uncertainties of the world. This 
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is even more so in situations of exile: The family is central to the 
Palestinian community in the diaspora, and family support is a 
principal means of survival. In the homeland, the family provides 
security for its members and functions on economic, social, 
cultural, and political levels. In exile, it helps its members to adapt 
to new social and economic conditions.
The family plays an important role in taking on the burdens 
of social institutions destroyed through displacement, becoming 
a focal point for a support network of other Palestinian families 
and Egyptian friends and acquaintances mobilized to address 
daily livelihood concerns. Within the family and kinship network, 
helping and supporting other members to attain their objectives is 
ultimately seen as increasing the opportunities of and benefi ting 
the family as a whole.
Many of our interviewees mentioned in passing the help 
provided not only by immediate family members but more distant 
relatives in such matters as obtaining residence permits, fi nding 
employment, underwriting travel for work abroad, investing in 
education, and so on. The following examples are typical:
My uncle wanted to help my father pay university fees. He 
brought me to Gaza to study at al-Azhar University and he 
took care of all my expenses. (7/37, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
When my uncles found out that I was unable to fi nd work here 
in Egypt, they tried to help me fi nd work in Gaza. They sent 
me a visitor’s permit, and I worked with them in construction 
a few years back. (8/13, Shubra al-Khayma, 11 June 2002)
It goes without saying that the basis of family continuity 
and renewal is marriage. In Palestine, the typical marriage was 
traditionally between cousins (especially fi rst cousins), a refl ection 
of the importance of clan. The high rate of such marriages in 
Palestine undoubtedly contributed to the reproduction of particular 
Palestinian communities as distinct and bounded units, whether 
villages, refugee camps, or urban neighborhoods.21
Inevitably, however, traditional family patterns have become 
more extended and heterogeneous in exile, with marriages to 
individuals outside the clan or family becoming common, even 
the norm. Such marriages increasingly have been with Egyptians, 
although many Palestinians continue to favor marriage with 
fellow Palestinians, if not with kinsmen. For these last, ties to the 
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homeland and identity are maintained and nourished through such 
marriages. The following interviewees typify this attitude:
I preferred having my two daughters marry Palestinians so 
that they would always feel part of one family. (7/ 35, Faqus, 
14 July 2002)
Palestinian women are more understanding of the conditions 
of Palestinian men here. They have more respect and 
appreciation for the head of the family, plus they understand 
our traditions better. (7/31, Bilbays, 11 July 2002)
Among our interviewees who attached great importance to 
marriage within the community, several saw Palestinian weddings 
as a way of introducing their children to old village networks and 
where potential spouses could be assessed for their children of 
marriageable age. Some tried to replicate the culture back home 
at these events:
My children’s weddings were held the Palestinian way, with 
fi ve to seven days of taalile (festivities for the bridegroom) 
before the wedding night. We usually do it in clubs and we 
bring Palestinian singers and dabkah dancers. (P17, ‘Ayn 
Shams, 8 June 2002)
Many interviewees, however, related how diffi cult it was to 
maintain traditional Palestinian marriage patterns along family or 
clan lines. For these individuals, what counts is “actual social ties, 
obligations, attachments, and loyalties, and the networks built up 
out of these.”22 Exposure over time to Egyptian culture has made 
many Palestinians more open to “mixed” marriages; indeed, as has 
been mentioned, there is a longstanding tradition of intermarriage 
between Egyptians and Palestinians that predates the 1948 
events. Many of our interviewees casually referred to Egyptian 
grandparents in passing, while for others a grandparent’s marriage 
to an Egyptian formed part of their story:
My grandfather used to buy armaments from Egypt and 
sell them in Palestine. During one of his visits to Egypt, he 
married my grandmother, who is Egyptian from Dyarb Nijim. 
As the situation deteriorated [in Palestine], he was unable to 
return with his goods [and settled in her village]. (7/38, Dyarb 
Nijim, July 2002)
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Not surprisingly, intermarriage has vastly increased in the last 
decades. No data exist on the extent to which it is practiced, but 
anecdotal evidence and the fi ndings of our study suggest that it is 
extremely widespread:
We are all married to Egyptians. My father’s marriage to an 
Egyptian helped him acquire his tax card for the television 
repair workshop that we have and for a work permit. It also 
helped us [the children] in our school and university education 
since we had reduced fees. My two sisters, after two years of 
marriage to Egyptians, have been granted nationality. I prefer 
marriage with an Egyptian since it facilitates the processing 
of paperwork during our residence here and creates one big 
integrated family within Egyptian society. (7/45, Minya al-
Qamah, 11 July 2002)
If a Palestinian woman has a choice, she would not marry a 
Palestinian man, in order to avoid administrative problems 
[for her future children]. (7/37, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
These interviews suggest the very practical benefi ts for Palestinians 
of having an Egyptian spouse, particularly an Egyptian husband 
who has traditionally had the legal right to pass his nationality on to 
his children automatically. Even though Egyptian women married 
to foreigners did not have this right prior to the amendment of the 
Nationality Law in 2004, such marriages did confer the right of 
residency on the spouse and their children—itself an important 
benefi t. Thus, bluntly speaking, marriage with members of the host 
community has been a strategy for upward mobility and enhancing 
one’s legal rights. Given the enormous diffi culties of being stateless 
in Egypt, the passage of the new Nationality Law, which appears 
to allow Egyptian women married to Palestinians to pass Egyptian 
citizenship on to their children born after 2004, the attractiveness 
of this option, at least for some, can only increase.
Friends and Business Relations
Much like the case of intermarriage, Palestinian attitudes 
toward extensive mixing with Egyptians have varied. For many in 
the fi rst generation, the bitterness of exile heightened their sense 
of longing for the close social ties of Palestinian village life, and 
such feelings often colored their reactions to the “other.”
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Relationships today are very different from those in the past. 
Today, each family is enclosed in their house. No one likes 
even to see good things happening for others. In the past, 
neighbors supported each other. The neighbors helped each 
other by lending money or lending anything needed, like 
onions or garlic. Today, none of this happens. My neighbor’s 
daughter got married and did not even invite us. (P4, Dar al-
Salam, 18 May 2002)
In our interviews, we found many of the older generation whose 
nostalgia for the homeland was refl ected in their preference to 
remain within their own group.
All my friends and contacts are Palestinians who migrated 
with me in 1967. We live in the same area; we work together 
and we support each other . . . we rarely have social contacts 
with Egyptians. (AP3, Alexandria, August 2002)
Such attitudes, however, are increasingly rare, particularly among 
the second and third generations. Indeed, many young Palestinians 
reported feeling more “Egyptian” than Palestinian and considered 
themselves part of Egyptian society. Those who were brought up 
in Egypt often said that they did not feel culturally different from 
Egyptians and did not feel the need to seek out other Palestinians.
I do not know any Palestinians. All my friends are Egyptian. 
My dad knows some Palestinians who I do not know. We have 
no Palestinian relatives [here]. I only know my [Egyptian] 
relatives from my mother’s side. (P15, Dar al-Salam, 2 June 
2002)
Speaking the same language (dialectical differences aside) and 
sharing the same basic culture, traditions, and (for the most part) 
religion, it is not surprising that close relationships have developed 
between many Palestinians and Egyptians. In addition to marriage, 
these relations include long-time friendships and commercial 
partnerships. Their importance is refl ected in the following quote:
We are on very good terms with our Egyptian neighbors. They 
are better than our family, especially because we live in a 
densely populated area. We support each other during illness. 
We have similar traditions. We visit each other. We lend each 
other money whenever any one of us is in need. Last year we 
Settling and Surviving in Egypt  71
helped our young neighbor with wedding expenses. I can ask 
my neighbors for money whenever I am in need. I have done 
that once. It is even better than asking family members who 
are abroad. I avoid asking them for any favors. I have some 
relatives in Saudi Arabia that I do not like to ask for help 
because they are arrogant. They would do the favor and feel 
that they own you by doing it. (P1, Giza, 10 May 2002)
The genuineness of the personal affi nities is not in doubt, but in 
a situation of stringent regulations and legal constraints—not to 
mention an environment that can quickly turn hostile under the 
impact of political developments—the utility of these relations is 
inestimable. The benefi ts run the full range, from an anonymous 
offi cial’s spontaneous overlooking of expired permits (the fact that 
unknown but large numbers of Palestinians have been living illegally 
in Egypt for years is itself an indication of such complicities) to 
conscious acts of support and solidarity. These last, in turn, range 
from small neighborly favors to acting as employment sponsor, 
putting oneself on the line, or offering gratuitous fi nancial help. 
Many of the interviews throughout this study illustrate the range; 
a few examples suffi ce:
When my brother left for Austria, he had overstayed his re-
entry visa. With the contacts that we have in the security 
services, we were able to sort out the re-entry and renewed 
his residency to enable him to come back to Egypt. (7/28, Abu 
Kabir, 13 July 2002)
I repair the cars of two Egyptian clients. They both work at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We always talked about the 
situation in Palestine and they always showed sympathy. We 
became good friends. Once I had a debt and I was asked to 
pay it, and I sought the help of one of these friends. He paid 
the debt and offered to bring me to Saudi Arabia, as he was 
supposed to be posted in the Egyptian embassy there. (8/13, 
Shubra al-Khayma, 11 June 2002)
Business relationships and partnerships are also common and a 
major source of “social capital” as a way of getting around Egyptian 
regulations limiting ownership rights for Palestinians.
Added to my father’s work at the railway station, he used 
to work with Egyptian friends by investing in land or shops 
and then selling the property when prices went up . . . Today, 
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we have made use of the back garden of our house, which is 
owned by the railway station, to build four shops. We invested 
in this in partnership with our Egyptian brother-in-law. The 
business is promising. We had to count on the family’s good 
contacts with Security to sort out the problem with the railway 
station when they wanted to sue us because we used the back 
garden. We have very strong relations with the Egyptians on 
the social and the professional levels. (7/21, Salhiyyah, 8 July 
2002)
Our fi eld research has demonstrated the extent to which many 
Palestinians in Egypt have succeeded, through good luck, hard 
work, and the skillful use of social capital, to survive and in some 
cases to thrive. The relatively high integration attested to by some 
of our interviewees, however, is only part of the picture. The 
good relations—in some cases true friendships—that bind some 
Palestinians and Egyptians should not obscure the reality of the 
precariousness of Palestinian lives in Egypt. Thus, in spite of the 
fellowship and positive experiences enjoyed by some, for many 
and perhaps most Palestinians Egypt remains, though in varying 
degrees, essentially the ghurba, a place where in the last analysis 
they are ghuraba (strangers), where they are made to feel like 
strangers.
Fear and Mistrust in the Ghurba
The most essential ingredient—indeed the indispensable 
basis—of any social network is trust. While trust undoubtedly 
characterizes many Palestinian personal relationships in Egypt, 
the overall atmosphere in the country is frequently seen by 
Palestinians as one of mistrust, extreme uncertainty, and even 
fear. This perception profoundly affects the construction of 
the community, rendering volatile any social integration and 
community participation through civic and political involvement 
and empowerment. Tolerance of social diversity in the host state 
has varied over the years, the lack thereof often shaped by state 
policies toward the Palestinian “foreigners” and fueled by media 
campaigns. Many of our fi eld interviews illustrated the distorting 
effect on community of such imposed external factors and the 
resulting insecurities.
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Egypt has been living under emergency law intermittently since 
1958 and continuously since 1981, when Sadat was assassinated.23
Emergency Law 162 of 1958 gives the authorities extensive powers 
to suspend basic liberties, including banning demonstrations 
and public meetings, arresting and detaining suspects without 
trial for prolonged periods, and turning to state security courts 
whose procedures fall far short of international standards. It is in 
accordance with the Emergency Law that the activities of groups 
such as the Palestinians are strictly regulated, arrest sweeps are 
made, and surveillance is sanctioned.
Without doubt, the vigor of the law’s application has varied 
considerably over the years, increasing in times of tension. 
As discussed in chapter 2, the singling out of Palestinians for 
surveillance intensifi ed with the deterioration of PLO-Egyptian 
government relations, especially after Sadat’s 1977 Jerusalem visit, 
and reached new heights with the al-Siba‘i assassination in February 
1978. Meanwhile, the Egyptian public, traditionally known for its 
good humor and tolerance, was heavily infl uenced at the time by 
media reports projecting negative images of Palestinians. As a 
weak, dispersed minority, the Palestinians had always been aware 
of their vulnerability, but the relative abruptness of their change of 
status in 1978 drove home as never before the precariousness of 
their situation. In the perception of many Palestinians, life in Egypt 
since that time has been characterized a constant and unbroken 
sense of insecurity. Thus, a Palestinian shopkeeper, recounting 
how his shop window had been shattered by Egyptian assailants 
in the wake of the al-Siba‘i assassination, continued without pause 
to describe the anti-Palestinian hostility during the Gulf war more 
than ten years later, as if no time had elapsed between the two 
events:
These were hard moments for us [after al-Siba‘i was 
killed], when our treatment by Egyptians and the Egyptian 
administration changed. During the Gulf war, Egyptians were 
happy that Iraq was under attack by Egyptian and American 
forces. We, Palestinians, were afraid. We used to sit in our 
closed shops to watch news and avoid harassment from the 
Egyptians. (P9, Wailey, 24 June 2002)
In such a volatile atmosphere, Palestinians often see themselves 
as being at the mercy of events beyond their control, subject to 
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harassment and security searches even following events in which 
there had been no Palestinian involvement.
The attack against the Israeli tourist bus in Isma‘iliyyah in 
1989 or 199024 affected us . . . As Palestinians, our houses were 
searched frequently. (7/37, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
In times of uncertainty, the ties within a community take 
on special importance. For many Palestinians in other host 
countries, social clubs, sometimes organized around towns or 
regions of origin, reinforce bonds of solidarity and identity and 
help reduce the sting of exile by creating a sense of belonging and 
fellowship. In Jordan, for example, numerous societies organized 
along these lines have sprung up among Palestinians since the 
1970s. Largely apolitical, these groups arrange cultural meetings, 
picnics, and weddings, help their poorer members, and mediate 
disputes among members.25 Such clubs or associations would 
be particularly welcome in a dispersed refugee community in a 
country like Egypt, where they would help reduce the effects of 
scatteredness, strengthen a sense of solidarity and belonging, and 
help build confi dence and a sense of security in diffi cult times. In 
Egypt, however, such social or cultural clubs are banned, and under 
the Emergency Law any meeting of more than fi ve persons must 
receive prior security clearance. Even the unions connected to the 
PLO, which were created with the express approval of the state, 
are required to obtain permits whenever they host events. When 
such events are held, state security personnel are posted at the 
door and often can be seen taking notes throughout the gathering.
Attempts even to form mixed Palestinian-Egyptian clubs have 
been discouraged if not prevented:
I tried to create a joint Egyptian-Palestinian social club. I went 
to the Ministry of Social Affairs and everything began falling 
apart from then on. I was asked to get security clearance and 
to go through many procedures and paperwork. I fi nally had 
to give up on it. (7/37, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
We also heard reports of loss of membership in Egyptian social 
clubs or of being barred from mixed sporting activities:
We were members of the Nasser Club, where we used to pay 
£E 15–20 per family to renew our membership. During the 
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rule of Sadat, a decision was made to prevent Palestinians 
from joining clubs. So we lost our membership. My son 
played with the junior football players at al-Ahli club. Later, 
he was transferred to the Zamalek club. Then he was stopped 
altogether from playing with these clubs because he is 
Palestinian. (P17, ‘Ayn Shams, 8 June 2002)
Though arrest sweeps have not been common in recent 
years, close surveillance of minorities, particularly Palestinians, 
continues. Some interviewees said Palestinian “agents” are used to 
report any actions or statements seen to run counter to the status 
quo to the Egyptian security forces. In an environment where 
suspicion reigns, it is not surprising that Palestinians tend to be 
cautious not only when dealing with Egyptians but also with fellow 
Palestinians. These sentiments were refl ected by a number of our 
interviewees, such as the following:
It is better for me not to know Palestinians because this can 
cause trouble. We are not living in our homeland, and every 
move we make should be calculated. One should avoid people 
who may cause suspicion on the part of the government. (P2, 
Port Said, 17 May 2002)
Thus, despite common historical experiences and a shared 
identity, we found a number of Palestinian families in both rural 
and urban areas who reported keeping to themselves.
Many Palestinians live near us. We know that we are 
Palestinians, but we never visit each other. There is nothing 
special between us, just like our relationship with our 
Egyptian neighbors. Our Palestinian identity is not a reason 
for us to interact. (P11, ‘Ayn Shams, 28 May 2002)
Similarly, a woman whose husband’s family was brought from 
Gaza by the Red Cross after 1967 to join her father-in-law, who had 
entered Egypt separately, had this to say:
Ever since they settled, [my husband’s family] did not contact 
any of those who came with them. We have limited contacts 
with Palestinian and Egyptian neighbors. My husband keeps 
telling me, ‘Let us care about our own business’ (khalina bi 
halna). (8/3, Abu Za‘bal, 30 June 2002)
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In a security-oriented state, it is perhaps not surprising if people 
become suspicious of one another and limit social interaction 
and responsibilities toward the community. Still, the response of 
such extreme withdrawal was relatively rare in our interviews—
almost as rare as its polar opposite: Palestinians who, despite the 
uncertainties and anxieties inevitable in such an environment, have 
managed to create their own “imagined” Palestinian communities in 
the ghurba. Shibin al-Qanatir in the Qalyubiyyah Governorate, for 
example, is a close rural community whose members are from the 
same region of Palestine and mostly in the same profession. There, 
not only does everyone know each other, but, as one member of 
the community told us, “Though we are not all relatives, we all call 
each other cousin!” (8/12, Shibin al-Qanatir, 3 July 2002).
The experience of living in the ghurba elicits many responses. 
In looking at the livelihood strategies deployed by Palestinians in 
Egypt, we found a wide range of attitudes, from a high degree of 
assimilation to total isolation and withdrawal into the family. But 
the largest number of those we interviewed fell between these two 
poles, showing a sense of solidarity and a greater comfort level 
among fellow Palestinians, yet acceptance of and easy mixing with 
Egyptians in daily contexts. Without doubt, however, anxieties 
remain, ready to bubble up to the surface when a political crisis 
arises to remind Palestinians of how fast things can change in the 
ghurba.
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Chapter 4
Residency and Employment 
In a country like Egypt, beset by overpopulation and poverty, procuring a livelihood can be an intense struggle for the great majority of the population, whether Egyptian or Palestinian. 
What makes the Palestinian situation more diffi cult, as already 
noted, are the legal barriers to rights normally taken for granted: 
the right to secure residency, the right to enter and leave the 
country of residence at will, the right to work, to be educated, to 
own property. This chapter and the next discuss each of these areas 
and the regulations that govern them, highlighting in many cases 
the elaborate stratagems people use to circumvent the obstacles in 
order to survive. This chapter deals fi rst with residence permits and 
travel documents and then with formal and informal employment.
Residence Permits and Travel Documents
Residency Categories and Renewals
Residence permits are the most important documents for living 
in Egypt: Without them, one must live virtually underground, in 
constant fear of being discovered and deported. Residence permits 
come in various categories and are issued by two separate bodies. 
For Palestinians who arrived in Egypt before 1967 (and their 
offspring and descendants), permits are issued by the Department 
of Immigration, Passports, and Nationality at the Mugamma‘, the 
government complex on Tahrir Square in central Cairo where 
various government bureaucracies are located. For those who 
arrived during or after the 1967 war (mainly from Gaza) and their 
offspring and descendants, the permits are issued by the AOGG, 
the former Egyptian administration in Gaza relocated to Madinat 
Nasr in northeastern Cairo. The residence permits fall into fi ve 
categories, according to the date of arrival of the head of household 
(or the original entrant on whom the residency depends): A, B, 
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and C category permits, for pre-1967 arrivals, are issued at the 
Mugamma‘; D and H category permits for post-1967 arrivals are 
issued by the AOGG. Residence permits are valid for variable 
durations, again depending on the arrival date. The residency 
renewal periods can be summarized as follows:
A:  Arrival before 1948; renewable every fi ve years, or ten years 
if proof of ten-year continuous residency in Egypt can be 
provided.
B:  Arrival in 1948; renewable every fi ve years.1
C:  Arrival in 1956; renewable every three years.
D:  Arrival in 1967; renewable every three years.
H:  Arrival after 1967; renewable every three years (can vary 
according to the conditions of entry into Egypt).
Although residency requirements in Egypt have always been 
strict (see chapter 2), during the Nasser years their application 
was somewhat relaxed. Today, they are rigidly enforced: 
Residency is contingent upon providing a reason for remaining 
in Egypt. Possible reasons include education, licensed work, 
marriage to an Egyptian, or business partnership with an Egyptian. 
Bureaucratically, these various reasons take the form of a 
guarantor, which can be an institution (e.g., place of employment, 
school or university, the PLO Labor Union) or an individual 
(e.g., parent, spouse, employer, business partner). In all cases, 
an offi cial document proving that the applicant lives in Egypt 
for one of these reasons, as well as the guarantor’s relationship to 
the applicant, must be provided.
The payment of fees for renewing residency is also required. 
Given the widespread poverty in the Palestinian community, 
where many families are without regular income, this can be a 
major concern.
I usually run out of money when I need to renew the residencies 
for the six children and myself. I may need to borrow money 
or sell some of our belongings, such as a television or the 
double bed, which I had to do twice in recent years. (7/30, 
Bilbays, July 2002)
The renewal of the residencies cost us £E 500 for seven 
persons—my husband and my six children. I sometimes run 
out of money and borrow from my family to help pay the fees. 
(P22, Faysal, 15 June 2002)
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Late payment can result in fi nes:
I was once late in renewing permits for me and the children 
because I did not have enough money. They wanted to fi ne 
me £E 315. I submitted an appeal and was exempted from the 
fi ne. They renewed the residencies as usual. (7/30, Bilbays, 
July 2002)
In some cases where the residency has not been renewed for 
some years for various reasons, only payment of a substantial fi ne 
averts deportation:
We had not renewed our residence permits for more than 
14 years. Our father, who used to travel with the PLO army, 
looked after these issues. It was only when he was put in 
prison that we realized that we needed to renew them and 
we had to pay a penalty of £E 2,000. (7/25, Abu Hammad, 10 
July 2002)
In both rural and urban areas, it is the women of the household 
who are frequently put in charge of handling bureaucratic and 
administrative matters such as renewing residence and travel 
documents or processing the children’s paperwork for school. This 
is especially true in cases where Palestinian men have married 
Egyptian women:
My wife usually takes care of renewing residence permits 
for me and the children, especially because we all depend 
on her as a guarantor for our stay. In addition, people in the 
administration are more sympathetic to her than they would 
be to me, a Palestinian. We usually pay £E 158 to renew each 
residency—every three years for me and every fi ve years 
for my children, since their mother is Egyptian. I rely on the 
help of my brothers in Saudi Arabia and in Libya to pay such 
expenses. (P10, ‘Ayn Shams, 23 May 2002)
I sometimes rush around for days to fi nish paperwork to 
renew my children’s and husband’s residence permits. I am in 
charge of all the paperwork for travel documents and schools. 
All have three-year residence permits. The children get their 
residence permits based on the fact that I am Egyptian. (P22, 
Faysal, 15 June 2002)
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One of the most common justifi cations for obtaining residency, 
besides marriage to an Egyptian, is proof of employment, generally 
in the form of a letter from the employer:
I renew my residence each year based on my permit to work 
as an electrician using the licence of my workplace. (8/13, 
Shubra al-Khayma, 11 June 2002)
Employees of the AOGG, which is part of the Egyptian 
government, or of the PLO have the fewest problems with residence 
permits, because they are considered public sector employees. 
Even when they are retired, they can renew their residencies on 
the basis of proof of their pensions. This is refl ected in a number 
of interviews.
The majority of Palestinians in Egypt, however, work in the 
informal sector, without work permits or stable jobs, and thus face 
the greatest obstacles in obtaining or renewing their residencies. 
Many have found creative ways of overcoming the problem. Some 
business owners are willing to provide the needed documentation 
as a favor:
My husband gets his [residence permit] on the basis of a letter 
from a factory claiming that he works there. Although he does 
not work in the factory, the owner was kind enough to give 
him such a letter on yearly basis. (P22, Faysal, 15 June 2002)
Among the easiest work permits to obtain are taxi drivers’ 
licenses, which can be used to renew residence permits. Our 
interviews revealed that numerous small shopkeepers or trades-
men get their residence permits on this basis so as to avoid 
bureaucratic problems arising from having a small business or 
performing “unlicensed work.” Imad, for example, is a licensed 
electrician and runs a repair shop out of his house, making relatively 
good money (almost £E 300 a month), but gets his residency permit 
thanks to a taxi license (P20, Dar al-Salam, 11 June 2002). Another 
owner of a workshop elaborates on this strategy:
Getting a work permit as a taxi driver is much easier than 
getting it as an owner of an electrical repair workshop. That 
would require providing proof of commercial registration, 
insurance, and licences for the shop. All this requires money 
and permits that I can’t provide. If an inspector comes to the 
workshop, I would need to give him fi ve to ten pounds so that 
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he wouldn’t report that the workshop is not registered. (8/11, 
Shubra al-Khayma, 12 June 2002)
Another relatively easy route to a residency permit is through 
an agricultural labor licence, which can be obtained with a letter 
from the PLO-affi liated Labor Union.
An agricultural labor permit usually costs one or two pounds. 
For a permit as a shop owner, I may need to pay £E 16 a month 
as insurance. In the past, I was able to get an agricultural labor 
permit easily, but now it is not so easy. The administration at 
the Mugamma‘ may ask to look at my hands and see that I 
don’t have the hands of a farmer. (7/37, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
Residency permits for children are renewed automatically with 
those of their parents. However, children can be deported at age 
18 if they are not still in school or at age 21 if they have not found 
licensed work upon completion of their university education. 
(Remaining in school itself represents a considerable fi nancial 
burden, because Palestinians can no longer attend public schools 
for free and university fees are prohibitive for many if not most.2)
Many in this position are forced to live illegally until they can 
provide the authorities with an offi cial reason for their stay:
My son became an illegal resident when he turned 21. The 
offi cer at the Mugamma‘ told me that he would soon be 
deported. My son had never gone to school because he had a 
fever when he was a baby that affected his brain. (P24, Wailey, 
24 June 2002)
If no other justifi cation for remaining in the country can be 
provided, as a last resort a bank statement showing a balance of at 
least £E 20,000 may be accepted by the Mugamma‘:
My second daughter is married to a Gazan who runs a business 
for a Saudi. He has neither a residence permit nor a work 
permit. He put £E 20,000 in the bank to get a residence permit 
but it has not yet been issued. (P22, Faysal, 15 June 2002)
Parents with some means often resort to this route in order to 
secure residence for unemployed children when they pass the 
legal age limit:
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We had to deposit £E 20,000 to get a residence permit for 
my eldest son when he turned 21. Now we have to deposit 
another £E 20,000 for our younger son. (AP2, Hilmiyyat al-
Zaytun, 5 August 2002)
For many young Palestinian men and women, marriage to an 
Egyptian is a means of legalizing their stay in Egypt. The legal 
benefi ts of such marriages until recently were not equal, however. 
As already mentioned, a Palestinian man marrying an Egyptian 
woman traditionally gained a guarantee of residency only, but 
not eligibility for citizenship for himself and their children. A 
Palestinian woman marrying an Egyptian man, by contrast, could 
look forward to receiving these benefi ts from her husband. The 
impact of this legal gender divide on marriage decisions in the past 
is evident in the following interview:
My son will soon turn 21. His father and I are thinking of 
getting him married soon. We have asked for the hand of 
my niece, an Egyptian, but her parents refused because my 
son is Palestinian. We have ensured the situation of our two 
daughters, who are both engaged to Egyptians. Eventually 
they will get Egyptian nationality. (8/3, Abu Za‘bal, 30 June 
2002)
Although, in keeping with an unwritten policy, the 2004 Nation-
ality Law is not being implemented with regard to Palestinians 
born of Egyptian mothers prior to 2004,3 the signifi cance of the 
law with regard to Palestinian-Egyptian intermarriage in the future 
cannot be overstated. The fact that the law is automatically applied 
to children born after 2004 to mixed couples where the mother is 
Egyptian removes an important barrier to such marriages. More 
than once in the course of our interviews, we heard of Egyptian 
parents opposing the prospect of their daughters marrying 
Palestinians. Their opposition, we were told, was motivated by 
their concern for the future of their grandchildren, who at the time 
of our fi eld research would have been subject to a life without 
protection or rights.
The Perils of Egyptian Travel Documents
The “Egyptian Travel Document for Palestinian Refugees” 
comes in two very distinct types: one for Palestinians residing 
in Egypt, and another for Palestinians who never had this right 
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(this latter is for travel only). The fi rst type is issued on the basis 
of a valid residence permit, and, like residence permits, comes in 
categories A, B, and C for pre-1967 arrivals and their descendants 
and categories D and H for post-1967 arrivals. These permits are 
issued, respectively, at the Mugamma‘ and by the AOGG, but in 
contrast to the residency permit, they are valid for an unvarying 
fi ve years.
Regulations governing the travel documents are strict. To ensure 
re-entry into Egypt, the Egyptian travel document holder with a 
valid residency permit who is traveling or residing abroad must 
either return to Egypt every six months or provide the Egyptian 
authorities in advance with proof of employment or of current 
enrollment in an educational institution abroad. In such cases, 
a one-year return visa may be granted. No extension or renewal 
can be granted through Egyptian embassies abroad. Any delay 
beyond the stipulated deadline can result in denial of entry or 
deportation.
The second type of Egyptian travel document, valid for travel 
only and carrying no rights of residency in Egypt whatsoever, is 
held by tens of thousands of Palestinians from Gaza and their 
descendants. During the decades when Gaza was under Egyptian 
administration, these documents were issued upon request to 
any Gaza resident. These were the documents used by the many 
thousands of Gazans who migrated, with the encouragement of the 
Egyptians, to Gulf oil states and elsewhere for employment from 
the late 1950s onward.4 After Israel occupied the Gaza Strip in 1967, 
Gazans abroad who did not attempt to return to their occupied 
homeland continued to use these travel documents, which were 
renewed by the Egyptian embassy in the countries where they were 
employed. An estimate of the number of such documents can be 
gleaned from a 1994 document issued by the Egyptian Department 
of Passports, Immigration, and Nationality detailing the number of 
Egyptian travel documents issued according to residency category: 
For category E, “arrivals after the June 1967 war,” the number given 
is 236,307.5 Needless to say, the overwhelming majority of travel 
document holders in this category were not residing in Egypt.
The Palestinian holders of this type of Egyptian travel document 
were tragically vulnerable to the winds of fate and politics. The 
most terrible example was their situation arising from the 1990–
91 Gulf crisis, already alluded to, when thousands either left on 
their own or were expelled from the Gulf states following the 
allied victory over Iraq. Most of some 30,000 Palestinians stranded 
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in Kuwait, accepted by no state, were Gazans with Egyptian 
travel documents.6 As for those who somehow managed to get 
to the Cairo airport, they were summarily deported along with 
their fellow Palestinians whose Egyptian residence permits had 
expired. Gazans fortunate enough to have Israeli re-entry permits 
for the Strip, and who reached the Cairo airport, were issued 72-
hour transit visas by the Egyptian authorities; transit between the 
airport and the Rafah border crossing to the Strip took place under 
a “strict and humiliating police escort” (the costs of which were 
borne by the transitees) to prevent them from staying illegally in 
Egypt.7
The Gulf war of 1990–91 was not the only politically motivated 
mass expulsion from which Palestinian holders of Egyptian 
travel documents suffered. A second such instance, though on 
a far smaller scale, took place in September 1995, when Libyan 
leader Muammar al-Qadhafi , making the point that Palestinians 
should return to Palestine, called upon Arab states to expel their 
Palestinian residents to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He himself 
set the example by expelling more than 1,000 Palestinian holders 
of Egyptian travel documents to the no-man’s land on the Egyptian-
Libyan border. Some managed to reach Gaza, where the PA was 
already in place, but Egypt granted transit visas only to those with 
Israeli re-entry permits; most were denied entry into or passage 
through Egypt. It is not known how many were legally permitted 
to enter Egypt or how many managed to sneak in. What is known 
is that several hundred remained stranded at Sallum camp at the 
border until January 1997, when Qadhafi  fi nally consented to allow 
them back into Libya; even then, it was not until 18 April that they 
were transported in four buses from the Sallum border point to 
Tobruk in Libya. Others were allowed to join their families in 
Egypt.8 The following interviewee refers to this episode:
My brother used to live in Libya. He was among those 
stranded at the border. For nine months he remained in the 
camp, but he managed to get smuggled back into Libya. He 
worked illegally as a teacher in a private school and his salary 
was given to him as an allowance [per hour worked] but not 
as a salary. Fearing prison, he then managed to fi nd a network 
of people to smuggle him into Egypt. Today, he has a bakery 
registered in his wife’s name and lives illegally in Egypt with 
no papers at all. (7/27, 10 July 2002)
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The fate of victims of such large-scale political events receives 
some public attention thanks to press coverage and human 
rights reports, but the hundreds if not thousands of cases of 
Palestinian residents or former residents of Egypt with Egyptian 
travel documents who are denied re-entry for transgressing—by 
carelessness or by force of circumstance—the rules of the travel 
document, or even due to bureaucratic red tape or error, go 
undocumented. For the Palestinian who has overstayed his visa, 
denial of re-entry, detention at the border, imprisonment upon 
arrival, or deportation are common occurrences. Such situations 
fi gured in a number of our interviews and ranged from the matter 
of fact or humdrum to the Kafkaesque.
Several of our interviewees referred to children whom they 
hadn’t seen for years:
Two of my children have been denied re-entry to Egypt. I have 
not seen them since they left [seven years ago]. One is a lawyer 
in Libya and the other has a photocopy center there. Neither 
has a work contract in Libya. (7/36, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
In some cases, even when papers are in order, the uncertainty 
about whether or not re-entry will be permitted is enough to make 
an individual discontinue work abroad:
I used to go to Libya when the borders were open and travel 
was easy. The problem is that I had to come back to Egypt 
every six months to keep my Egyptian residence permit. I was 
unable to apply for a return visa [valid for one year] because 
I never had offi cial work contracts in Libya and was working 
in various places. But in 1995, when I saw what happened 
to my brother when he returned from Yemen, I decided to 
come back. He was detained at the airport for several days 
and then deported back to Yemen despite the fact that he had 
an Egyptian travel document and had regularly renewed his 
residence. (7/37, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
The following stories give some sense of the situations that 
can arise from the combination of the rigid regulations governing 
the travel documents, the desperate need for work, and the 
precariousness of statelessness. They also shed some light on the 
refugee condition and the network of family spread across the 
Palestinian diaspora:
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When Basel fi nished his preparatory school, he went to work 
for a car dealer in Libya. Five years later, his sister, who is 
married to an Egyptian living in Sudan, invited him to Sudan. 
He went there to work. Later, his mother managed to get 
him a permit to come to Egypt for 15 days, as his residence 
permit for Egypt had expired. He arrived in Egypt, and after 
his [temporary visitor’s] visa expired, he was imprisoned. His 
psychological situation was very bad when he arrived, and 
the prison only made it worse. While he was in prison, his 
family tried to get him a permit for Sudan or Gaza so that he 
would have a place to go when the authorities deported him 
upon his release. His cousin in Gaza fi nally managed to buy 
him a visitor’s permit on the black market for $1,500, but by 
the time he got out of prison the intifada had broken out, and 
even though he had the visitor’s permit the authorities refused 
to deport him there. Eventually, his sister in Sudan was able 
to invite him again so that’s where they deported him. (P23, 
Giza, 18 June 2002)
While many accept their fate of yet another exile, some choose 
a different solution:
In 1994, I went to Saudi Arabia for two years to work as a 
painter. I overstayed my residence there and in the meantime 
I had lost my re-entry to Egypt. As a result of overstaying my 
[Saudi] visa, I was put in prison for 45 days in Saudi Arabia 
and was then asked to leave. My aunt, who lives in Libya, 
helped me. She invited me to Libya, where I stayed a year and 
a half, working as a painter. Later, my aunt was able to get me 
a permit to go to Palestine [after the PA was established]. So I 
went to Gaza via Egypt and stayed there [Gaza] for a year and 
a half. I then applied for a tourist visa to Egypt and I got one 
for two weeks. As it expired and I wanted to remain in Egypt, I 
found a member of parliament and asked him to raise my case 
with the minister of the interior. He offered me three choices: 
be deported; pay £E 15,000 and apply for a tourist visa; or 
remain in the country illegally. I chose the third option. (7/39, 
Dyarb Nijim, 15 July 2002)
Although it is impossible to estimate how many Palestinians 
are living in Egypt illegally, our interviews (which represent only a 
very partial sample) suggest that the number is considerable.
Detaining stateless Palestinians with only an Egyptian travel 
document at the border is a common occurrence. One example 
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is Abu Saqer, born in Cairo in 1976, a holder of an Egyptian travel 
document who had been living in Moscow. When his Russian 
residence permit expired, Abu Saqer decided to go to Egypt to see 
his family and to reapply from there to return to Moscow. Upon 
arrival at Cairo airport in August 2001, he was denied entry and 
sent on a plane back to Moscow. In turn, the authorities in Moscow 
prevented him from entering Russia because of his expired 
residence permit. He was stranded at the Moscow airport for some 
fourteen months.9 He was eventually granted asylum in Sweden.10
Article 3 of the Arab League Casablanca Protocol on the 
treatment of Palestinians residing in Arab countries states that 
“When their interests so require, Palestinians presently residing in 
the territory of [name of signatory state] shall have the right to leave 
the territory of this state and return to it.” Although Egypt signed 
the protocol in 1965, its provisions concerning travel have not been 
honored since the late 1970s. In effect, Egyptian travel documents 
are essentially laissez-passer, which offer no protection.
My son has a category H travel document. He is able to renew 
his residence with his Egyptian wife as guarantor. Last year, 
he was with his friends at a summer camp, and they were 
calling him “Pasha” [a colloquial term for a military offi cer]. 
A security offi cer overheard and asked to see my son’s ID. As 
he did not have his travel document with him, he was charged 
with impersonating an offi cer and put in prison for 11 months. 
Meanwhile, I was responsible for his expenses in prison and 
for the expenses of his wife and little daughter. I used to take 
him £E 200 every month. (7/29, Abu Kabir, July 2002)
When arrested, Palestinians may be sentenced or deported, 
regardless of the grounds for arrest. In some cases, state security 
offi cials require the families of the detained individuals to apply 
for visas to countries likely to accept them to facilitate deportation 
procedures. Sometimes, as in the case of Basel cited above, the 
family takes the initiative on its own.
Employment
In the absence of reliable statistics, it is diffi cult to profi le 
a diverse and scattered population such as the Palestinian 
community in Egypt. An attempt at providing an overall picture 
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of their economic status was made in al-Ahram Hebdo in October 
1997. Though ten years old and impossible to verify, the (unoffi cial) 
estimates advanced in the article, which put the Palestinian 
community at 70,000, could serve as a rough indictor: 78 percent 
of the community was estimated to be living under the poverty 
line, 18 percent as having average salaries, and 4 percent as being 
wealthy.11
Similarly, no comprehensive data are available concerning 
Palestinian employment according to location and occupational 
category. Nonetheless, by piecing together information obtained 
from interviews with Palestinian offi cials in Egypt with access to 
countrywide Palestinian Labor Union registration lists,12 we found 
certain occupations concentrated in particular areas. For example, 
al-‘Arish (including Bir al-Abid, Shaykh Zayud, and Rumanah), which 
was believed to represent up to 15 percent of the Palestinians in 
Egypt, was found to have a preponderance of laborers, fi shermen, 
skilled craftsmen, and farmers. In the Sharqiyyah Governorate 
(including Zaqaziq, Abu Hammad, Abu Kabir, Faqus, and Minya al-
Qamah), merchants and farmers predominated. Port Said had a 
large number of teachers. In Cairo, the largest concentration of 
Palestinians in Egypt, the leading occupations reported included 
merchants, businessmen, PLO employees (PLA members and 
employees at the various offi ces, unions, affi liates, and so on), 
employees of the AOGG, teachers, wage laborers, and drivers.
During a September 2001 interview, the late Adel Attiyah, 
then the head of the PLO Labor Union, described the very broad 
employment categories of some 12,000 workers and employees 
then registered with the Union. Of the 12,000 total, approximately 
1,000 were seasonal workers, 2,000 were drivers (with commercial 
licenses), and 8,000 were skilled (trained) workers. Registered 
employees in the public sector (mainly with the AOGG) numbered 
under 1,000, of whom almost 60 percent were retired. An additional 
30 percent of public sector employees were reported to have joined 
the PA in Gaza or the West Bank.13
The Palestinian Business Community
Much has been made of the supposedly wealthy Palestinian 
businessman. Although a small segment of the community is 
wealthy, the deeply entrenched perception of Palestinian riches in 
Egypt, fueled by the media (as described in chapter 2), is highly 
exaggerated. A not-implausible 1993 article in Rose al-Yusuf entitled 
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“Palestinians in Egypt: Refugees and Millionaires” stated that 2,500 
Palestinians have £E 15–20 million invested primarily in services 
and transportation.14 A 1994–96 study by Sari Hanafi  of Palestinian 
businesspeople in the diaspora found that over a quarter of the 
62 he interviewed in Egypt owned industrial factories, while the 
largest number (less than half) were engaged in import/export. The 
remainder (a little less than a third) were involved in agriculture, 
tourism, construction, and services.15
Palestinians arriving in Egypt after 194816 who had enough capi-
tal to start their own businesses and who were granted commercial 
licences and franchises in the early Nasser years began to prosper, 
especially after the departure of much of Egypt’s Jewish population 
in the wake of the 1956 Suez war and the nationalization of their 
businesses. Moving into sectors where Jewish businessmen had 
been strong, such as the wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, 
small hotels, and restaurants,17 Palestinians also developed an 
important presence in the tertiary sector, including barbershops, 
restaurants, and sweet shops.
Much of today’s Palestinian business community in Egypt is from 
Gaza. Trade relations between Egypt and Gaza, established in the 
early 20th century, fl ourished during the Nasser period, as luxury 
goods produced in Gaza found a ready market in socialist Egypt. 
Following the 1967 war, many Gazans transferred their businesses 
and capital to Egypt, a move made easier by the fact that they 
shared a common currency. The large size of Gazan families and 
the tendency for multiple branches of businesses to be set up by 
various family members contributed to the Egyptian perception 
of inordinate Palestinian wealth. The more successful of the Gaza 
families, including the al-Ashi and al-Surafa, rapidly expanded into 
diverse economic activities. The community also proved adaptable: 
During Sadat’s economic opening (infi tah) starting in 1974, when 
Palestinian businessmen were perceived as an economic threat, 
many took Egyptian partners. Still, wealthy Palestinians in Egypt 
to this day do not exceed a few thousand persons.18
Bureaucracy and Regulations
The employment situation of Palestinians has not changed 
signifi cantly since the Sadat regime abruptly canceled Nasser’s 
liberal measures in 1978, starting with Law 48 that made the 
employment of foreigners in the public sector subject to reciprocity 
with other countries. This law effectively barred Palestinians from 
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public sector employment without special dispensation—which 
applied almost exclusively to those working for the AOGG and 
the PLO and its affi liated bodies. In 1981, Article 26 of Law 137 
applied the same reciprocity restrictions to the private sector, 
while Article 27 stipulated that foreigners could not practice their 
professions without a permit from the Ministry of Labor and a valid 
residence permit. Adding to the diffi culties, a quota for foreigners 
in the private sector was introduced. Article 4 (Law 25 of 1982) 
stipulated that foreigners could not exceed 10 percent of the total 
workforce in any enterprise so as not to compete with the national 
labor force,19 although certain exceptions were permitted if they 
served national interests. This law is still in effect today.
The most recent Egyptian legislation concerning employment 
does not alter this picture. Article 3 of Law 43 of 1988 establishes 
the following conditions for obtaining work permits:
A.  The foreign employee can not compete with the national labor 
force.
B.  The foreign employee must have certain qualifi cations that are 
needed by the employer.
C.  The qualifi cations and expertise of the alien must match the job 
for which the permit is requested.
It is unlikely that Palestinians would have expertise or special 
qualifi cations that native Egyptians would not have, as suggested 
in point B, because Palestinians able to complete university 
would have obtained the same kinds of degrees as their Egyptian 
classmates. Beyond the specifi ed requirements, there are other 
considerations that make employers reluctant to hire Palestinians, 
which are aptly summarized in the following interview:
Finding a job is extremely diffi cult for young men here. In the 
private sector, it is stated that for every one foreigner there 
should be ten Egyptians. This is in addition to the requirement 
to insure the employee. Most companies do not want to 
provide insurance. Recruiting a Palestinian will also cause the 
company to be questioned by Security. So companies prefer 
not to have Palestinians working for them. (P16, ‘Ayn Shams, 
8 June 2002)
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In such a situation, qualifi cations do not count for much:
I applied to work in a restaurant that has several branches 
in Cairo. After I submitted my papers and provided proof of 
prior employment at a fi ve-star hotel, I was refused because I 
am Palestinian. I had to look for another job and so I became 
a taxi driver. (P12, ‘Izbit al-Nakhal, 29 May 2002)
Given the bureaucratic obstacles and drawbacks, small-scale 
enterprises that do hire skilled and unskilled Palestinian workers 
tend do so “off the books,” without contracts, insurance, or other 
benefi ts. The fact that many Palestinians employed in the private 
sector are working illegally makes them vulnerable to exploitation 
in terms of working hours, working conditions, and pay. The 
employer, for his part, runs no risk, because with no legal recourse 
and with jobs so scarce, people are happy to accept employment 
whatever the conditions.
Informal Sector Employment
With entry into the labor market blocked or stymied by 
legislation, it is not surprising that most Palestinians in Egypt turn 
to the informal sector, creating their own employment options or 
working in small-scale, individually run enterprises. Palestinians 
with limited resources and basic education represent a dynamic 
class engaged in myriad activities that, if not highly remunerative, 
at least allow them to provide for themselves and their families. In 
general, with the increasingly apparent failure of rural and urban 
formal sectors to absorb new entrants to the labor force, more 
attention is being paid to the informal sector as a hedge against 
growing unemployment.20 The informal sector, with its diversity 
of income opportunities both legal and illegal, has enabled many 
Palestinians to become economically active and more independent 
through their own enterprise.
In al-‘Arish and Rafah, for example, many Palestinians have been 
successful in the informal sector as carpenters, tailors, mechanics, 
builders, and professional repairmen. They have penetrated these 
professions by competing with locals, even while gaining the trust 
of local consumers and potential clients. Many have set up work-
shops in their own homes. It is true that the location of these two 
towns near the border of Palestine, with Egyptian Rafah overlooking 
Palestinian Rafah on the Israeli-occupied side, has contributed to 
the local economy. Underground tunnels dug between the Egyptian 
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and Israeli-occupied sides long enabled inhabitants to earn money 
smuggling high-quality but relatively inexpensive gold from Egypt 
to Gaza and Marlboro cigarettes, cheeses, pharmaceuticals, and 
other goods from the Israeli market to Egypt. Starting from the 
fi rst intifada in 1987, Palestinians wanted by Israel were smuggled 
out to Egypt, and weapons were smuggled in.21
A survey conducted by the Ministry of Labor on the distribution 
of Palestinian laborers with work permits indicated that the largest 
portion of Palestinians in Egypt work as drivers.22 We have already 
mentioned the ease of obtaining taxi permits and their importance 
as a fallback for obtaining residency based on employment. But 
many of the Palestinians in this category are engaged in transport 
and hauling. Compared with other fi elds of employment, transport 
has been less affected by political events and administrative 
decisions, and policies concerning the issuance of the various 
categories of driver’s licences have not changed signifi cantly.
If the truck is there, you need £E 300 to apply for a licence and 
£E 150 for the insurance. Then you need to sit for the exams. 
(8/12, Shibin al-Qanatir, 3 July 2002)
Indeed, trucking and long-haul transport are among the 
most common professions in the Qalyubiyyah and Sharqiyyah 
governorates north and northeast of Cairo. Many Palestinian men 
followed their fathers in these professions, while others became 
involved through social networks. In time, many have come to 
own their own trucks. Political events—most dramatically the 
1967 war—have affected the routes, but the trucking business has 
thrived.
I started working on trucks and articulated transport trucks 
when I was 18; I used to help my father in his work and in 
taking care of his truck. I never changed businesses. Today 
I own fi ve trucks. I bought them all during the 1980s and the 
1990s. I have six Egyptian employees. (7/28, Abu Kabir, 13 
July 2002)
The role of family networks in the trucking business is especially 
evident in the small town of Shibin al-Qanatir, which has a large 
Palestinian population and where truck driving is the most common 
profession. The following interview is a good example:
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My husband is an assistant to a truck driver. He makes £E 140 
a week, or sometimes £E 200, while a driver of a truck like my 
father’s makes £E 600 a week and requires a category 1 driving 
licence. The income differs for my two brothers-in-law, who 
own transport trucks and each make at least £E 5,000 a month. 
My other brother-in-law repairs trucks. He charges £E 5 to £E
20 for a day’s work. (8/12, Shibin al-Qanatir, June 2002)
Strategies for making a living adopted by lower-income earners 
with little education are usually diverse and complex and include 
an array of activities, with family members pooling their resources 
earned in a variety of ways. While work in the informal sector can 
be an avenue to success, more often, in both rural and urban areas, 
it entails long hours for little pay. Often, the work is only seasonal. 
The rewards are especially meager for those without skills or 
education:
My husband works in saksonia [collecting old clothing] and 
he then sells the clothes in the market. He works in cities 
around us as well, not only in Qanayyat. He works from 8 @-L .
until 5 O-L . every day and makes £E 15 a day. My son, who 
did not go to school either, is a carpenter. He makes £E 10 a 
day. This barely covers his own expenses. I work in seasonal 
harvesting. I usually get 5 kilograms of rice or corn or the 
product that I am harvesting. I am never paid money. Our 
daily expenses may vary between £E 3 and £E 5 a day, added 
to the fact that we have fi ve sheep that we butcher to eat. 
(7/41, Qanayyat, 15 July 2002)
Many families combine self-employment at various jobs and 
salaried labor to meet their needs:
I work as a tailor three days a week for 12 hours and make £E
150 a month. My daughter works as a secretary for 12 evening 
hours and makes £E 150. My son, who is a painter, makes 
more than £E 150 a month but has very irregular working 
hours. (P22, Faysal, 15 June 2002)
Very few interviewees in rural areas reported that they still 
work in agriculture. As will be discussed in chapter 5, Palestinians 
have not had the right to own agricultural land in Egypt since 
1985. However, some of those we interviewed were engaged in 
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activities related to farm work. Faqus, for example, is known for 
its concentration of blacksmiths:
My husband was trained as a blacksmith in Yibna [near Ramla, 
in Palestine]. I used to help him by knocking on the iron and 
blowing the kur [bellows]. The best season for our work is the 
harvest season, since the manjal [sickle] and other harvesting 
tools are in demand. My children all learned these skills from 
their father. (7/35, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
Another blacksmith from the same town relates the following:
I have worked as a blacksmith ever since I was in the fourth 
elementary class back in Yibna, Palestine. I depend on God 
for my income. I have been working here for a long time now. 
I do not have a shop. I have worked on the streets since 1948 
when we arrived. At night I keep all the equipment behind the 
wall of the cultural center. They are kind people. They let me 
do this. (7/ 36, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
The few agricultural workers the team interviewed appeared to 
be the most vulnerable we encountered. Income from agricultural 
work is low and seasonal fl uctuations make it diffi cult to earn a 
steady income. These issues are refl ected in the case of 55-year-
old Murad of Salhiyyah, who has been in farming all his life. His 
wife also works in seasonal agriculture. During harvest seasons, 
they have money and food, but work is not available at other 
times, meaning that they are often unable to pay for electricity, 
water, and other basic services. His three sons, unskilled laborers, 
have tried to fi ll the gap. Ahmad, the second son, for example, 
is employed in a workshop for ten hours a day and then works 
repairing refrigerators and electronic equipment (7/22, Salhiyyah, 
8 July 2002).
Some families that perhaps start with more assets manage to 
move ahead through ambition, hard work, and cooperative effort, 
despite the diffi culties faced:
I go to university three days a week. When not at university, 
I deliver produce from the land we own and from the lands 
around it. I drive the pickup truck and deliver the produce 
to the central vegetable distributorship [wakaleh] in the city. 
In the evening, I work in the coffee shop we established. My 
brother also works in a coffee shop with my brother-in-law. 
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The coffee shop pulls in a profi t of £E 60 to £E 130 a day. (7/21, 
Salhiyyah, 8 July 2002)
The following interview gives another example of how informal 
work can be used to support an education and move up the scale:
My son Atif, who is now an adjunct professor at al-
Azhar University, got his position on his own. His father 
died when he was young. He had to make the money for 
his education and to help with household expenses. Atif 
worked in the evenings at a blacksmith’s shop when he was 
at preparatory school. In secondary school, he became a bus 
driver’s assistant. When he fi nished school and started his 
college education at the Social Welfare College, he worked 
at a Laundromat. He then applied for higher education at the 
Institute for Arab Research and got a job at the Red Crescent 
hospital. He made £E 200 a month for four years. (P12, ‘Izbit 
al-Nakhal, 29 May 2002)
Working Women
When asked about women who work, many males interviewed 
said that they think women are better off at home taking care of 
their children and the household. Women are often seen in their 
traditional role as mothers, while men see themselves as being 
responsible for protecting the home and earning an income. A 
woman from a rural area recounts the following:
My husband is an arzuki [wage laborer]. Some days he works 
and others he doesn’t. I am expected to run the house and 
manage its expenses with only £E 5 a day. I wanted to help, 
especially since I am an Egyptian fallaha myself. I asked my 
husband if I could buy ducks and chickens and breed and sell 
them. He refused and said, “You will bring us shame.” As you 
know, these are the attitudes of Palestinians! (8/3, Abu Za‘bal, 
30 June 2002)
Such attitudes are rare among those who have had the opportunity 
to receive an education. In such cases, the husband may encourage 
his wife to work not only out of economic need but for a more 
satisfying lifestyle:
I got married when I was still at university. When I graduated 
from the faculty of arts, I traveled with my husband to the 
98  Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948
Emirates. We both worked there. He taught in the army [as 
a technician] and I taught in a government school. Since we 
came back, I have managed a day care center that I established 
with the help of my husband. (8/8, Abu Za‘bal, 2 July 2002)
In general, our interviews supported the notion that traditional 
attitudes about the “shame” of women working have become 
less common over time. Women have assumed increasingly vital 
roles in income generation and making household decisions. 
Unemployment among males and economic stresses have increased 
pressures on women to earn a living. Many women in both urban 
and rural areas reported being engaged in various kinds of informal 
commerce, including micro-trading—for example, buying small 
items like lipstick from a supermarket and selling them on the 
street.
I had a big wooden board made for me. I started buying large 
amounts of goods and selling them from a street cart [basta
or farsha in the Egyptian dialect] in the market in ‘Ayn Shams. 
My eldest son used to help me after school. (P13, ‘Ayn Shams, 
23 May 2002)
Far more common, however, was the trading of modest quantities 
of goods between Gaza and Egypt. This kind of trading is more 
easily carried out by women, who are generally better at dealing 
with the authorities (police, customs offi cials, tax agents) at the 
borders and who are traditionally subjected to less scrutiny than 
men. The requirements for such commerce are modest: a limited 
initial investment to buy the goods and a base in Palestine, usually 
with relatives or in-laws, through which to sell. The family also 
provides a social network of customers. The reported profi t from 
an average trip, interviewees told us, ranges from £E 1,000–2,000.
To improve our fi nancial situation, my wife traded goods 
between Gaza and Cairo. She went to Gaza with an Israeli 
visa and sold the goods that she took from here and bought 
goods there. When she arrived in Gaza, she stayed with my 
family in our family house. At fi rst, she used to pass without 
being noticed. When she increased the amount of goods, she 
started paying duties every time she traveled. This was not a 
problem; on many occasions, she would pay some money to 
the tax collector [customs offi cer] and he would let her pass 
Residency and Employment  99
without paying any duties. This all stopped when the intifada 
began. (P10, ‘Ayn Shams, 23 May 2002)
Women commonly work to supplement the family income. 
Mustafa’s wife “works in seasonal agriculture, at harvest time. She 
makes usually seven to ten pounds a day” (7/39, Dyarb Nijim, 15 July 
2002). Mustafa owns a juice shop, which does not provide a regular 
income. Two of the family’s four children are still in school, and 
two daughters are engaged and expected to furnish their marital 
homes,23 making the extra income, however small, necessary.
A growing number of women are taking over as heads of 
households. Many interviewees reported having been abandoned 
when their husbands secured positions with the PA in Gaza in 1995. 
Even before the move to Gaza, many wives of PLO fi ghters were 
left on their own for long periods of time. An Egyptian woman, 
now divorced, is an example:
I worked in the morning as a cleaner when I was 20 and went 
to sewing classes in the evening. When I fi nished the classes, 
I worked as a seamstress for an actress, Madame Zuzu. This 
was when I met my husband. After we got married, he made 
me quit. However, after he left us to go to Lebanon, I had to go 
back to work. I had my family’s sewing machine, so I started 
working in an underwear factory. I also sew clothes for my 
daughters’ friends. (P1, Dar al-Salam, 9 June 2002)
In such cases, women’s responsibilities double—they are left in 
charge of both running the house and earning an income outside 
the home. Some of our interviewees expressed frustration or 
anger at the number of husbands who neglect their responsibilities 
while pursuing their own pleasures and interests, but felt they 
had no choice but to forge ahead. Many amply demonstrated the 
proposition that women are better than men at “gritting their teeth 
and getting on with the work.”24
Work Abroad
Even in the heyday of Nasser’s liberal policies toward 
Palestinians, employment opportunities in Egypt were scarce. From 
the late 1950s onward, large numbers of Palestinians—especially 
from Gaza—sought work abroad. Later, PLO institutions helped 
publicize job opportunities in the Gulf and other Arab countries 
such as Libya and Yemen:
100  Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948
Yemen used to advertise employment vacancies at the PLO 
offi ce. I applied soon after I fi nished my master’s degree. I was 
accepted to teach and I lived there for ten years. However, I 
came back to Egypt regularly to renew my residency. (7/40, 
Qanayyat, 15 July 2002)
Expertise and education were the principal qualifi cations 
needed to apply abroad, and those who had benefi ted from Egypt’s 
free schooling and university education were strong candidates.25
Social networks also played a major role, with early arrivals 
having jobs in a foreign country helping family members fi nd work 
there. On the Palestinian side, work abroad not only provided a 
job—in many cases with higher salaries than could be dreamed 
of in Egypt—but sometimes also good education and better 
opportunities for their children:
In the late 1960s, my husband, who had a diploma from the 
Institute of Teaching in Egypt, had a job opportunity in the 
Emirates. He applied and relied on the help of his cousins 
who lived there. He resigned from the Egyptian Ministry of 
Education and settled in the Emirates. His salary was more 
than 1,600 Emirati dirhams. Our four sons and I soon followed 
and we stayed for twenty years. Today, Muhammad studies 
medicine, Abdallah is in architecture school, Ahmad attends 
engineering school, and Mahmud is at a medical engineering 
school. (8/8, Abu Za‘bal, 2 July 2002)
However, as we have seen, what were once promising (if often 
risky) options ended in the early 1990s with the expulsion of 
most Palestinians from the Gulf states following Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait and other regional events. Most of the accounts we heard 
of working abroad referred to the past. Interviewees also spoke 
about how they spent or invested the money they were able to set 
aside, with many drifting into the informal sector:
I went to Saudi Arabia for the fi rst time in 1977. I used to work 
for two to four months at a time as a professional painter or 
mason on construction sites and then would return to Egypt. 
At that time the fare to Saudi Arabia was £E 100. Later, I 
started going for a year at a time, making at least £E 1,000 to 
£E 2,000 a month. I would then come back to Egypt, stay for 
a month and then go to Palestine and work for a few months. 
I would then return to Egypt and go back to Saudi Arabia. In 
Residency and Employment  101
Saudi Arabia, ten of us lived in one house. When I returned 
to Egypt for good, I started selling vegetables with a street 
cart [basta] and then rented this shop to sell sugar cane juice. 
(7/39, Dyarb Nijim, 15 July 2002)
Both skilled and unskilled Palestinians sought work in the Gulf, 
often relying on relatives or friends already there to procure visas 
for them.
I was in the Liberation Army of the PLO. After I began receiving 
a pension, I asked my sister, who lives in Saudi Arabia, to help 
me get a visa, and she did. I worked at the Saudi Ministry 
of Water for eight years. When the Gulf war started, I had a 
problem renewing my residency there, so I had to come back. 
I now have a shop for ready-to-wear clothing. I pay rent and 
taxes for the shop. But the work is seasonal, with income 
increasing and decreasing accordingly. (P5, Dar al-Salam, 18 
May 2002)
As already noted, the Gulf was not the only destination for 
Palestinians from Egypt seeking work. Libya was also very 
popular, especially as it was right next door to Egypt; employment 
opportunities closer to family were preferred. Moreover, until 
Qadhafi ’s expulsion of Palestinians to the border in 1995, 
Palestinians in the country had enjoyed virtually the same rights 
and privileges as Libyans.
In 1969, my father came to Cairo to continue his education. 
He studied for four years to be a technical assistant in the 
fi eld of electronics. He worked in Egypt for a year and 
then left for Libya, where he worked in a TV repair shop. 
Meanwhile, he created a family by marrying my mother and 
having two children. Ten years later, he returned to Minya 
al-Qamah, where my mother’s family lived, and opened his 
own workshop. While we were growing up, he expanded his 
workshop to Zaqaziq. Today, I am in charge here and he is in 
charge of the other branch. (7/45, Minya al-Qamah, 11 July 
2002)
Few Palestinians remain in Libya today. Even after the crisis was 
resolved, those who returned saw their salaries cut in half and 
many new obstacles to employment put in their way.
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The number of Palestinians from Egypt currently working 
abroad is not known, but it is likely to be small. Certainly, work 
abroad is no longer an outlet for Palestinians in Egypt that can be 
sought with much hope of success.
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and Financial Assets 
Livelihoods are sustained through tangible assets (physical, economic, and fi nancial) and intangible assets, including the rights (and access) to employment, education, and health 
care. This chapter continues the discussion of both kinds of assets 
Palestinians in Egypt use to earn their livelihoods.
The fi rst section addresses education, the main route to securing 
decent employment and a stable future. Since the cancellation of 
the Nasser-era privileges accorded to Palestinians in this domain, 
access to education has been complicated. Most of the section 
on education deals with evolving restrictions and exemptions 
and how Palestinians have adapted to them. Access to health 
services has been the least problematic and is the area where 
our interviewees expressed the greatest satisfaction. The section 
dealing with health is therefore the briefest, mainly consisting of 
an outline of the services available to the community. The third 
section looks into tangible assets commanded by the community 
in the form of real estate and at the laws and changing policies 
limiting land ownership. It also touches upon fi nancial capital and 
how Palestinians use the fi nancial resources at their disposal —
mainly pensions and remittances—to improve their prospects. As 
mentioned in the introduction, our fi eld research was interrupted 
before we were able to begin interviewing members of the business 




The Egyptian educational system is composed of elementary, 
preparatory, and secondary levels. The secondary level has both 
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academic and vocational streams. All levels are offered by public, 
private, and religious (azhari) schools in both urban and rural 
areas. Public schools are free for Egyptians. Private school fees 
vary from £E 700 to £E 3,000 a year. Azhari schools provide free 
education to students of all nationalities provided they have 
Egyptian residence permits.
In addition to the regular educational institutions, the manazil
system makes it possible for students to obtain a diploma through 
home study; in Egypt, manazil is used almost exclusively by 
families unable to pay the school fees. Students under the system 
study the state-approved curriculum at home and sit for the 
government’s fi nal exams without having attended formal classes:
My six children attended private schools. When my husband 
left for Gaza, where he works as a cleaner in the Gaza Airport, 
and stopped sending money, I took them out of school. I 
had them study at home [manazil]. This was much cheaper, 
especially since we used to borrow the books assigned from 
the neighbors because I did not have money to pay even 
for that. I will make sure they get their certifi cates even if I 
need to beg. I should arm my children with education. (7/30, 
Bilbays, July 2002)
Another alternative is literacy classes, which are provided by 
mosques throughout Egypt for a nominal yearly fee. For some 
members of the community, however, even a very modest sum is too 
much to afford. The youngest daughter of one of our interviewees, 
forced to leave school to help her mother when her father had a 
major illness, recounts:
I tried to attend literacy classes. I fi nished the fi rst level, but 
I could not sit for the exams because they wanted me to pay 
the fees, £E 15, and I could not. (P22, Faysal, 15 June 2002)
At the level of higher education, private universities in 
Egypt require fees from all students, whereas public universities 
are free for Egyptians. To attend public universities, Palestinians 
must pay fees in foreign currency. Al-Azhar University offers free 
university education in the faculties of Arabic language and Shari‘a
(the science of Islamic religious law), but the other faculties require 
payment in foreign currency.
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Fluctuating Access
Beginning in the mid-1950s and continuing for some two 
decades, Palestinians enjoyed free public education at all levels 
on the same basis as Egyptian nationals. This situation changed 
abruptly in early 1978, when the Sadat government canceled the 
Nasser-era privileges for Palestinians, and a ministerial decision 
(from the Ministry of Education) decreed that Palestinian children 
be transferred from public to private (i.e., paying) schools. The 
suddenness of the change is refl ected in the following interview:
All my children received their education for free because 
Palestinians were treated like Egyptians. Only my daughter 
was unlucky, because the change in treatment of Palestinians 
happened when she was at school. I made her study at home 
[manazil] until she fi nished. (7/44, Hehya, 15 July 2002)
The ministerial decision specifi ed that if there were no private 
schools in the district, Palestinian children could go to government 
schools. For this, a paper from the head of the municipality had to 
be submitted to the Maktab al-Wafi din (General Administration 
for Foreign Students) along with other papers pertaining to the 
student’s educational level.
Some people were able to “slip through the cracks” and escape 
bureaucratic scrutiny:
Today my children are at government schools. At fi rst no 
one knew that they were Palestinian and I never brought up 
the issue. Several years later, their Palestinian identity was 
discovered and I was asked to pay for the three previous 
years. Now, every year I get a letter from the governor of 
educational affairs asking me to prove that there is no private 
school in this area so my children can go to the public school. 
(7/38, Dyarb Nijim, July 2002)
The ministerial decision exempted children of employees of 
the PLO, the AOGG, and other public sector employees, including 
retirees. These children were provided free education up to the 
university level, even after the formal break with the PLO following 
the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979.
I had been educated in Egyptian public schools. I then earned 
a technician’s diploma from the college of nursing in Cairo, 
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and upon graduation in 1971 was hired by the Ministry of 
Health. So my children also had their school education free of 
charge in public schools. (7/43, Hehya, 15 July 2002)
The post-1978 restrictions on primary and secondary education 
were soon extended to the university level, governed by the Ministry 
of Higher Education, and Palestinians accepted by Egyptian 
universities were required for the fi rst time since the Nasser years 
to pay university fees, in pounds sterling (GBP). Some were able to 
receive help from the PLO to fund their university education.
The foreign fees for Palestinians attending university were 
imposed in 1979. Abdallah was then at university. There were 
then 187 Palestinian students at Zaqaziq University. They held 
a sit-in in front of the Palestinian embassy and obliged the 
PLO to pay GBP 1,200 for each student. (7/40, Qanayyat, 15 
July 2002)
Others were not so lucky:
In my last year at the faculty of commerce at Zaqaziq 
University, the decision to require Palestinian students to pay 
fees in foreign currency was passed. In the early 1980s, I was 
asked to pay the pound sterling equivalent. My sister had to 
leave university because my family was not able to pay for 
her. (7/38, Dyarb Nijim, July 2002)
In addition to the fee requirement, the 1978 decision also 
restricted the access of foreigners to certain university faculties, 
notably medicine, pharmacology, engineering, economics, political 
science, and mass communications.
My daughter could not study architecture because 
Palestinians were not allowed to attend certain schools at the 
university. With the help of some contacts, we managed to 
receive permission for her, but we needed to pay the foreign 
fees despite the fact that I had been a government employee. 
And in 1987 when my son came fi rst in his class in Alexandria 
in the high school exams, he could not study engineering. 
Neither the ministry nor the university would admit him. He 
did not want to study a trade, so he did not continue with his 
higher education. (AP3, Alexandria, August 2002)
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Education restrictions were confi rmed periodically, and 
sometimes expanded. Thus, while decisions 87 (1983) and 75 
(1984) of the Ministry of Higher Education merely reaffi rmed 
the Palestinians’ foreign status and reiterated the ban on their 
entering technical faculties such as medicine and engineering,1
Article 2 of Ministerial Decision 394-A of 1992 added that foreign 
students could not exceed 10 percent of the total student body. 
While Article 3 of the same decision restated the ban on the study 
of certain disciplines, it specifi ed that these subjects could not 
be studied “without the permission of the university director,” 
thereby implying that exceptions were possible. Priority in 
accepting foreign students was given to recipients of government 
scholarships and students who fi nished their secondary education 
in azhari schools.
My father was a government employee, but we all went to 
azhari schools. Today, at al-Azhar University, I have no 
problems. My father still works for the government and my 
mother is Egyptian. I even applied for a Mubarak Scholarship 
and I got it. They help students by giving them £E 200 to £E
300 a year. (7/21, Salhiyyah, 8 July 2002)
University tuition was far beyond the means of all but a small 
fraction of Palestinians, and fees continued to rise. By 1991, they 
had reached GBP 2,000 for the fi rst year in the human sciences 
faculties and GBP 1,000 for the following years. The fees at the 
scientifi c faculties (for those students who had obtained the 
required special permission to enroll) went up to GBP 3,000 for 
the fi rst year and GBP 1,500 thereafter.2
The result of the imposition of fees and other restrictions was 
a dramatic drop in the number of Palestinian students enrolled 
at Egyptian universities: From an average of 20,000 students a 
year from the mid-1960s up to 1978, the fi gure dropped to 4,500 
a year in 19853 and to just over 3,000 a year by 2000.4 Certainly, 
the overwhelming majority of Palestinian university students in 
Egypt had always come from other Arab countries (and, before 
1967, from Gaza as well), but the falling numbers affected resident 
Palestinians at least as much.
Meanwhile, the PLO had been directly subsidizing university 
fees for the children of at least some of its employees, but these 
outlays were affected by the cutoff in funding from the Gulf in 
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retaliation for the PLO’s statements during Iraq’s occupation of 
Kuwait in 1990–91.
As my husband was working at the PLO, we used to provide 
papers [for the subsidies]. When the Gulf war started [1991], 
my daughter was at university and we submited the usual 
papers, but they were not recognized. The PLO later stopped 
funding students at all universities. My daughter had to leave 
the university. (P30, ‘Izbit al-Nakhal, 13 June 2002)
In general, the prohibitive cost of higher education for 
Palestinians was a subject of great concern, especially for the 
resident community. In 1992, Ministerial Decision 24/722/92, Article 
5, Section 10 facilitated access to higher education for certain 
categories of Palestinians, notably the children of PLO and public 
sector employees. The move, which involved reducing university 
fees to 10 percent of the full amount, appeared to be related to the 
Palestinian–Israeli peace negotiations that had begun following the 
October 1991 Madrid conference and that ultimately led, however 
indirectly, to the signing by Israel and the PLO of the September 
1993 Oslo Accord setting the framework for a peace settlement. 
Just a month later, on 30 October 1993, the General Administration 
for Foreign Students (Maktab al-Wafi din) of the Egyptian Ministry 
of Higher Education sent an offi cial letter to the cultural attaché of 
the Palestinian embassy clarifying the categories of Palestinians 
exempted from paying 90 percent of the university fees. The 
categories were as follows:
 Children of public sector employees,• 5 including retirees; 
children of Egyptian widows and divorcees; and children 
of women who have passed Egyptian high school exams;
 Continuous residents of Egypt—those who were born in •
Egypt and have completed all levels of basic education in 
Egyptian schools;
 Students needing fi nancial assistance who can submit •
papers verifying their economic circumstances.
The decision to exempt the children of public sector employees, 
especially of PLO personnel, from 90 percent of the foreign fees was 
formalized at a meeting between the Egyptian minister of higher 
education and his Palestinian counterpart in spring 1995. The PA 
had already been established in Gaza, with a foothold in the West 
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Bank, and the meeting had been arranged to institute ways aimed to 
facilitate the enrollment of Palestinians in all faculties of Egyptian 
universities as a way of supporting the Palestinian state-building 
project; at the same time, the ban on studying certain subjects 
(e.g., medicine, engineering) was also dropped. An announcement 
to this effect followed the meeting.6
Though a 90-percent exemption is certainly substantial, the 
reduced fee still amounted to GBP 100–150 a year, a considerable 
sum for most Palestinians in Egypt. The requirement of payment 
in a foreign currency made settling the fee all the more diffi cult, 
though in some cases (seemingly arbitrary) this was not applied.
I study engineering at King Fuad University. My mother 
has problems paying the fees for me and my sister, who is 
graduating this semester. We both pay 10 percent of the fees 
in pounds sterling . . . sometimes the administration at the 
university asks us to pay in pounds sterling and at other times 
we are asked to pay the equivalent in Egyptian pounds. This 
makes us sometimes pay less or more, depending on the 
conversion rate. (PP9, Port Said, 18 June 2002)
For some families, the school fees were completely beyond 
their means. We were told of a number of cases where students 
or parents resorted to subterfuge to assure an education for their 
loved ones.
When my sister was born, my Egyptian grandfather registered 
her as his daughter. This gave her an Egyptian identity 
document that enabled her to study at school with no 
problem of paying fees. It was only when we wanted to go to 
Palestine that we had to change her papers to show that she is 
Palestinian. (7/46, Minya al-Qamah, 11 July 2002)
We also heard of cases of forging documents to prove Egyptian 
nationality—a tactic that often failed:
When Muhammad was at university and we were unable to 
pay his fees, we tried to forge a divorce paper for him to make 
use of the advantages given to the son of an Egyptian divorced 
woman. The university administration was not satisfi ed with 
the paper and asked to see the two people who testifi ed to 
the divorce. That was impossible, since we hired just any two 
passing men when we did it. (7/22, Sharqiyyah, 8 July 2002)
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The consequences of being caught at such forgeries were dire:
My other son, Ahmad, forged an Egyptian ID to prove that he 
is Egyptian so he could go to school without paying fees. But 
my daughter’s ex-husband told the police, who put Ahmad in 
prison and prevented him even from studying manazil when 
he got out unless the fees of all the previous years were paid. 
(7/22, Sharqiyyah, 8 July 2002)
A far more common tactic, reported to us by many, was simply to 
attend university courses without paying fees. A number of students 
we interviewed told us that they paid security guards to let them 
into the university and then paid administrative staff members to 
let them sit for the exams; in some cases, they paid the minimal 
registration fees required of Egyptians and promised to pay the 
foreign fees upon completion of the coursework. But lacking the 
offi cial foreign student registration and without university identity 
cards, they were in a vulnerable position. In most cases they were 
unable to pay the accumulated fees when the time came. As a 
result, many students who attended the classes and even passed 
their exams did not receive a degree.
Even though I had to pay only 10 percent of my children’s fees 
[because I work in government], it was expensive for me on 
my salary and I couldn’t pay them. So my children, Abla and 
Mahmud, went to university and attended courses but did not 
receive their diplomas. (7/43, Hehya, 15 July 2002)
Often we were told that students who successfully completed 
their course work and exams had hopes that the PLO would pay 
the outstanding foreign fees, and in fact for some years—especially 
up to the Gulf war—this was generally the case. Moreover, in the 
early 1990s, UNRWA’s Cairo Offi ce and the Palestine Department 
of the League of Arab States raised more than $600,000 for the 
payment of university fees, mostly to allow Palestinian students 
who had completed all the requirements for graduation to obtain 
their diplomas and to permit those in their fi nal year to graduate.7
In addition, generous donations are occasionally made by affl uent 
Palestinian businessmen or Egyptian actors and actresses. During 
the second intifada, the Palestinian embassy in Cairo received 
many donations to support Palestinian students in Egypt who 
were unable to pay the foreign fees, but almost all of these were 
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for students whose families lived in areas of Palestine under siege 
by the IDF during spring 2002, particularly Jenin.
The case of Palestinians attending classes but not receiving 
diplomas was re-examined by the Egyptian government in 1997. 
Some Egyptian educators counseled against making exceptions to 
the rule. For example, the president of Cairo University, Dr. Faruq 
Isma‘il, opposed the exemption on the grounds that the school 
would then have to exempt other Arab students as well.8 Though 
the Egyptian government did not enact any blanket “amnesty,” 
President Mubarak did agree to exempt some Palestinian students 
from paying the fees.9 Short of such interventions, university 
certifi cates were not granted.
My daughter Rabab studied at a Hotelerie and Tourism College 
but she was not given the diploma because I could not pay the 
1,800 pounds. Now she cannot work since she cannot prove 
that she did all the course work and sat for the exams. (7/29, 
Abu Kabir, July 2002)
Some students take this philosophically. The son of one of our 
interviewees (8/8, Abu Za‘bal, 2 July 2002) reported that he fi nished 
attending university but because he had not been able to pay the 
fees, he never got his diploma. However, he added that he didn’t 
mind. “What is important,” he told us, “is that I got my education.” 
At the pre-university level, some interviewees told us that 
Palestinians with economic diffi culties could apply for state 
support, or bahth ijtima‘i. Many reported that requests were 
usually accepted after a visit by a government social worker. The 
procedure was described as follows:
By applying to the Ministry of Social Affairs, it was possible 
to demand an assessment of the economic condition of the 
family based on which a certifi cate of poverty would be issued 
and a reduction of fees granted . . . We in the diaspora have 
nothing but education to protect us. I say this knowing that 
I cannot get a job with a university certifi cate because I am 
Palestinian. (8/2, Shibin al-Qanatir, 4 July 2002)
The bahth ijtima‘i process has reportedly accelerated since 
the outbreak of the second intifada, as Egyptian government 
offi cials have tried to take account of the fact that harsh economic 
conditions in the PA areas meant that many Palestinians in Egypt 
no longer receive remittances from their relatives in Gaza. The 
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process is sometimes facilitated by the Palestinian embassy. 
According to Fathi Kuttab, of the embassy’s education offi ce, the 
Egyptian Ministry of Education informed him that Palestinian 
students in public schools who could demonstrate need would 
be referred to the Ministry of Social Affairs, which in turn would 
exempt qualifying students from paying the fees. Ninety such 
applications had been processed through the embassy during the 
previous school year.10
I used to pay £E 200 a year for each son. Two years ago, 
Palestinians were exempted from fees and are to be treated 
as Egyptians. This was good for my children. (8/9, Abu Za‘bal, 
3 July 2002)
At the university level, the minister of higher education announc-
ed a 50-percent reduction in university tuition for Palestinian 
students at public universities for the three academic years 
from 2000 to 2003.11 This reduction, however, applied to those 
Palestinians not already covered by the 90-percent exemption, 
mostly Palestinian students from other countries.
Given the pervasive poverty in the community, fee reductions, 
especially at the university level, affect a relatively small number 
of Palestinian families in Egypt. For many in the community who 
must struggle to get by, educating their children is simply not an 
option; in fact, they no longer even think of education as a basic 
right:
I was never able to fund my children’s education. The boys 
had to get vocational skills to work. One learned to work with 
gypsum and paints. Two went to a tailor’s workshop, and the 
last one is in a carpentry workshop. (7/25, Abu Hammad, 10 
July 2002)
Some of our interviewees argued that having an education is not 
all that important, especially when many people even with good 
university degrees cannot fi nd jobs:
Metal [the trucks] is a priority over education, since it secures 
a future for the children. (7/31, Bilbays, 11 July 2002)
Beyond the impact of pushing the poorer members of 
the community into insecure informal employment, another 
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consequence of the cost and diffi culties in accessing education is 
that girls are more likely to leave school early for marriage. Many 
of the families interviewed believed that marrying young girls off 
can be advantageous: It means having “one less mouth to feed,” 
and if the husband is better-off than the family, the household’s 
economic conditions may be improved:
My oldest daughter went to school until age 16. Priority was 
given to her marriage, to alleviate some of the costs. The same 
is true for our second daughter; she was 15 when some of our 
relatives asked for her hand. (P22, Faysal, 15 June 2002)
The youngest daughter in this same family described how she 
had to drop out of school when her father became gravely ill: 
I went to school until third grade. My family couldn’t pay the 
fees. I never even sat for the exams because they coincided 
with my father’s illness. We did not have a choice. I am sad to 
have stopped school. I always wanted to be like other girls, 
who go to school and live their lives. (P22, Faysal, 15 June 
2002)
Health
Health Services Available to Palestinians
No regulations limit Palestinian access to health care in Egypt. 
What follows are the main types of health facilities available to the 
community.
The Palestine Hospital, run by the PLO-affi liated Palestine 
Red Crescent Society,12 is located in the northern Cairo suburb of 
Heliopolis. It serves mainly Palestinians insured by PLO institutions 
and their families as well as current and former employees of the 
AOGG. Some Palestinians employed in other sectors obtain medical 
insurance through the PLO-affi liated Labor Union. The hospital 
also serves any uninsured Palestinian or Egyptian at private sector 
hospital rates. In addition to its medical facilities, the hospital has 
a pharmacy.
Charitable clinics, usually linked to mosques, are found 
throughout Egypt. The Palestinians interviewed expressed satis-
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faction with the level of services provided in such centers, reporting 
them to be conveniently located, effi cient, and moderately priced:
I do not have medical insurance at the Red Crescent Hospital 
even though I could apply for it because money is already 
taken out of my membership [dues] at the [PLO] Labor Union. 
However, the hospital is quite far from my house. I prefer to 
go to the clinics attached to the mosques, where I pay £E 3 per 
visit. (P9, Wailey, 24 June 2002)
Egyptian public hospitals are also found throughout Egypt. 
Palestinians who are or were employed by the Egyptian 
government receive free medical treatment. Though their families 
are not covered, uninsured persons, Egyptian or Palestinian, pay 
only modest fees for treatment in public hospitals. However, 
Palestinians tend to avoid the public health services, reporting 
inadequate cleanliness, ineffi ciency, and overcrowding.
Health clinics for maternity and early childcare are located in 
many areas. Few women interviewed said that they used them. 
Those who did expressed relative satisfaction but reported 
overcrowding and poor hygiene.
Private clinics in rural and urban areas charge, on average, 
between £E 20 to £E 35 a visit. Many Palestinians resort to private 
clinics only in emergencies or for critical conditions, though others 
who are better-off use them more often:
I am insured at the PRCS [Palestine Red Crescent Society]… 
When my wife needed an operation, the Palestine Hospital 
did not have the speciality we needed. We had it done in a 
private hospital and paid £E 12,000. For follow-ups, my wife 
goes to a nearby private clinic where she pays £E 25 per visit. 
(P16, ‘Ayn Shams, 8 June 2002)
We can go to private clinics and pay £E 20. The money I could 
save by being treated at the Palestine Hospital, where I have 
medical insurance, would be used for transportation to get 
me there, so I prefer not going. (P9, Wailey, 24 June 2002)
Health Concerns
In general, our interviewees expressed satisfaction with the 
quality of health services available in their neighborhoods or 
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districts. For minor medical needs, the services are affordable 
and adequate. The most frequent complaint about health care 
was related to access to special medicines for chronic diseases. 
Medicines, especially if purchased from a private pharmacy, tend to 
be expensive and can have a major impact on the family’s budget: 
My wife and I have diabetes. We need £E 102 worth of medicine 
per month. (P9, Wailey, 24 June 2002)
We usually buy medicines from the Palestine Hospital, where 
they reduce the price by 70 percent. But often, the medicines 
we need are not available. (P16, ‘Ayn Shams, 8 June 2002)
Other common complaints include the need to travel long 
distances to access health care, the diffi culties and cost of reaching 
health care facilities, and the high cost of major operations.
But while Palestinians express relative satisfaction with health 
services in Egypt, the consequences of not having a safety net cannot 
be overemphasized. Any unexpected health crisis can require full 
mobilization of available resources. One of our interviewees told 
us about the fi nancial crisis her family suffered when her husband 
had a heart attack, requiring her to sell the land she had inherited 
from her family to cover the hospital bills (8/3, Abu Za‘bal, 30 June 
2002). In addition to selling property, many reported selling gold 
and borrowing from family and friends to help pay for medicine 
and hospitalization. 
The case of Ahmad, a tailor and family breadwinner, illustrates 
how a serious illness can disrupt the household’s fragile situation, 
with lasting consequences. When he had a heart attack, donations 
and loans from relatives helped the family survive, but his youngest 
two children were forced to leave school permanently to help care 
for their father and because the family could no longer afford 
school fees. Ahmad was eventually able to return to work at a 
reduced level, but the family continued to suffer from the reduced 
wages and the impact of accumulated debts. (P22, Faisal, 15 June 
2002)
Financial Assets 
This section looks at how Palestinians use the fi nancial assets 
at their disposal to achieve their goals or simply to survive, and 
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how they deal with or circumvent the limits and legal obstacles 
confronting them. In particular, it looks at land ownership and 
property rights and the various forms of fi nancial capital.
Palestinians and Property Rights in Egypt
Egypt traditionally has placed tight restrictions on land 
ownership by foreigners, for example, on property located near 
international borders and agricultural land (Law 62 of 1940; Law 
124 of 1958). For a time, however, Palestinians were privileged 
compared to other foreigners concerning the right to own land. 
As noted in chapter 2, during the Nasser era Palestinians had been 
explicitly exempted from Law 15 of 1963 barring foreigners from 
owning land. Remarkably, this privilege long outlasted the loss of 
their exemption from “foreigner” status in 1978, because Article 2, 
chapter 3 of the 1963 law specifi cally stated that Palestinians could 
own land in Egypt “until the Palestinian territories are liberated 
from the occupiers.”13 Thus, it was only in 1985, when Land Law 
104 superseded (and canceled) Law 15 of 1963, that Palestinians 
lost the right to own land. 
In the meantime, in 1976, Law 81 had been passed preventing 
foreigners from owning real estate (buildings and plots of land, 
generally in more urbanized areas). Palestinians, however, were 
not affected, because at the time they were still exempted from 
foreigner status. In 1978, when their treatment on a par with 
Egyptian nationals ended, the 1976 law suddenly became relevant 
to them. Article 2B stipulated that foreigners could own real estate 
with permission from the Ministerial Council14 under the following 
conditions:
 Only one property for the purpose of private residence or •
private business could be owned.
The property could not exceed 1,000 square meters.•
 Payment for the property must be made in foreign currency •
through a local bank.
 Ownership of the property could not be in partnership •
with an Egyptian.
The article further stated that the offspring of an Egyptian woman 
married to a foreigner had the right to inherit the property.
The law could also be applied retroactively. In one documented 
case, a Palestinian head of household arriving in Egypt in 1967 
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purchased a piece of land from a local Egyptian. When the Egyptian 
government began a sewage project on his property, it initially 
promised compensation for the land, the value of which he states 
was £E 135,000. No compensation was paid, and the failure to pay 
was later claimed to be legal on the grounds that Palestinians were 
not allowed to own land in Egypt.15
The requirement under Law 81 that foreigners needed the 
Ministerial Council’s permission to own real estate was canceled 
by Law 106 of 1985, even though the new law also incorporated 
the conditions for foreign ownership spelled out in Article 2B of 
the 1976 law (see above). Several years later, these conditions for 
foreign ownership were amended by Law 56 of 1988, as follows:
 The surface area of the property must not exceed 3,000 •
square meters.
 Property subject to the law of archaeology protection •
cannot be owned by a foreigner.
While changes in the 1976 law governing real-estate ownership 
affected some Palestinians, the legislation with the greatest impact 
on the community was the above-mentioned Law 104 of 1985 
barring foreign individuals and companies—without exception—
from owning agricultural property or fertile lands in Egypt. Article 
1 was especially relevant, because in principle Palestinians were 
the only foreigners who still owned agricultural land at the time the 
1985 law was enacted. This article stipulated that foreign-owned 
agricultural land would revert to the state within fi ve years of the 
law’s taking effect. It is worth noting that much of the agricultural 
land held by Palestinians in Egypt was land they had reclaimed, and 
some Palestinians had relied on the land as a fi nancial guarantee 
for renewing their residency every year. The PLO protested the 
1985 law, but to no avail.16
In light of the new legislation, Palestinians had to get rid of 
their agricultural landholdings within the allotted time span to 
avoid uncompensated expropriation. Some sold their properties 
at below-market prices; others registered them in the name of 
Egyptian in-laws or Egyptian friends or partners. However, false 
registration makes for vulnerability by sharply limiting legal 
redress in the event of ownership disputes. Some of those we 
interviewed reported having been cheated out of their properties 
when Egyptian associates denied their ownership rights. Though 
contracts were often drawn up to try to protect the Palestinian 
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owners, they weren’t always successful. One of our interviewees, 
whose case turned out favorably for him, recounts the following:
I owned a piece of agricultural land with two other 
Palestinians before 1982. I also bought a farm of 72 feddans 
[288 dunams] of rehabilitated land in Isma‘iliyyah at a time 
when Palestinians had the right to own such land, so I had 
no problem registering it. Later, when the law was issued 
barring Palestinians from owning land, I decided to turn my 
share over to three Egyptian acquaintances. One of them told 
me that if I died, he could guarantee that my male offspring 
would know that the land really belonged to me, but he could 
not guarantee that his sons-in-law would not claim it [upon 
his death]. So he was honest and withdrew from the deal. One 
of the other Egyptians later tried to deny my ownership, but 
in the end we met and were able to solve the problem. (P17, 
‘Ayn Shams, 8 June 2002)
Government ineffi ciency sometimes worked in favor of 
Palestinian owners:
My father came back from Saudi Arabia in 1966 and built 
this house [a three-story building], and bought a piece of 
agricultural land, which was then permitted. He also bought a 
shop to sell clothing. The 15 feddans of agricultural land that 
he bought were not registered at the Property Registration 
Department. When the decree preventing Palestinians from 
owning agricultural lands was issued, our land was not 
registered, so no one knew it was owned by Palestinians. 
After 1985, we had to sell some parts of it to create a new 
business for my brother. (7/37, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
Many people registered their land at the Property Registration 
Department without declaring ownership. The implementation 
of the decisions concerning property ownership was left to the 
discretion of the administration. Many of the people we interviewed, 
especially those with an Egyptian wife or mother, were not worried 
about the on-the-books restrictions on foreign land ownership.
We own three buildings and some agricultural land. We bought 
land in 1975 and were planning to build a house on it, but 
my mother refused because it was on the main street and she 
did not think it was a convenient location for a building. The 
land was registered in her name because she has Egyptian 
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nationality. Today, poor farmers work the land. We do not 
take any rent from them. In 1980, we bought another piece of 
land on which we built the house. In 1995, we bought another 
piece of land and built a warehouse on it. In 1998, we bought 
a building where we keep our goods and where we have 
shops to rent. We also bought another piece of agricultural 
land, which is registered in my [Egyptian] wife’s name. All the 
other buildings are registered in my own name. In case of any 
problems, I can transfer the registration to my mother or wife. 
(7/38, Dyarb Nijim, July 2002)
The vulnerability and risks associated with the earlier 
partnerships, which could not be legally registered, were eliminated 
in 1997 with the passage of the Guarantees and Investments 
Incentives Law (Law 8 of 1997). This law gives foreigners the right 
to own businesses on a larger scale within the context of business 
partnerships where 51 percent of the property is owned by an 
Egyptian.
Financial Resources
Financial capital here falls into two main categories: available 
stocks (e.g., cash, bank deposits, jewelry) and monetary infl ows 
(e.g., wage income, pensions and remittances, transfers from the 
state). This section will focus in particular on how Palestinians 
used these various forms of fi nancial capital to improve their 
economic status and extend their meagre resources.
Pensions
Employment in the public sector—by the AOGG, the PLO bodies, 
or (in earlier periods) directly by the Egyptian government—offers 
a number of advantages. Though public sector salaries tend to be 
lower than those in the private sector, the income is stable and a 
pension is guaranteed. Insurance is also provided after retirement 
for the employee and often for his family as well. Moreover, work 
days are generally shorter, allowing the employee to conduct other 
business after hours. Thus, for enterprising individuals, public 
sector employment can provide a base for other ventures:
My father was an employee at the railway station. He was also 
a partner with many Egyptians in commercial businesses that 
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he ran in the afternoon . . . Today, we run four shops that we 
set up after my father died. We invest in the agricultural land 
my father had and we have his pension of £E 460 a month. 
The house where we live is owned by the railway station. 
(7/21, Salhiyyah, 8 July 2002)
Palestinians who worked in the AOGG or with one of the PLO 
entities receive a pension from the PLO after retiring. Living 
expenses in the Palestinian territories are much higher than in 
Egypt, and salaries, accordingly, are higher. Taking advantage of 
this, many retired PLO employees make use of social and family 
connections in Gaza to have their pensions diverted to Gaza, where 
the amount paid is higher and delivered in hard currency.
I get my pension from Gaza. My son takes the check and 
cashes it on my behalf in Gaza. I get the equivalent of £E
1,200. (P17, ‘Ayn Shams, 8 June 2002)
Some people we interviewed received small pensions from the 
government simply for having been registered as a worker with 
the Labor Union. One man who worked seasonally as a blacksmith 
reported:
I also get £E 80 [a month] from the Egyptian government as 
a pension since I was registered as an agricultural laborer, 
despite the fact that I never worked as a farmer. This is 
the licence that I got fi fteen years ago. I renew it yearly by 
providing a letter from the Labor Union and paying £E 50. 
(7/ 36, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
Remittances
Palestinians who went to work in the Gulf states often felt 
responsible for helping their immediate and extended families.17
In many cases, the remittances were shrewdly invested to increase 
the family’s resources:
My brother left for the Emirates in the early 1960s to teach. 
He helped us greatly to expand out truck transport business. 
We had one truck when he left; today we have fi ve. He used 
to send us money. Business was bringing business. And our 
work expanded. (7/28, Abu Kabir, 13 July 2002)
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Many with jobs abroad contributed to—or entirely paid for—the 
education of siblings or other family members:
My brother in Saudi Arabia sends 150 pounds to each of my 
four sons who are at university. (7/26, Abu Hammad, 10 July 
2002)
When I returned from my ten-year stay in Yemen, the 
regulations stated that Palestinians should pay for university 
education in foreign currency. My brother and sister were 
then at university. I paid for their university education until 
they fi nished. (P8, ‘Ayn Shams, 23 May 2002)
Remittances from abroad were invested in the education 
and professional development of family members. In this way, 
the remittances constituted a base for long-term investments in 
Egypt.
After my husband fi nished his studies at the teachers’ institute 
in Egypt, he was hired by the government. Ten years later, 
he went to work in the Emirates. We used to send money to 
my brothers-in-law, who bought us a piece of land and even 
supervised the construction of a house for us. When we 
returned, we had a house. On the fi rst fl oor, we established 
a publishing house that my husband runs and a children’s 
nursery that I run. (8/8, Abu Za‘bal, 2 July 2002)
Palestinians in Egypt were also dependant on remittances sent 
to them by relatives who joined the PA in Gaza. When they arrived 
in Gaza, some were able to send the equivalent of $100–$150 to 
their families back in Egypt. Many Palestinians reported that 
they depended totally on this money. However, the deteriorating 
conditions and soaring unemployment at of the outbreak of the 
second intifada interrupted the regular payment of PA employees 
and put an end to the fl ow of remittances from Palestine.
Savings and Investment
Very few people interviewed reported using banks for their 
savings. Those who are able to save usually invest whatever 
surplus they have into businesses. A good example is a man in Abu 
Kabir who owns three transport trucks and who told the research 
team that he does not have a bank account, even though he would 
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have no trouble opening one. Instead, he invests whatever he has 
in various businesses (7/28, Abu Kabir, 13 July 2002).
Buying property (either directly or through a family or friend) is 
one of the most common means of saving in both rural and urban 
areas. A number of Palestinians from Gaza also still own inherited 
properties there. Whether used for agriculture or to develop a 
business, property can generate income for the family.
I have an orange grove in Gaza that I recently decided to 
convert from fruit production to seed production, since I 
heard seeds can bring in more profi t. I also receive rent from 
shops there, which is collected by my nephew who still lives 
in Gaza. (P1, Giza, 10 May 2002)
Gold is one of the most common ways of saving money, especially 
in rural areas; it is rare to fi nd a Palestinian (or indeed an Egyptian) 
woman who does not possess gold jewelry and bracelets received 
as part of her dowry or subsequently purchased with savings. 
Gold obviously does not generate income, but at least it either 
holds or increases its value, an especially important consideration 
in infl ationary times, and can be easily converted into cash. A 
number of our interviewees noted that when family belongings 
must be sold in times of need, the woman’s belongings—notably 
her gold—are the fi rst to go. This divestment strategy is “gendered 
in its impact and an indicator of women’s particular vulnerability 
and lack of decision-making power within the household.”18 It is 
important to add, however, that gold and jewelry are generally not 
seen in sentimental terms, but as assets that can be sold during 
emergencies. Such saleable property often constitutes the family’s 
only safety net.
The gold I had was eventually sold to get us out of debt. 
My husband had no regular job since he left the PLO. I was 
helping with work and with my gold savings. (P6, ‘Ayn Shams, 
18 May 2002)
In a number of cases, it was also clear that the decision to sell was 
the woman’s:
I was able to help my son by selling the pieces of gold left to 
me so that he could start his own business, an Internet shop. 
After he graduated, he was unable to fi nd a job. Every time 
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he would apply, he would be told, “You are Palestinian.” (8/2, 
Shibin al-Qanatar, 4 July 2002)
Land is another saleable asset, though selling it takes time. In 
all cases, however, selling personal belongings and property is 
generally a strategy of last resort. 
We had a piece of land in Gaza inherited from my grandfather. 
When we were having fi nancial diffi culties, we sold it. The 
money helped my oldest son to get married and my other son 
to buy a taxi, which was registered in my name as an Egyptian 
to avoid any problems. (P12, ‘Izbit al-Nakhal, 29 May 2002)
Another common way to save money for unforeseen expenses 
or specifi c purposes is by joining with a group of relatives or 
neighbors in a cooperative (gama‘iyyah). To be able to do so, 
however, requires at least a minimum of surplus income.
Being part of a gama‘iyyah forces its members to save, but 
you need a regular and stable income. My husband is a part-
time tailor and does not earn enough to cover our expenses. 
So how can we save in a gama‘iyyah? (P22, Faysal, 15 June 
2002)
Each member of the cooperative regularly contributes a 
set amount. At the end of each month, members can take turns 
borrowing money. In all regions where we conducted interviews, 
we found that the main purpose of the cooperatives was to pay for 
school/university or residence renewal fees. Not all experiences 
with cooperatives were positive, however:
Our money was embezzled in a gama‘iyyah from which we 
expected to get £E 20,000. My brother in Saudi Arabia was 
sending me money and I needed to save for the children’s 
school fees, so I became part of a gama‘iyyah. I was paying 
£E 500 monthly. For ten months I paid to this cooperative. By 
chance, I discovered that the gama‘iyyah had collapsed in 
the seventh month, but the woman in charge was still taking 
money from me. We had a big fi ght when I tried to claim my 
money. I threatened to call the police. She paid me some of 
the money but she still owes me £E 2,250. (P10, ‘Ayn Shams, 
23 May 2002)
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Help from the State 
Egyptian government subsidies for students in need were 
mentioned earlier in the chapter. In the 1970s, the government also 
included Palestinians in the distribution of food ration cards. This 
practice continued even after the dramatic change in policy toward 
the Palestinian community in the late 1970s. In 1980, for example, 
Article 3 of Resolution 22 stipulated that ration cards be issued to 
needy Palestinians and Sudanese who had been living continuously 
in Egypt. However, as many of our interviewees reported, this was 
discontinued, although we were unable to determine when.
The government gave us a green ration card and then later 
it was a red card. It helped us buy staples, but this stopped 
some years ago. (7/36, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
God helped us in those times because we used to get food 
through the food ration card that the government distributed. 
Now this has stopped. (8/3, Abu Za‘bal, 30 June 2002)
An old man who sells candy and cigarettes from a pushcart near 
the Suez Canal in Qantara told the team that he was imprisoned 
from 1947 to 1970 for selling drugs. After serving his sentence, he 
was released to join his family in Qantara:
I get a monthly subsidy from the Ministry of Social Affairs. It 
used to be £E 10; now it is £E 25. I used to get £E 30 from the 
governor of Gaza during the [holiday] feasts. However, to get 
this money, I have to travel to Cairo. Because of old age and 
illness, I stopped going, so I no longer get it. (P31, Qantara, 
19 June 2002)
Despite their diffi culties, none of the Palestinians interviewed 
wanted to ask for money rather than earning it themselves. Dignity 
and appearances are central concepts, and taking charity is seen 
as a last resort:
I hear often that the Administrative Offi ce of the Governor of 
Gaza gives subsidies in some seasons to Palestinians. I never 
go there. My dignity prevents me from accepting money from 
others. (7/ 36, Faqus, 14 July 2002)
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Chapter 6
Egypt and the PLO: 
Politics and Privileges 
Although offi cially established in East Jerusalem,
1 the PLO 
almost certainly would not have seen the light of day had 
it not been for the extraordinary Palestinian organizational 
ferment in Nasser’s Egypt of the late 1950s and early 1960s—and 
the strong political backing of Nasser himself. Created in 1964 
under the auspices of the Arab League, the body was not truly 
representative of the Palestinian people and lacked autonomy 
of decision. Nevertheless, in the fi ve years before it was taken 
over by a new, more representative leadership, it had succeeded 
in establishing a solid institutional framework that remained 
fundamentally unchanged and, equally important, had been 
formally recognized as an independent entity by all the member 
states of the Arab League.2 The movement that spearheaded the 
1969 takeover of the PLO, and which has dominated it ever since, 
was Fatah. Although founded in Kuwait, Fatah, too, can be said to 
have its roots in Egypt, for it was in Egypt that its founders and 
leaders received their political formation and learned fi rsthand the 
art of organizing and mobilizing.3
Yet for all Egypt’s importance in the emergence of the Palestinian 
national movement, its small and marginalized Palestinian 
community was for the most part too absorbed in the struggle for 
survival to participate in these larger events. Palestinian activism 
in Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s was largely led by Palestinians 
from Gaza and elsewhere in the diaspora who had come to Egypt 
to study.4 Yet as Laurie Brand has shrewdly pointed out, it was, in 
a sense, the very “marginality” of the local Palestinian population 
that made Nasser’s enthusiastic sponsorship and encouragement 
of Palestinian mobilization possible, because the community was 
too small to pose any kind of threat. In the Gaza Strip, by contrast, 
Palestinian organizing efforts had from the outset been closely 
monitored by Egyptian intelligence and sharply curtailed.5
128  Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948
This chapter will briefl y look at the evolving relations between 
the PLO and the Egyptian government. It will then look at the PLO’s 
institutional framework in Egypt, including the PLO mass unions 
and other affi liated bodies. A third section will focus on benefi ts 
and privileges enjoyed by members of the community affi liated 
with the PLO. A fi nal section will look at one of the consequences 
of the establishment of the PA in the occupied territories under the 
Oslo accords: the return of thousands of Palestinians to Gaza as of 
the mid-1990s.
Egypt and the PLO: A Political Overview
In the years immediately following the Nakba, there was 
no Palestinian political movement as such.6 This was not only 
because of the disarray following the catastrophe of 1948, but also 
because the dominant ideology of the time was Arab nationalism, 
which considered Arab unity a prerequisite to the liberation 
of Palestine. Most Palestinians subscribed to that ideology. As 
mentioned in earlier chapters, Nasser made Palestine the central 
plank of his emerging pan-Arabism, opening Egyptian universities 
to Palestinian students from any country and encouraging Cairo-
based Palestinian organizing efforts that encompassed Palestinians 
from across the Arab world. Even before the creation of the PLO, 
diaspora-wide Palestinian student and workers’ organizations7 had 
been founded in Egypt, as well as an activist Palestinian women’s 
league that was later instrumental in establishing the PLO-affi liated 
women’s union.
It was in the early 1960s that Nasser, in an effort to burnish 
his pan-Arab credentials (which had suffered with the 1961 
breakup of the UAR), began to emphasize the need for a separate 
Palestinian political entity8 at meetings of the Arab League, which 
he dominated. At the January 1964 Arab Summit in Cairo, Ahmad 
Shuqayri, the Palestinian delegate to the Arab League, was asked 
to initiate contacts with the aim of establishing such an entity. 
When he went beyond the original concept by including military 
units and military training in the plan, Nasser supported him and 
persuaded the league to go along. Indeed, the addition served 
Nasser’s purpose, for his sponsorship of the PLO was in large part 
aimed at countering the growth of Palestinian groups advocating 
armed struggle, and the military element strengthened the new 
organization’s appeal.9 In general, it should be emphasized that 
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Nasser’s support of Palestinian institutional development was 
always subordinated to his larger political aims, both in terms of 
advancing his pan-Arab agenda and strengthening his hand vis-à-
vis the other Arab states, and controlling and co-opting Palestinian 
mobilization by bringing it under his umbrella.
The Arab nationalist ideology10 had begun to be challenged in 
the late 1950s, most prominently by Fatah, a movement founded 
in Kuwait in 1959 by a group of Palestinians led by Yasir Arafat, 
Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Faruq Qaddumi, and Khalil Wazir (Abu 
Jihad), who had begun their activism in the Palestinian Student 
Union (PSU) in the early 1950s.11 Fatah’s central idea was that the 
Palestinians must not depend primarily on the Arab states for help 
but must liberate themselves through armed struggle. Though the 
idea was fully developed only after Arafat and his comrades left 
Egypt for the Gulf in 1957, it had begun to germinate during their 
student days in Cairo.12
Fatah and the other commando groups did not attract a wide 
following until after the June 1967 defeat ended the dreams of 
liberation through Arab unity.13 Although Nasser had earlier 
bitterly opposed the guerrilla groups,14 he quickly took stock of 
the new situation. Recognizing Fatah as the most important and 
most moderate of the guerrilla factions, he began to cultivate 
it, furnishing arms and training facilities within months of the 
war’s end15; later, he continued to provide crucial diplomatic 
support.16 The PLO’s sharp criticism of Nasser for his acceptance 
of the second Rogers plan in August 1970 led to a serious falling 
out, with the PLO offi ces in Cairo and the Cairo-based PLO and 
Fatah radio stations closed down. Still, when the Resistance was 
under deadly assault by the Jordanian regime in September 1970 
following fedayeen provocations, Nasser intervened. His last act 
before his death of a heart attack on 28 September was to broker 
a truce between King Hussein and Arafat, thereby ending the most 
acute phase (Black September) of the bloody fedayeen-Jordanian 
government showdown of 1970–71.
As was seen in chapter 2, relations between the PLO and the 
Egyptian government continued to be strong for some time after 
Nasser’s death: Egypt, for example, co-sponsored the resolution at 
the 1974 Rabat Arab summit proclaiming the PLO the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. But relations began to 
deteriorate with the 1975 Sinai II disengagement agreement, which 
basically signaled Egypt’s withdrawal from the Arab-Israeli confl ict. 
Tensions were further aggravated by Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 
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November 1977 and the Arab Summit in Tripoli soon after, where 
the PLO joined Syria, Algeria, and South Yemen in an anti-Egyptian 
coalition. The formal break occurred when Egypt and Israel signed 
their peace treaty on 17 March 1979. Relations between Egypt 
and the PLO, “frozen” for more than three years, did not begin to 
thaw until the early 1980s, particularly following Israel’s summer 
1982 invasion of Lebanon and siege of Beirut, which outraged 
Egyptians.17 More recently, especially since the 1993 Oslo accords, 
Egypt has endeavored to play an active role in the peace process. 
The restoration of relations with the PLO, however, had little impact 
on the status and situation of the Palestinians in Egypt.
The PLO in Egypt
Institutions
The PLO maintained a powerful presence in Egypt until the 
late 1970s. With money fl owing in from the oil-rich Arab states, 
supplemented by a “liberation tax” on Palestinians working in the 
Egyptian public sector as of 1969,18 the PLO had ample funds to 
disburse in Egypt despite its growing military and administrative 
apparatus in Lebanon after its expulsion from Jordan. Its presence 
in Egypt included fi ve mass unions and the Palestine Red Crescent 
Society with its network of health clinics (see below). Through 
its own offi ces and departments, it ran various welfare programs, 
administered the Martyrs’ Fund, and provided subsidies for 
Palestinian students both local and especially from elsewhere 
in the Arab world. The PLO also helped local Palestinians with 
bureaucratic problems and certain personal status issues, fulfi lling 
many of the functions of an embassy. Although Fatah was the 
dominant faction of the PLO, it also had its own bureau in Cairo, 
the only PLO faction to do so.19
Cairo had long been the hub of Palestinian diaspora activities, but 
this role ended with Egypt’s change in policy after the mid-1970s. 
When the PLO resumed activities in Egypt after the resumption of 
diplomatic ties in 1983, its orientation, by default, was more local. 
Also, during the more than three-year freeze, its presence had been 
reduced to the Labor Union and two offi ces handling everyday 
affairs for the community,20 and it never again regained its earlier 
size and infl uence. Still, its presence remained signifi cant until 
the early 1990s, when the abrupt end to donations from the Gulf 
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states caused by PLO political positions during the 1990–91 Gulf 
crisis led to a cutback in its activities. This trend was accentuated 
by the establishment of the PA in the occupied territories in 1994 
and the decision to shift priorities to state-building. Many PLO-
related institutions and offi ces (including medical; see Palestine 
Red Crescent Society section below) were transferred to Gaza, 
and the budget for PLO activities in Egypt was slashed. Moreover, 
because the PLO in Egypt had always served fi rst and foremost the 
members of the local community who were associated with it, its 
principal constituency was itself greatly reduced when many of 
these relocated to Gaza as of 1995.
Thus, since the mid-1990s the PLO presence in Egypt has 
been mainly the Palestinian embassy, the remaining four unions 
operating at a reduced scale, and the Palestine Hospital. Aside from 
issuing Palestinian passports, the embassy’s main tasks seem to be 
facilitating the transfer of wounded from Gaza to Egypt for medical 
treatment (since the intifada); securing entry permits from Israel for 
travel to Gaza; and helping Palestinians re-enter Egypt by securing 
the proper permits from the Egyptian government—either for short 
visits or, for those wanting to return for good, residency.
Unions and Affi liated Bodies
It bears emphasis that the PLO unions in Egypt, like the PLO 
infrastructure in general, were not set up for the benefi t of the local 
population. The unions, which operated in Arab countries where 
there was a signifi cant Palestinian presence, had two principal 
functions: mobilizing Palestinians behind the Palestinian national 
project and serving the local communities. In places with large 
Palestinian populations, the two were more or less congruent; 
in Egypt, however, the second goal in practice took a back seat. 
Furthermore, in several of the unions—notably the GUPS, and to a 
lesser extent the Women’s Union (even though not headquartered 
in Egypt)—the diaspora focus seemed to predominate until the 
reorientation of Egyptian foreign policy in the mid-1970s and 
especially the precipitous drop in Palestinian student enrollment 
in Egyptian universities after 1977. From then on, the PLO unions 
in Egypt became more Egypt-centered, albeit focused especially 
on the local population with PLO ties. This involved mainly those 
who entered Egypt in 1967 or after. As the unions in Egypt became 
more local in orientation, their “national project” aspect shrank to 
insignifi cance, and they became almost exclusively involved with 
dispensing aid.
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Traditionally, there were fi ve Palestinian unions in Egypt: GUPS, 
GUPW (hereinafter the Labor Union), GUPWom (hereinafter 
the Women’s Union), the General Union of Palestinian Teachers 
(GUPT), and the General Union of Palestinian Writers and 
Journalists (GUPWJ). Of these, the GUPS, historically the most 
important, was permanently closed in 1977. In addition to the 
unions, there is also the Palestine Red Crescent Society, which has 
a slightly different status. Finally, the PLO has several affi liated 
bodies, including the Palestinian Charitable Association.
The mass mobilization function of the PLO-affi liated bodies in 
the early years is best exemplifi ed in the GUPS. It was established 
in 1959, when the PSU in Cairo (which had been run by Arafat and 
his comrades from 1952 to 1957) joined with Palestinian student 
organizations in other Arab countries and beyond to form, with 
Nasser’s support, a diaspora-wide Palestinian student movement. 
Its activities went far beyond ordinary student politics. Heads 
of state and political leaders met its delegations, and in 1965 it 
organized an international symposium on Palestine attended not 
only by students but by political leaders and intellectuals from 
fi fty-eight countries, an enormous success that was seen at the 
time as a breakthrough not just for the GUPS but for Palestine.21
It did not become part of the PLO until after its 1969 takeover by 
Fatah and the commando organizations.
GUPS activism ultimately got it into trouble. In January 
1972, it joined with Egyptian students in massive riots 
protesting Sadat’s “no-war-no-peace” stalemate, and in a foretaste 
of what was to come, Sadat singled out the Palestinians as being the 
fomenters of the disturbances and arrested large numbers of them.22
Their demonstrations against the Sinai II agreement in September 
1975 led to the deportation of many Palestinian students, the sharp 
curtailment of GUPS activities, and various punitive measures 
that dramatically reduced the number of Palestinian university 
students in Egypt.23 The union was closed down in November 1977 
at the time of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, the event that marked his 
true break with the Palestinians.
After the GUPS was banned, four unions remained in Egypt, 
although only the labor and women’s unions had any real 
importance. Contributing to their longevity was their avoidance 
of any political activity whatsoever and the care they took to 
cultivate the support of Egyptian allies (the Egyptian Trade Union 
Federation, in the case of the Palestinian Labor Union; solidarity 
groups, in the case of the Women’s Union).24 Their survival in Egypt, 
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according to some observers, has been to an extent contingent 
upon maintaining close contact with state security.
The Labor Union
The Palestinian Labor Union (modeled after the Palestinian Arab 
Workers Organization established in Haifa in 1925) was founded in 
Cairo in 1963 and became part of the PLO when it was established 
the next year. The Labor Union, like the other Palestinian mass 
unions, aimed at diaspora-wide Palestinian mobilization, but it 
never neglected the local community. Thus, even while traveling 
throughout the Arab world to establish contacts for a broad 
organization, it recruited Palestinian workers in Egypt itself; 
its fi rst offi ce was in the industrial area of Helwan.25 The union 
reached out to Palestinians throughout Egypt by creating branches 
in agricultural and industrial areas such as Sharqiyyah, Fayyum, 
Qina, al-‘Arish, and Qalyubiyyah, as well as Cairo. The top positions 
in the union were traditionally held by members of the PLO from 
the diaspora or fi ghters who had been with the PLO in Jordan and 
Lebanon.
The aim of the union has been to help its members fi nd and 
maintain jobs and to improve employment conditions, securing 
shorter working hours, guaranteed sick leave and paid holidays, 
and protection against arbitrary dismissal. Thanks in part to its 
efforts, under Egyptian Law 58 of 1971, Palestinian workers with 
permanent residence status in Egypt were exempted from having 
to acquire work permits. This victory, however, was nullifi ed after 
the al-Siba‘i assassination, when the law was revoked.
The Labor Union was the only PLO union in Egypt allowed to 
remain open when Egyptian-PLO relations were frozen after the 
signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in 1979. At that time, 
however, Palestinian union activity was limited to the following:
 Sending out letters to facilitate issuing/renewing of work •
and residence permits for applicants in Egypt.
 Providing fi nancial assistance for families after a member’s •
death and helping with funeral expenses if necessary.
 Networking among skilled job seekers and employers.•
Defending the rights of Palestinian laborers.•
 Establishing Palestinian cemeteries in various locations. •
(Three were built by the PLO.)
Distributing aid to needy union members.•
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Since the mid-1990s and the establishment of the PA, even 
these reduced functions have become largely beyond the means 
of the Labor Union, whose principal task is now issuing letters 
verifying employment to facilitate obtaining work and residence 
permits (alluded to in many of our fi eld interviews) and other 
administrative functions. It also provides members with medical 
insurance taken out of membership dues. At the time we did our 
fi eld research, the union listed a membership of about 11,000 wage 
laborers and about 1,000 public sector workers (mainly PLO and 
AOGG employees or retirees) through its seventeen branches and 
sub-branches.26 Although even today the Labor Union remains 
the largest and most important Palestinian union in Egypt, and 
despite its potential for outreach through its many branches, our 
interviews in the fi eld indicated that many Palestinians in dire need 
had never heard of it.
The Women’s Union
The PLO’s Women’s Union was established in Jerusalem in 1965, 
but a Palestinian women’s organization (the “League of Palestinian 
Women”) had been founded in Cairo two years earlier, in 1963, 
by a group of Palestinian graduate students led by Samirah Abu 
Ghazalah.27 Similar to the other PLO unions, its goal was to mobilize 
Palestinian women to serve the Palestinian cause and to provide 
services to the community. In 1968, the union established al-Wijdan, 
a mother and child care center in the ‘Abbasiyyah district of Cairo, 
to provide poor families with free medicine and treatment using 
funding from Palestinian businessmen. The center was closed 
in 1974 –75 by the authorities for what was deemed “political 
activity”—putting new roofs on the homes of Palestinians who 
lived in the area. This experience only strengthened the union’s 
traditional avoidance of any discussion of Egyptian domestic 
matters or activities that could attract government scrutiny. The 
Women’s Union has gone out of its way to reach out beyond the 
Palestinian community, regularly inviting the wives of various 
Arab and foreign ambassadors to their functions28 and welcoming 
interested Egyptians as members. Such activities fall within its 
efforts to promote understanding of the Palestinian situation. The 
union recently published a calendar with brief descriptions of 
Palestinian life under Israel’s reoccupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza as of 2002.
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One of the most important activities of the Women’s Union in 
the past was subsidizing students. During the PLO’s “fl ush years,” 
the sums disbursed were considerable. According to the head of 
the union interviewed in 1997, a total of £E 30 million had been 
spent over the years to fund 2,600 students in Egypt.29 This fi gure is 
signifi cant as an indicator of the Women’s Union’s former “diaspora 
orientation,” because only a small fraction of these funds would 
have gone to local Palestinians, with the vast majority underwriting 
Palestinians from elsewhere in the Arab world. In any case, the 
union has tried to maintain the tradition to the extent possible with 
its very limited means.
When my children attended school, I used to get £E 200 from 
the Women’s Union to help pay the fees. (P31, Qantara, 19 
June 2002)
Further reductions followed the shift of PLO priorities after 
1995. The union continues to pay private school fees for a small 
number of poor families, but it does so at a reduced level. In some 
cases, it has ceased payments altogether:
The PLO was in charge of university education for Palestinians 
serving with it. Moreover, the Women’s Union paid school fees 
for the children of PLO employees. The family would give the 
bills to the union and the union would pay. That stopped four 
years ago. I do not know why! (P7, ‘Ayn Shams, 23 May 2002)
Other traditional Women’s Union programs such as literacy 
classes and loan support schemes have been discontinued because 
of insuffi cient funding and lack of full-time staff. With fewer 
resources, the union has continued to do what it can to provide 
material help and fi nancial subsidies:
I also receive new or used clothing from the Women’s Union. 
In most cases, the sizes are wrong, but I take them and try to 
sell them and buy things for the house. (P18, Dar al-Salam, 9 
June 2002)
The Women’s Union gives me £E 20 every time I visit them. I 
try to seek their help, but I am unable to get a regular subsidy 
from them. (7/25, Abu Hammad, 10 July 2002)
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As part of its objective of preserving Palestinian traditions and 
identity while building women’s assets through income-generating 
projects, the union engaged low-income women in traditional 
Palestinian embroidery and helped them market their products:
I worked for the Women’s Union making embroidered dresses. 
We sold them in hotels like the Sheraton and Hilton. I left 
because the money wasn’t enough for the amount of work. 
(8/3, Abu Za‘bal, 30 June 2002)
The Women’s Union also continues to hold a yearly bazaar—
part of a long-standing tradition—which sells, among other things, 
locally produced Palestinian embroidery and other items. The 
union has a folk group called Chorale Abbad al-Shams. A folk 
dance troupe has performed in the past with the Egyptian national 
dance troupe and throughout the Middle East, raising money and 
publicizing the Palestinian cause abroad. However, it has involved 
only a small number of Palestinians, mainly those whose parents 
are affi liated with the PLO.
Palestine Red Crescent Society
The Palestine Red Crescent Society was originally established 
as a national Palestinian medical organization in 1968 in Jordan, 
after the Battle of Karameh, and it soon came under the umbrella 
of the newly reconstituted PLO. In 1970 it opened a branch in 
Egypt, establishing clinics in areas with signifi cant Palestinian 
populations. The Palestine Red Crescent Society also established 
medical centers in Maniyal, Alexandria, Zaqaziq, and Tahrir. When 
the PLO was forced to leave Lebanon in 1982, Cairo became the 
organization’s headquarters and remained so until 1995, when 
it moved to Gaza. During those years, the multi-story Palestine 
Hospital, a major medical facility with some 20 specialties and a 
large pharmacy, was built in Heliopolis. A childcare center, called 
Jerusalem, was created in Madinat Nasr for hospital employees. 
Other new facilities were opened, including a socio-medical center 
and, at ‘Ayn Shams, a rehabilitation institute that also served, 
according to the hospital director, as “a unique training center for 
therapists working with the handicapped.”30 In 1983, to satisfy the 
growing need for nurses and paramedical personnel, the Palestine 
Red Crescent Society opened the al-Falujah Nursing Institute, 
which offered a three-year program for registered nurses and a 
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two-year program for technicians and paramedics. The school was 
a godsend for many Palestinians who were no longer permitted 
to study science or medicine in Egyptian public universities. The 
hospital also provided a recruitment center for qualifi ed graduates 
who might otherwise have had diffi culties fi nding work:
I studied at the nursing college that was linked with the Red 
Crescent before it was moved to Gaza. I was even given 
a subsidy of £E 38 a month. (8/12, Shibin al-Qanatir, 3 July 
2002)
With the establishment of the PA in 1994, many Palestine Red 
Crescent Society activities were transferred to Khan Yunis in 
Gaza, including the rehabilitation center, the training center, and 
the al-Falujah Nursing Institute. All Red Crescent medical centers 
throughout Egypt were closed except the Palestine Hospital, which 
now serves some 20,000 persons under the medical insurance 
program. The hospital provides medical care for those working at 
PLO institutions as well as for current and former employees of the 
AOGG. It also serves the families of the Association of Palestinian 
Martyrs and Injured and handles the cases referred to it by the PA 
because of inadequate facilities in Gaza.
Those with medical insurance pay 10 percent of the standard 
fees for consultations and operations and 20 percent for medicine. 
Although the Palestine Hospital provides care for anyone who 
needs treatment, it does so at private sector rates. In an interview, 
hospital director Dr. Muhammad Zaghlul expressed regret that 
it was not possible to treat uninsured Palestinian free of charge, 
explaining that the hospital has had a huge budget defi cit as a 
result of severe cuts following the PLO’s 1995 decision to give 
priority to the establishment of health centers in Gaza and the 
West Bank. He also noted that money deducted from the salaries 
of PLO employees for medical coverage is not being paid to the 
Red Crescent, nor is the hospital being reimbursed for the medical 
cases referred to it by the PA in Gaza. The director added that he 
sometimes asks the PA minister of health for fi nancial assistance 
for critical cases.31
Many of the Palestinians interviewed said that Palestine Hospital’s 
location in Heliopolis makes it diffi cult to reach. Transportation 
costs leave many reluctant to seek care at the hospital, even if they 
have insurance. In addition, medicine for chronic diseases is not 
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always available, and traveling back and forth to obtain subsidized 
medicine is not always practical.
Despite the cutbacks, the Palestine Hospital is an important 
source of employment for Palestinians. While most private 
sector companies have a 10-percent ceiling on foreign workers, 
as mentioned in chapter 4, the Palestine Red Crescent Society 
is considered a foreign investment, where the ceiling for foreign 
labor is 41 percent. According to the director, the actual number of 
Palestinians employed at the hospital exceeds 40 percent, because 
many Palestinian women married to Egyptians work there as 
Egyptians, and most of the doctors with Jordanian nationality are 
Palestinians.32 However, a number of interviewees reported that 
personal connections are necessary to be hired:
I applied to work at the Red Crescent Hospital, but my 
application was completely ignored. The hospital gives priority 
to Fatah people. They are the ones who were recruited and 
the ones who were helped to go to Gaza. There is a double 
standard, and wasta [personal connections] plays a strong 
role in the hospital administration. (P8, ‘Ayn Shams, 23 May 
2002)
In addition to its medical function, the Palestine Red Crescent 
Society is a national humanitarian society that provides a wide 
range of services to Palestinians. It sponsors classes for women 
to learn sewing and traditional Palestinian embroidery patterns, 
and it has a permanent exhibit of Palestinian handicrafts to market 
their products, among others. It also has a social center, which is 
perhaps the most important meeting place for Palestinians in the 
region. It sponsors a dance troupe, called Falujah, whose mission 
is to preserve Palestinian culture and identity in exile and to spread 
awareness of the Palestinian cause.
Other PLO-affi liated Bodies
Another PLO-related organization that provides some services 
to needy Palestinians is the Palestinian Charitable Association, 
established in 1983 and funded by the Palestinian Businessmen’s 
Council. Unlike most of the PLO-affi liated organizations, the 
Charitable Association does not limit its services to the PLO 
community. Its activities—which include subsidizing education 
and health services and channelling job opportunities to Palestinian 
job seekers and employers—prospered in the early 1990s, but its 
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resources are now limited. It currently serves several hundred 
Palestinian families who live below the poverty line; several 
hundred more families are on the waiting list.33 Many of those 
assisted by the association are women whose husbands abandoned 
them when they left to join the Palestinian Authority in Gaza in the 
mid-1990s:
When the PA was set up in Gaza, my husband left me to go 
back without taking care of the family expenses here. I had to 
seek help from the Charitable Association. I get an irregular 
subsidy of £E 50 from the association. (7/29, Abu Kabir, July 
2002)
When Abu Alia left me, my mother and my sister helped me 
with the main household expenses . . . I also get a subsidy 
from the Charitable Association of £E 80 a month. I also get 
£E 50 monthly from the Ministry of Social Affairs since I am 
a divorced Egyptian. With the income I make from sewing 
underwear for a factory and trading of goods brought from 
al-‘Arish, I am able to manage. In seasons like Ramadan, many 
people give charity through the Charitable Association, which 
can reach £E 400 to £E 500. (P18, Dar al-Salam, 9 June 2002)
The Businessmen’s Council, which funds the Charitable 
Association, has an indirect link to the PLO. In the early 1980s, 
Palestinian businessmen had sought to create an organization 
of their own in order to play a role in the social, cultural, and 
economic affairs of the community. With the Egyptian government 
fearing that such an organization could be co-opted for political 
purposes, and the PLO worrying about a potential challenge to 
its own dominance in the community, the Palestine Red Crescent 
Society stepped in and formed the board of trustees of what was 
to become the Palestinian Businessmen’s Council. The board 
involved Palestinian businessmen in fi nancing PLO institutions and 
in its decision making. In this way, the business community was 
brought within the fold of the PLO. The Council, however, had little 
success. The fi rst attempt to organize it failed, and a new council 
was formed in 1996. According to its current head, Ali Jawhar, the 
council is not very active because of personal differences among 
the members.34 The Businessmen’s Council and the Charitable 
Association remain linked, however, and Ali Jawhar is the head of 
both organizations.
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One of the PLO-affi liated bodies that caters exclusively to the 
families of PLO personnel is the Association of Martyred and 
Injured Palestinians. The organization serves the families of some 
500 PLO members killed or wounded, providing assistance through 
monthly subsidies.
My son was a martyr in Gaza. He was killed after he returned 
to Palestine after the establishment of the PA. My husband, 
who is a PA offi cer now, left us ten years ago and stopped 
sending us money. He divorced me two years after my son 
was killed. To survive, I depend on a pension from the 
Association of Martyred and Injured Palestinians. They pay 
me the equivalent of 180 Israeli shekels.35 (P4, Dar al-Salam, 
18 May 2002)
Even an organization with so sacred a mission among 
Palestinians has suffered budget reductions, and services have 
been cut back: The association used to help pay school fees but 
no longer does so.36 In addition to its fi nancial subsidies, however, 
the organization does continue to cover medical treatment at the 
Palestine Hospital for the families it serves.
Working for the PLO 
In addition to its primary role as the locus of Palestinian 
resistance and the Palestinian national movement, the PLO, 
through its military forces, administrative infrastructure, unions, 
and associated bodies, was the largest employer of the Palestinians 
in Egypt until the move to Gaza. The leadership cadres of almost 
all the PLO-affi liated bodies were PLO appointees brought in from 
the outside, though many of them had gone to university in Egypt. 
Needless to say, this was also true of all PLO offi cials in Egypt with 
diplomatic status, fi rst and foremost those of ambassadorial rank: 
the head of the PLO offi ce (since 1993 the Palestinian embassy), 
the PLO ambassador to the Arab League (based at the Palestinian 
embassy), and the PLO representative in charge of the Palestinian 
fi le at the Arab League (based at Arab League headquarters). Other 
PLO positions, including at the unions, medical clinics, and so on, 
would be occupied by “local” Palestinians. The largest number of 
“local” Palestinians employed by the PLO, however, was associated 
with or retired from the various military units, especially the PLA.
Egypt and the PLO: Politics and Privileges  141
For those associated with it, the PLO offered stability through 
regular incomes, pensions, free education up to the university 
level, reduced university fees, and subsidized or free health care 
at the Palestine Hospital. Association with the PLO also meant 
relative ease in obtaining residency and travel documents from 
the government. These privileges were not affected by the ups and 
downs of PLO-Egyptian relations.37 The decline in benefi ts later 
experienced by PLO employees and their families was a result of 
the PLO fi nancial crisis in 1991.38
Almost without exception, those associated with the PLO were 
part of the infl ux entering Egypt in the wake of the 1967 war. Many 
were with the ‘Ayn Jalut Brigade of the PLA, then under Egyptian 
command. Several thousand were retained on active duty (under 
Egyptian command) and deployed at the Bitter Lakes on the Suez 
(except for a year deployed in Syria in 1970–71) and fought in the 
1973 war.39 A larger number of ‘Ayn Jalut veterans were settled in 
Cairo, offi cially as “reserves”40 but actually free to pursue their 
own affairs following Egypt’s reorganization and reduction of the 
brigade. Some of these, especially after the PLO’s takeover by the 
commando organizations in 1969, joined in fi ghting under direct 
Palestinian (generally Fatah) command. Palestinians “based” in 
Egypt fought in Jordan in the civil war and its aftermath in 1970–71, 
the Lebanese civil war, in south Lebanon, and against the Israeli 
invasions in 1978 and 1982. In many cases, as noted in earlier 
chapters, families of the fi ghters had been brought from Gaza 
to Cairo after the 1967 war; in other cases, the fi ghters married 
while in Egypt. In both situations, their families remained behind 
as they went to fi ght elsewhere. The peripatetic movement of the 
fi ghters—and their long absences—were refl ected in many of the 
interviews:
My father was the fi rst to arrive in Egypt, because he was 
working with the PLO. His grandfather was Egyptian, so he 
used to come to Sanhud [in Qalyubiyyah Governorate], where 
he married my mother. He was traveling most of the time to 
Jordan, Iraq, or Lebanon. He would then come back to Egypt 
to stay for some time before leaving . . . (7/46, Minya al-Qamah, 
11 July 2002)
Several years after the 1973 war, my husband left for Lebanon 
with the PLO and fought there. He then went to Libya after 
the PLO was expelled from Lebanon [in 1982]. The moment 
the PA went to Gaza, he joined them and was one of the fi rst 
142  Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948
to arrive. For more than ten years, my husband did not return 
to Egypt. (P4, Dar al-Salam, 18 May 2002)
Beyond the absences, it is clear from many of the interviews 
that very often the men did not take their responsibilities to their 
families very seriously. Um Karim’s husband, for example, fought 
with the PLO army in Jordan [during the 1970 –71 Palestinian-
Jordanian fi ghting], moving afterwards to Syria before being sent 
to Lebanon:
He used to come and check on me and the baby I had when he 
was in Jordan. He came to see us every three to eight months 
and would send us some money every now and then. I had to 
work as a maid to have a regular income, especially because 
my [Egyptian] family’s condition is no better than mine, so I 
had to depend on myself. When he was in Lebanon, he stopped 
sending money. (P13, ‘Ayn Sham, 23 May 2002)
After the PLO fi ghters and guerrilla organizations were expelled 
from Lebanon following Israel’s invasion in 1982, the fi ghters who 
had previously been based in Egypt returned. Some remained in 
the PLO ranks and others retired, often trying to fi nd other work. 
One of the privileges of having been a fi ghter with the PLA, or 
employed by the PLO, was that they could more easily leave Egypt 
without the anxiety of whether or not they would be allowed to 
return, since the PLO would always issue them letters providing 
reasons for their travel and assuring their re-entry.
After my husband left the Liberation Army, he went to fi nd 
employment in Libya. There he worked in a fi eld that he had 
always wanted to be involved in—steel and iron polishing. 
When he returned to Egypt, he started his own business. 
Today he has a workshop where he spends most of his time. 
(P9, Wailey, 24 June 2002)
Many former PLO offi cers tried to set up their own businesses 
after leaving the force, while still drawing pensions: 
My father worked for the Liberation Army until 1975. He then 
resigned. Having been in Lebanon with the PLO, he decided 
to export and import clothing with some Lebanese partners. 
Then he decided to import cars. Through some contacts, he 
decided to go to Iraq and start a construction business. In 
Egypt and the PLO: Politics and Privileges  143
1985, he returned to Egypt because of the Iraq-Iran war and 
started a construction company in Egypt. I worked with my 
father for four years before I went to Yemen to work in the 
same construction fi eld. Soon afterward, I came back from 
Yemen to take over my father’s ceramic tile business. (7/38, 
Dyarb Nijim, July 2002)
Through the Labor Union, the PLO often also acted as a clearing 
house for jobs abroad and even helped cover travel expenses.
Through the Labor Union, it was announced in all faculties 
at Egyptian universities that Yemen was looking for teachers. 
I applied and was accepted. The PLO offi ce then helped in 
buying the [plane] tickets to Yemen. (P8, ‘Ayn Shams, 23 May 
2002)
In later years, as already indicated, PLO services and privileges 
were reduced as a result of the fi nancial crisis following the 1990–91 
Gulf war. This trend continued and deepened as the peace process 
shifted the PLO’s priorities, climaxing with the establishment 
of the PA in 1994. From then on, PLO-related salaries in Egypt 
were cut, and aid programs, scholarships, and subsidies, already 
much reduced, for the most part ceased altogether. Many of our 
interviews refl ected, either directly or in passing, how this change 
had affected their lives.
But while the new situation that grew out of the Oslo process 
caused hardship for many, for others it offered an unimagined 
opportunity: the fulfi lment of the long-cherished dream of return 
to the homeland.
Relocating to Gaza
When the PA was established in the territories in 1994, the 
Palestinian embassy in Egypt called for those who wanted to 
relocate to Gaza to submit their applications for employment with 
the PA. Former PLO fi ghters were given priority, but Israel had the 
fi nal say as to who was allowed to enter.41 This being the case, the 
PLO was required to present a list of potential returnees to Israel 
for approval. Refugees who had been expelled from Palestine in 
1948 were not part of this move, probably so as not to create a 
precedent with regard to the Palestinian right of return. Those 
144  Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948
permitted to enter the territories had almost invariably arrived 
during or after the 1967 war.
Israel’s veto power was illustrated in several interviews, 
including the following:
I applied to the Palestinian embassy for work in one of the 
ministries when the PA was established in Gaza. My uncle 
worked in Gaza and I was hoping that my application would 
be accepted. When my uncle invited me to go to Gaza, I was 
denied a visitors permit by the Israelis since it seems there 
is a blacklisted person with the same name. I want to live in 
Palestine and have Palestinian nationality. (7/21, Salhiyyah, 8 
July 2002)
Palestinians granted permission to go to Gaza were given 
Palestinian identity cards upon arrival and issued Palestinian 
“passports” or travel documents (laissez-passer) renewable every 
three years. Reliable statistics on how many actually entered Gaza 
are not available, but according to the Palestinian ambassador 
to Egypt, Zuhdi al-Qudwah, some 45,000 Palestinians left Egypt 
for Gaza after 1995.42 While this number may be high, certainly 
many thousands made the move. When the team was interviewing 
families in Dar al-Salam, Wailey, and other places where PLO 
people had lived, we were repeatedly struck by indications of 
the extent of the return: Time and again people would point out 
empty apartments—sometimes almost entire buildings—vacated 
by owners or occupants who had gone to Gaza. More than once 
we were told that we were “too late” for our survey, as most of the 
Palestinians in the neighborhood had already left.
Many present or former PLO employees pulled strings or used 
their infl uence to get their children jobs with the PA:
I helped all my children to get work in the PA. I was a lieutenant 
myself in the PLO army. Today all my sons have Palestinian 
IDs and have good positions with the PA. (P1, Giza, 10 May 
2002)
Without doubt, most of those who returned to Gaza from Egypt 
had been with the PLO, both active and retired, but they were not 
the only ones who wanted to go. Return to Gaza and the West Bank 
was seen by many as a way of escaping the humiliating status they 
had endured in the ghurba. An example of this kind of attitude is 
the following:
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As far as I know, those who used to work for the PLO were 
the ones able to apply for a Palestinian ID. I would love to 
have any passport other than this [Egyptian] travel document. 
Even when I ask to marry a woman, I am refused because her 
parents don’t want their grandchildren to suffer. (8/2, Shibin 
al-Qanatir, 4 July 2002)
In addition to the normal aspirations for return, a number of 
other reasons made fi nding work with the PA or in Palestine an 
attractive option. For PLO stalwarts, it was a chance to be part 
of the state-building enterprise. Especially for fi rst-generation 
Palestinians, return meant the chance to rebuild ties with their 
families. For others, it was a way of seeking employment stability 
and a sense of belonging that had been lacking in Egypt. For 
still others, it offered a chance to regularize their legal status; 
we often heard that young Palestinians with problems renewing 
their residence permits at age 21 and who had problems fi nding 
employment were more likely to try to leave for Gaza.
Some young people who entered Gaza on the strength of their 
parents’ PLO connections ended up living by their wits, blending 
into an informal economy or even working in Israel:
My father, who was then working at the PA, tried to get me 
a job with the PA but my mother wouldn’t allow it. I worked 
during these two years as a laborer in Israel. I also worked 
in a gas station and sometimes as a painter. (7/46, Minya al-
Qamah, 11 July 2002)
For those unable to fi nd jobs with the PA but who still wanted 
to return to Gaza, a number of other possibilities were open. 
Palestinian women whose parents still lived there were able to 
apply for them (and their families) to join them through the family 
reunifi cation program.43
Another means of entering Gaza was to apply for a visitor’s 
permit (tasrih ziyarah) through family members living in Palestine. 
The permit, usually valid for three months, was issued by Israel, 
which tightly controls the borders of the PA areas. In many cases, 
however, Palestinians would overstay their permits.
I know many people who left here and now live there [Gaza] 
with no IDs or legal papers and who have exceeded their stay 
. . . I wonder how they are living there. (P5, Dar al-Salam, 18 
May 2002)
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Some Palestinians who received permits to enter Gaza did not 
move there permanently but used them to lay the ground for an 
eventual return, establishing a base for themselves in Palestine 
and then returning to Egypt to wait for the economic and political 
situation to stabilize. Some bought property as a long-term 
investment; others rented houses and made seasonal visits between 
Gaza and Egypt. Similarly, a surprising number of interviewees 
saw the marriage of their children to Gazans as a fi rst step to their 
own return to Palestine.
All my children are married to Palestinians, so when the 
situation gets better in Gaza, we will be able to go back. It 
will then be very easy for both the husband and for the wife to 
return. (8/11, Shubra al-Khayma, 12 June 2002)
Many young women who were not able to fi nish their education 
in Egypt were sent to Gaza to marry Palestinian relatives in order 
to ensure that the coming generation would live in Palestine.
For many, the return proved diffi cult.44 It is common for 
Palestinians, especially young people who have never been there, 
to imagine the homeland as “heaven on earth,” with images passed 
down from parents and grandparents of citrus groves, green fi elds, 
warm family, and neighborly, helpful relations. Arriving in Gaza, 
they found dire economic conditions and a society scarred by long 
years of harsh occupation. They also found a more conservative 
society and different customs from what they were used to in Egypt, 
making adaptation diffi cult for some. The desire to reconnect with 
family sometimes also turned sour.
In a number of cases, men had not only started a new career in 
Gaza, but also a new family. A young man whose father was a PLO 
offi cial who had joined the PA and whose mother was Egyptian 
recounts the following:
We had always maintained a close relationship with my 
uncles, aunts, and cousins in Gaza. They often came to our 
house here in Egypt. After having settled in the West Bank, 
where he was living with his Palestinian wife in Tulkarm, 
my father wanted us all to join him. So, we left and stayed 
with them for six months. The situation was bad for us, so 
we went to Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip. My father insisted 
on having my sister marry his nephew. They got married and 
she was living with her in-laws, who were treating her badly. 
After four months she wanted to return to Egypt. Because 
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we didn’t have good relations with my uncle, we returned to 
Egypt. My mother got divorced from my father and my sister 
got divorced from our cousin. A few months afterwards, my 
sister delivered a baby girl in Sanhud. Our experience in the 
West Bank and Gaza was diffi cult and my mother doesn’t have 
relations with Palestinians any more. (7/46, Minya al-Qamah, 
11 July 2002)
Sometimes, return ended in tragedy:
My son wanted to go live with his father in Gaza, so he did. 
He fi nished his high school exams at an UNRWA school in 
Gaza. When he fi nished his education, he joined Hamas. On 
his nineteenth birthday, he was out with his friends and they 
harassed some Israeli soldiers standing on an observation 
tower. The soldiers could not take this and Muhammad was 
shot in the head. He died on the spot. We all went to Gaza on 
hearing the news. My son became a martyr. His father had 
married another woman and it was not suitable for us—my 
fi ve children and me—to remain, so we decided to return to 
Egypt. My two daughters quit university there and came back 
a few years ago. (P4, Dar al-Salam, 18 May 2002)
Those who had relocated to Gaza and decided to come back 
to Egypt faced major problems. If they had stayed away for more 
than six months without obtaining the necessary permit, they were 
denied re-entry into Egypt, putting those who had overstayed their 
three-month Israeli visitors permits in a particular bind. Many 
Palestinians are currently living in Gaza illegally, as stateless 
persons. The research team was told of many cases of Palestinian 
women in this situation who had married in Gaza and subsequently 
lost their legal status in Egypt:
My son and daughter now live in Gaza. My daughter lost her 
Egyptian residence permit because she got married and did 
not come back within six months. (7/30, Bilbays, July 2002)
With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000, the 
situation in Gaza changed dramatically. PA salaries were reduced, 
and the economy slowed to a standstill as a result of increasingly 
frequent Israeli closures and curfews. Some who had attained legal 
status in Gaza tried to go back to Egypt until the situation in the 
Palestinian territories improved:
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My elder son returned here in March 2002. Work had become 
very slow for him ever since the intifada started. He is back 
now working in construction. My other son bought a taxi 
in Khan Yunis. He also complains of the stagnant economic 
situation. I told them to join the PLO, which could have 
ensured them regular salaries. They preferred informal work. 
(P5, Dar al-Salam, 18 May 2002)
Many of those who left for Gaza had kept their apartments in 
Egypt, but others had liquidated everything before the move and 
had no place to go back to. Others incurred debt in the process:
When we decided to come back due to family problems, 
I had to start looking for work in Egypt. I fi rst worked as a 
truck driver with my cousins but because we did not own the 
vehicle, we had enormous debt. I now earn a living by making 
furniture. (7/46, Minya al-Qamah, 11 July 2002)
Most frequent, however, were bureaucratic diffi culties. For many 
who returned, obtaining a residence permit became a problem for 
the fi rst time. Though the Palestinian passport (laissez-passer) is 
recognized by more than eighty states,45 those who acquired it and 
renounced their Egyptian documents paid a heavy price if they 
decided to go back to Egypt. Regardless of how short the duration 
of their stay in Palestine and regardless of how many years they 
had lived in Egypt, they became de facto and de jure foreigners and 
had to apply for resident permits as foreigners. The “privileges” 
they used to have in Egypt were lost.
I hold the Palestinian travel document because I was given 
a Palestinian identifi cation document. I thought it would be 
better to have a Palestinian travel document. It turned out to 
be more diffi cult. Life in Egypt became more expensive for 
us. With the Egyptian travel document, we had privileges, 
especially since I am a former ‘Ayn Jalut offi cer. My children 
were able to go to public schools. But now we are considered 
foreigners. (P11 ‘Ayn Shams, 28 May 2002)
Even for those who retained their Egyptian travel documents, 
residence permits, which in the past had been relatively certain for 
the families of PLO employees, became problematic:
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My father, who now works with the PA, issued us all Palestinian 
identifi cation documents, but we kept our Egyptian travel 
documents. Since we came back from Palestine, the Offi ce 
of the Gaza Governor has not agreed to renew our residence 
permits using the Egyptian travel document. They require 
us to get a Palestinian travel document on which basis the 
residence will be given since we now have Palestinian 
identifi cation documents. (7/46, Minya al-Qamah, 11 July 
2002)
Ever since I took a Palestinian identifi cation document in 
Gaza, I must renew my residence permit every year, whereas 
I used to renew the Egyptian travel document every three 
years (since I came in 1967 as part of the PLO army). I renew 
my residence permit on time to save myself the hassle and to 
avoid the harassment I may get from some government offi ce. 
(P5, Dar al-Salam, 18 May 2002)
Just as there are no reliable fi gures on the number of Palestinians 
in Egypt who left for Palestine, so are there none on how many 
returned to Egypt. Furthermore, from our interviews we were led 
to understand that a number of those who have come back still 
hope to return to settle in Gaza when calm is restored.
Perhaps surprisingly, the diffi culties and harsh realities 
encountered in Gaza did not always dampen the romantic notions 
of return. Despite everything, a number of our interviewees 
have continued to see living in the homeland as an end to their 
struggles:
My son was living in Libya when the [Libyan] authorities 
confi scated his house and deported him and his family 
in 1997. While he was there he lost his Egyptian residence 
permit. Through his cousins, he was able to get a permit to 
visit Gaza, but that expired and he is now living there illegally 
with no papers. But at least he is living with his family in the 
homeland. (AP3, Alexandria, August 2002)
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under International and Regional 
Conventions
Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence 
within the borders of each State. . . . Everyone has the right 
to leave any country, including his own, and to return to 
his country.
—Article 13, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Everyone has the right to a nationality. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right 
to change his nationality.
—Article 15, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
In much if not most of the world, there is a disconnect between the rights and protections people are guaranteed under the law (both national and international) and the rights and protections 
they actually enjoy. This is undoubtedly more salient in the case of 
refugees and stateless persons. With particular regard to Palestinian 
refugees, there is in addition a controversy as to what protections 
they are entitled to under international conventions.
In order to understand the legal situation of the Palestinians 
in Egypt and what protections they do—or should—have under 
international and regional treaties, it is necessary fi rst to review the 
evolution of the Palestinian refugee question in the organization 
most deeply involved with the issue (and, some would argue, 
having the legal and moral responsibility to resolve it): the United 
Nations. Thus, while earlier chapters have focused on Egyptian 
administrative policies and regulations affecting the Palestinians 
in Egypt, this chapter examines Palestinian legal rights—both as 
refugees (if they qualify as such under established defi nitions) or 
154  Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948
as stateless persons (if they fall within the “displaced” category 
assigned to those who lost their homes as a result of the 1967 war)—
under international and regional treaties and other instruments of 
public international law.
When Palestinian refugees began fl ooding into the neighboring 
Arab states as of spring 1948, they received an immense outpouring 
of sympathy. Palestine was the “hottest” issue in the Arab (and 
indeed Muslim) world, where populations could not but be moved 
by the plight of Arabs or Muslims like themselves who been driven 
from their homes by what were seen as foreign usurpers backed by 
colonial powers. In many places, local inhabitants provided food 
and shelter or supplies to help refugees camping out in orchards 
or fi elds; volunteers were organized to provide medical services.1
Governments provided shelters in schools and other public 
buildings, as well as food and supplies, all within the limits of poor 
and largely agrarian societies lacking infrastructure.
The unquestioned assumption at the time, however—not only 
in the Arab countries but worldwide—was that the situation was 
temporary and that as soon as the fi ghting ended, the refugees 
would be able to return to their homes. This assumption seemed 
authoritatively confi rmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 
194 (III) of December 1948, which stated that the refugees should 
be “permitted to return [to their homes] at the earliest practicable 
date.” It was seen as inconceivable in the Arab world that a solution 
proposed by the United Nations and enjoyed the apparently 
unanimous support of the Western powers could not be imposed 
on the fl edgling state of Israel, which owed its very existence to the 
United Nations. However, as the refugees’ stay became prolonged, 
putting undue strain on already fragile economies, attitudes in the 
host countries began to shift.
For the Arab states, refugee “repatriation” became the 
cornerstone of their Palestine policy. In their view, the international 
community in the form of the United Nations had created 
the refugee problem by forcing the November 1947 partition 
resolution on Palestine against the clear wishes of over two-thirds 
of the population. This being the case, it was felt, the international 
community had the moral obligation to compel Israel to take back 
the refugees it had expelled or otherwise driven out. This position, 
while rooted in genuine convictions and a sense of justice, had 
clear pragmatic implications, particularly for the host countries. 
It also had obvious implications for the treatment of Palestinian 
refugees residing within these countries.
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The fi rst part of this chapter traces the history of UN involvement 
in the Palestinian refugee problem and the various UN conventions 
relating to refugees, and shows how some segments of the refugee 
population—including the Palestinians in Egypt—have “fallen 
through the cracks,” left virtually unprotected. The second part 
of the chapter addresses the position of the Arab League and the 
gap between its offi cial statements, especially the 1965 Casablanca 
Protocol, and the actual treatment of Palestinians by its member 
states, particularly (in the last two decades) Egypt.
International Protection
The United Nations and the Refugee Problem
The dramatic worsening of the situation on the ground in 
Palestine immediately after the passage of UN General Assembly 
Resolution 181 in November 1947 and the all-out Haganah offensive 
launched in early April 1948 made the impossibility of any “peace-
ful” implementation of the UN partition plan patently obvious to 
the world community. On 14 May 1948, the same day that Britain’s 
Mandate over Palestine formally ended, the UN General Assembly 
created the position of UN Mediator for Palestine, whose tasks 
were to promote a truce between the parties and to work toward 
“a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine.”2 By the 
time of the mediator’s appointment, more than 300,000 Palestinians 
had already fl ed or been driven from their homes, either to parts of 
Palestine not yet engulfed by war or across international borders 
into neighboring countries. With the entry of the Arab state armies 
on 15 May, the fi ghting intensifi ed and refugee crisis worsened. 
In June, the United Nations created the Disaster Relief Project, 
with a 60-day mandate to coordinate emergency aid efforts among 
relief organizations and the governments of countries where the 
refugees had fl ed. In November 1948, the Disaster Relief Project 
was succeeded by the UN Relief for Palestine Refugees, which in 
turn was superseded over a year later by the UNRWA.
Meanwhile, the UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, a 
diplomat who had gained international recognition for his work 
as the head of the Swedish Red Cross during World War II, had 
arrived in Palestine in late May. Despite his successful mediation 
of a 30-day cease-fi re in June, he was having a diffi cult time 
“promoting peaceful adjustments,” especially because once on 
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the ground his views on the requirements of a lasting solution 
evolved rather quickly and soon included the need for substantial 
revisions in the UN partition boundaries, mostly to the benefi t of 
the Arabs. With the refugee fl ight intensifying as Israel conquered 
more territory beyond the UN-allocated Jewish state, Bernadotte 
began fi rmly insisting that assuring the refugees’ right to return 
was an essential precondition for a settlement. Never very popular 
on the Israeli side, Bernadotte became enemy number one among 
the “dissident” Zionist groups, Irgun and Lehi (the “Stern gang”).3
On 16 September 1948, Bernadotte submitted his report to the 
UN General Assembly.4 On the refugee issue, he emphasized that 
the “right of the refugees to return to their homes” must take place 
“at the earliest practical date.”5 In his view, it was
undeniable that no settlement can be just and complete if 
recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugee 
to return to the home from which he has been dislodged . . . 
It would be an offense against the principles of elemental 
justice if these innocent victims of the confl ict were denied 
the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants 
fl ow into Palestine.6
Bernadotte also declared that “because of large-scale looting, 
pillaging and plundering and of instances of destruction of villages 
without military necessity,” Israel had a “clear” liability “to restore 
private property to its Arab owners and to indemnify those owners 
of property wantonly destroyed.”7 Although he acknowledged that 
most of the refugees “may no longer have homes to return to” and 
that “resettlement” in Israel would present problems of “special 
complexity,” he insisted that whether the refugees were repatriated 
or resettled elsewhere, their “unconditional right to make a free 
choice should be fully respected.”8 He also emphasized that it was 
“indispensable” for the General Assembly to “take a fi rm position 
on the political aspects of the problem” and that only with “fi rm 
decisions” would the two sides “acquiesce” in a settlement.9 Word 
of the tenor of his report preceded his return to Jerusalem the next 
day, and upon arrival, on 17 September, he was assassinated by 
members of the Stern Gang, a terrorist group (also involved in the 
Dayr Yasin massacre) led by Yitzhak Shamir, who later became 
prime minister of Israel.
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The UNCCP
In the “Specifi c Conclusions” of his report, Bernadotte 
summarized his recommendations concerning the refugees as 
follows:
[T]he right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in 
Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should 
be affi rmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, 
resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and 
payment of adequate compensation for the property of those 
choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by 
the United Nations conciliation commission.10
His recommendation was that the UN conciliation committee 
should be established to work with the UN to “ensure the 
continuation of the peaceful adjustment of the situation in 
Palestine,” to make recommendations, and “to supervise the 
observance of” the arrangements decided by the United Nations, 
including with regard to refugees.11
These two recommendations—concerning the refugees and the 
conciliation committee—were at the heart of UN General Assembly 
Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.12 Both are embodied in 
the resolution’s now-famous paragraph 11, which
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes 
and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to 
do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation 
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return 
and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles 
of international law or in equity, should be made good by the 
Governments or authorities responsible; 
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the 
repatriation, resettlement and economic and social 
rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation 
and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United 
Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with 
the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations.
But the UNCCP as created by the General Assembly, in contrast 
to Bernadotte’s more limited concept of a facilitating body, not 
only charged the new body with the late mediator’s mandate to 
“promote” peaceful adjustments, but decided to “extend the scope 
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of the negotiations” and to “[Instruct] the Conciliation Commission 
to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned 
to achieve a fi nal settlement of all questions outstanding between 
them.”13 BADIL co-founder Terry Rempel argues that the resulting 
dual mandates assigned the UNCCP—the broad mandate to achieve 
a fi nal settlement of the outstanding issues between the parties, and 
the specifi c mandate to protect the Palestinian refugees,14 inter alia 
by facilitating their repatriation and the payment of compensation 
to them—were incompatible and represented a confl ict of 
interest15 due to Israel’s unalterable opposition to more than token 
repatriation. Moreover, it became increasingly clear that the United 
States and other Western powers, despite their endorsement of UN 
General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), were not at all prepared 
to insist on the “fi rm political decisions” that Bernadotte had said 
were indispensable to securing a fair settlement.
Making little headway in the political realm, the UNCCP in June 
1949 established a technical committee to investigate practical 
ways of resolving the refugee problem. This included investigating 
how to determine refugee choices and collecting information on 
repatriation, resettlement, and compensation. The committee’s 
report assumed as a given the resettlement of large numbers 
of refugees outside Israel. It also concluded that the idea of 
determining individual refugee choices, called for by Bernadotte 
and implied in UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) (i.e., 
“the refugees wishing to return . . .”) was “premature,” because 
repatriation, unlike resettlement, was a “political decision.”16
In August, a second committee, the Economic Survey Mission—
also known as the Clapp Commission, after its chairman, Gordon 
Clapp—was established by the UNCCP to pursue another track, 
this one emphasizing the improvement of the refugees’ situation 
through an integrated economic program. The word “repatriation” 
was still used in its statement of purpose, but its real focus was 
resettlement. Specifi cally, its mandate was to investigate ways 
to “reintegrate the refugees into the economic life of the area on 
a self-sustaining basis within a minimum period of time; and to 
promote economic conditions conducive to the maintenance 
of peace and stability in the area.”17 To this end, the Economic 
Survey Mission undertook a tour of Arab countries to study their 
economic situations and absorptive capacities. In its report to the 
General Assembly in November, the Economic Survey Mission 
showed a sympathetic understanding of the refugees’ plight, but 
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its conclusions were determined by its mandate and the political 
realities of the time:
Why do not the refugees return to their homes and solve their 
own problems? That is what the great majority of them want 
to do. They believe, as a matter of right and justice, [that] they 
should be permitted to return to their homes, their farms . . . 
They are encouraged to believe this remedy open to them 
because the General Assembly of the United Nations said so in 
its resolution of 11 December 1948. For purely psychological 
reasons, easily understandable, the refugees set great store 
by the assurances contained in this resolution . . . But
repatriation of Arab refugees requires political decisions 
outside the competence of the Economic Survey Mission.
The report went on to ask rhetorically, “Why do not the refugees 
go somewhere else? Why not resettle them in less congested 
lands?” After providing several answers to this question, the report 
declared: “In these circumstances, the only immediate constructive 
step in sight is to give the refugees an opportunity to work where
they now are.”18 Among its recommendations was the creation of 
a public works program to rehabilitate the refugees; it was out of 
this that UNRWA was established in December 1949 under UN 
General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV).
In fact, the right of return clause of UN General Assembly 
Resolution 194 (III) was doomed from the start, not only because 
of the realities on the ground but also because of the very 
composition of the UNCCP charged with implementing it. The 
UNCCP comprised representatives of the United States, France, 
and Turkey (both close U.S. allies), and it was this three-nation 
body that formulated UNCCP policy and carried out initiatives 
through the subcommittees responsible to it. According to historian 
Michael Fischbach, a leading expert in land issues,
Washington was able to make sure that the commission’s 
policy and initiatives did not cross the “red lines” it had 
established for resolving the confl ict. Among the most 
important of these were that repatriation was not feasible 
and that refugee compensation must be in lieu of repatriation. 
These undeclared parameters were to guide the UNCCP’s 
efforts throughout its entire existence, even though, for 
political reasons having to do with its mandate from the 
160  Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948
UNGA, the commission continued to press for at least token 
repatriation of some of the refugees.19
In this regard, Israel, under strong U.S. pressure, did agree in 
September 1949 to repatriate 100,000 refugees if they could be 
settled in areas Israel would determine by itself and in accordance 
with its security needs, and if the Arab states would at the same 
time agree to a general peace settlement. Neither the Arabs nor the 
United Nations and the United States found the offer acceptable, 
and Israel itself soon withdrew its offer.20 Nonetheless, the UNCCP 
forged ahead with attempts to facilitate the repatriation of refugees 
who wanted to return to Israeli-controlled areas. For example, it 
approached the government of Israel to secure the return of the 
former inhabitants of the no-man’s land in the north Gaza region, 
refugees in Egyptian-administered Gaza, and refugees in the Gaza 
zone who were from the Beersheba area. Only small groups were 
returned, however. Refugees from the areas of Abasan and Akhzah 
in Palestine were permitted to return to cultivate their lands. 
Others were permitted to return if the family breadwinner had 
remained in Israel. In December 1948, a total of 800 dependents 
from Lebanon and Jordan rejoined their families in Israel, and 115 
came back from Gaza.21
Early on, the UNCCP had begun to move away from its larger 
mandate of mediation between the parties aimed at reaching 
a fi nal settlement in order to concentrate on more technical 
matters.22 Increasingly, it turned its attention to refugee properties. 
Its demands that Israel abrogate its 1950 Absentee Property Law, 
which gave a legal veneer to the seizure of refugee properties, led 
nowhere, and the transfer of refugee land to the state continued 
unabated, as did the demolition of mosques and other religious 
buildings. The UNCCP also called for the suspension of all measures 
of requisition and occupation of Arab houses and for the unfreezing 
of Waqf (religious endowment) property.23 In 1950, it established a 
Refugee Offi ce to determine the ownership, interest, and nature 
of each refugee property. The offi ce also prepared an initial plan 
for the individual assessment of refugee properties relying on 
detailed information collected from refugees. By 1964, the offi ce 
had collected 453,000 records amounting to 1,500,000 individual 
refugee holdings.24 The UNCCP maintains the most comprehensive 
records in existence of Palestinian refugee properties. As for the 
protection of the refugees’ broader rights and interests, however, 
within four years of its formation, the UNCCP had become little 
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more than a symbol of UN concern for the unresolved Arab-Israeli 
confl ict.25
The 1951 Refugee Convention and Article 1D
Meanwhile, in December 1950, exactly a year after the 
establishment of UNRWA, the United Nations created the offi ce 
of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as the principal 
international instrument responsible for protecting refugees 
worldwide and charged it with overseeing international refugee 
conventions. Several months later, in July 1951, a conference 
convened by the UN in Geneva approved the landmark Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which in turn mandated the 
UNHCR to represent refugees, intervening with state governments 
on their behalf, if necessary, in order to ensure their protection.26
The 1951 refugee convention is the most comprehensive legal 
document ever issued on refugee rights: It defi nes who is considered 
a refugee, what rights refugees have, and the legal obligations of the 
countries in which they reside. According to the 1951 convention, 
a refugee is a person who,
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself to the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of former 
habitual, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return 
to it.27
Contracting states are called upon to grant refugees “treatment 
as favorable as possible and, in any event, not less favorable than 
that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.” 
The protection and rights provided under the convention include 
the right to education, to free movement, to own and dispose of 
movable and immovable property, to form associations, to earn 
wage employment, and to have access to the courts.
Palestinian refugees, however, are not covered by this important 
convention. Article 1D states:
This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present 
receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other 
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than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
protection or assistance.
Nowhere are Palestinians mentioned specifi cally in the 1951 
convention, but there is no doubt that the exclusion referred to 
them, since in principle they were already being served by two 
UN bodies. The UNCCP had been expected to provide for their 
protection based on UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III),28
and UNRWA had been created expressly to provide them with 
assistance and relief. The Statute of the UNHCR contains a similar 
clause excluding from its mandate the Palestinian refugees,29
as does the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons.
Article 1D of the 1951 Convention does, however, contain a 
qualifying clause. Its second paragraph reads as follows:
When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, 
without the position of such persons being defi nitively settled 
in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the 
General Assembly of the UN, these persons shall ipso facto
be entitled to the benefi ts of this convention.
Commenting on the exclusion clauses of the 1951 Convention, 
the UNHCR Statute, and other such instruments, legal scholar 
Susan Akram writes: 
Almost all states and international entities have interpreted 
the relevant provisions . . . as severely restricting the rights [of 
Palestinian refugees] in comparison to the rights guaranteed 
every other refugee group in the world. As a result, Palestinian 
refugees have been treated as ineligible for the most basic 
protection rights guaranteed under international law to 
refugees in general . . .30
Akram, however, focuses on Article 1D’s “protection or 
assistance” and “ipso facto” phrases, arguing that that they 
were intended to provide Palestinian refugees with continuity of 
protection under various organizations and instruments. Basing 
her analysis on the drafting histories of the various instruments, 
she further maintains that the original intention of the international 
community was not less protection for the Palestinian refugees but 
a special “heightened protection regime” because of international 
recognition of responsibility for the disaster that befell them.31
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This being the case, according to Akram, Article 1D should 
be interpreted not as an exclusion clause but as a “contingent 
inclusion clause,” ensuring that if, for whatever reason, either
protection (provided by the UNCCP) or assistance (provided by 
UNRWA) should cease before a fi nal resolution of the refugee 
situation, that agency’s function should be transferred to the 
UNHCR, and the refugee convention would fully and immediately 
apply without preconditions to the Palestinian refugees.32
According to the 1951 convention’s drafting history, as detailed in 
Les Travaux Préparatoires, “the shared intention of the Arab and 
Western states was to deny Palestinians access to the Convention-
based regime so long as the United Nations continues to assist 
them in their own region.”33 Indeed, the Arab states led by Egypt 
are on record as favoring the Palestinian refugee exclusion clause 
of the 1951 convention and the UNHCR statute. Takkenberg states 
that the main reason that emerged from an examination of the 
Travaux Préparatoires was their concern that if the Palestinians 
were included under the UNHCR, they “would become submerged 
[within other categories of refugees] and would be relegated to 
a position of minor importance,” which could have a negative 
impact on the refugees’ chances of repatriation.278 Takkenberg 
further notes that while the Arab states believed that funding 
the relief efforts was the responsibility of the Western states that 
had supported partition and the creation of Israel, they (the Arab 
states) “were concerned that assistance or protection be extended 
to the Palestinian refugees irrespective of whether [UN] relief 
would continue to be provided.” As such, the Arab states made it 
clear that the “exclusion” provision was to be only temporary.35
Whatever the intentions of the United Nations and other 
concerned parties, it became increasingly obvious as years passed 
that Palestinian refugees were not receiving adequate protection, 
as was dramatically illustrated in the 1990–91 Gulf crisis that left 
tens of thousands of stateless Palestinians stranded in Kuwait 
and elsewhere, and in the Libyan expulsion episode of 1995–97. 
Apparently responding to concerns about the vulnerability of the 
Palestinian refugees, in October 2002 the UNHCR issued a “Note 
on the Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees to Palestinian Refugees.” (The text of the 
note is provided in Appendix 4.) After noting in its fi rst paragraph 
that the convention “contains certain provisions whereby persons 
otherwise having the characteristics of refugees, as defi ned in 
Article 1A, are excluded from the benefi ts of this Convention” 
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and summarizing paragraph 2 of Article 1D, the note’s second 
paragraph reads as follows:
While paragraph 1 of Article 1D is in effect an exclusion 
clause, this does not mean that certain groups of Palestinian 
refugees can never benefi t from the protection of the 1951 
Convention. Paragraph 2 of Article 1D contains an inclusion 
clause ensuring the automatic entitlement of such refugees 
to the protection of the 1951 Convention if, without their 
position being defi nitively settled in accordance with the 
relevant UN General Assembly resolutions, protection or 
assistance from UNRWA has ceased for any reason. The 1951 
Convention hence avoids overlapping competencies between 
UNRWA and UNHCR, but also, in conjunction with UNHCR’s 
Statute, ensures the continuity of protection and assistance of 
Palestinian refugees as necessary.36
Because the Palestinians living in Egypt do not receive 
assistance from UNRWA, it would seem obvious that they should 
fall under the “inclusion clause” in paragraph 2 of Article 1D. As 
such, it is logical that they would automatically be entitled to the 
benefi ts of the 1951 convention and fall within the mandate of 
the UNHCR, “providing of course that Article 1C, 1E and 1F do 
not apply,”37 none of which in fact do apply to the great majority 
of the community. Yet the UNHCR has clearly not acted on what 
appears to open the door to extending protection under the 1951 
convention to the Palestinians in Egypt, among other places. 
The reason for the UNHCR’s continuing failure to extend 
protection to the Palestinians in Egypt is not diffi cult to ascertain. 
Egypt ratifi ed the 1951 convention in 1981 but at the same time 
placed reservations on a number of key articles.38 These include 
articles 12, 22, 23, and 24, which address, respectively, personal 
status, access to public education, access to public relief and 
assistance, and labor legislation and social security. In other words, 
even though it ratifi ed the convention, Egypt, by virtue of its formal 
reservations, is not obligated to provide even those refugees in 
Egypt who are registered with UNHCR (such as the Sudanese 
and the Somalis) permanent residence, the unqualifi ed right to 
work, or education. Takkenberg suggests that Egypt’s stance may 
derive from a “perceived confl ict between the status favored by 
the Arab League and that of the Convention, and also because for 
many years the PLO had opposed providing individual Palestinian 
refugees with the status of the 1951 Convention because this was 
Protection under International and Regional Conventions  165
considered prejudicial to the inalienable rights of the Palestinian 
people as a whole.”39
Other Conventions
Three other international conventions have potential relevance 
to the Palestinians in Egypt: the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons, the Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Racism.
The 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons, passed 
on 28 September of that year at a conference convened by the UN 
Economic and Social Council, follows almost exactly the model of 
the 1951 convention. Using almost identical language, it applies to 
stateless persons (who are not necessarily refugees40) the rights 
accorded by the 1951 convention to the refugees covered by the 
UNHCR mandate. A stateless person is defi ned as one “who is 
not considered as national by any state under the operation of its 
laws.”41 It should be noted that Article 1.2 (i) of the 1954 convention 
contains the same exclusionary clause as the 1951 convention on 
refugees—that is, that it does not apply to persons who at present 
are receiving from UN organs or agencies other than the UNHCR 
“protection or assistance so long as they are receiving such 
protection or assistance.” No further qualifi cation is provided in 
the exclusion.
The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness requires 
the contracting states to grant nationality to stateless persons 
meeting certain conditions, the most prominent of which is that 
the persons are born in that state’s territory. Aside from listing 
the other qualifying conditions (besides birth in the country of 
residence), the convention spells out the modalities under which 
stateless persons should be naturalized.
Palestinians meeting the UNRWA defi nition of refugees (see 
Introduction) who have not been granted citizenship by any country 
are stateless as well as being refugees. However, the international 
community distinguishes between Palestinian refugees (who left 
Palestine as a result of the 1948 war) and those who left the West 
Bank and Gaza as a result of the 1967 war, who are “displaced 
persons” (except for those who were already registered as refugees 
with UNRWA—the “twice displaced”). Displaced persons who 
have not received citizenship in any country defi nitely qualify as 
being stateless. This category includes all Palestinians, whether 
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or not they fi t the legal defi nition of refugee, who hold Egyptian, 
Lebanese, and Syrian travel documents, “temporary” Jordanian 
passports (Gazans residing in Jordan and West Bankers), or 
Palestinian passports, which are in fact only travel documents, or 
laissez-passer.
Unfortunately, however, neither Egypt nor any of the Arab 
countries primarily concerned signed either of the two statelessness 
convention and therefore are not bound by their provisions. Only 
Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia signed the 1954 convention, and only 
Libya and Tunisia signed the 1961 convention. Moreover, Libya’s 
ratifi cation of both statelessness conventions did not prevent it 
from expelling its Palestinians in the mid-1990s.
A fi nal convention with provisions relevant to Palestinians, the 
UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
1979. This convention potentially has enormous importance for 
Palestinians in Egypt, where thousands of Egyptian women married 
to Palestinians have been unable to pass Egyptian citizenship on 
to their children, who therefore remain stateless.42 Paragraph 2 of 
Article 9 of the convention reads as follows: “States Parties shall 
grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of 
their children.” Egypt in fact did ratify the convention in 1981, but as 
in the case of the 1951 refugee convention, it ratifi ed it with specifi c 
reservations, one of which was Article 9. 
Regional Protection: Arab League Resolutions
Early Arab League resolutions concerning Palestinian refugees 
emphasize solutions based on “ensuring their return to their 
homes and confi rming the preservation of their properties, their 
money, their life, and their freedom” (Resolution 205 of 17 March 
1949). Statements on the treatment of Palestinian refugees in the 
host states were less committal: Resolution 391 of October 1951, 
for example, affi rms that “The Council of the League approves the 
Political Committee’s decision with reference to the decision of 
the Palestinian Permanent Council to discuss all refugee affairs 
thoroughly and to consider their need to work, travel, and remain 
in the host countries. The Council requests the committee to 
prepare a fi nancial report on the needs for Palestinian refugees” 
(emphasis added).
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In 1952, the Arab League established the Administrative Offi ce 
of Palestine, with two sections, one for political and legal matters 
and another for refugee affairs. From then on, resolutions began 
to deal more substantively with practical issues pertaining to the 
refugees, often reiterating political positions as well. Resolution 
462 of 23 September 1952 is a good example. In Article 1, the 
Political Committee advises Arab governments to defer efforts 
to settle Palestinian refugees and calls on the UN to implement 
the resolutions concerning the return of Palestinian refugees to 
Palestine and their compensation for damages and property losses. 
In Article 2, it recommends that the Arab host countries endeavor 
to improve the refugees’ living conditions and coordinate with 
UNRWA to create work projects for Palestinians, though it con-
fi rms that these projects should not aim at settling Palestinians 
permanently and should preserve their right of return and 
compensation. In Article 3, the committee requires Arab 
governments to coordinate efforts to facilitate the travel of 
Palestinians and to cooperate in accommodating their temporary 
stay in host countries.
Several years later, Resolution 714 of 27 January 1954 
unanimously approved the issuance of travel documents for 
Palestinian refugees. According to Article 1, “The governments of 
member states of the League have agreed that each government 
should issue the Palestinian refugees residing in its territory, or 
coming under its jurisdiction, temporary travel documents upon 
their request” and in accordance with the certain provisions that 
are spelled out. Of particular signifi cance are Article 3, which 
stipulates that the bearer is subject to the residency rules of 
the issuing state (i.e., does not derive residency rights from the 
document), and Article 6, which stipulates that the member states 
“shall accord to the holders of these travel documents the same 
treatment with respect to visas and residence as is accorded to 
their own nationals.”43
By far the most signifi cant of the Arab League efforts with regard 
to the Palestinians is the Casablanca Protocol on the Treatment 
of Palestinians, adopted in 1965. (An unoffi cial translation of the 
Casablanca Protocol is provided in Appendix 3.) The protocol 
emphasizes the importance of preserving Palestinian identity and 
maintaining Palestinian refugee status (in anticipation of their 
eventual return). The Arab states that signed the Casablanca 
Protocol agreed to grant Palestinians living in their territories 
residence permits, the right to work, and the right to travel on a 
168  Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948
par with their nationals.44 Article 3 states, “When their interests so 
require, Palestinians presently residing in the territory of [name 
of country] shall have the right to leave the territory of this state 
and return to it.” The protocol does not, however, cover rights 
to own property, to access courts, or to education. Takkenberg 
points out that, in contrast to earlier resolutions, the protocol 
does not mention Palestinian refugees but rather refers simply 
to the treatment of “Palestinians,” implying recognition that all 
Palestinians regardless of their de jure status require protection.45
Unfortunately, the observance of these basic rights has varied 
greatly from host state to host state, as well as within the same 
state at different times. (Egypt is a prime example of the latter.) As 
early as 1969, the League’s Conference of Supervisors of Palestinian 
Affairs studied the actual treatment of Palestinians in various Arab 
countries and concluded that it was far below standard and urged 
member states to implement the Protocol in full.46
Realizing that the rights outlined in the Protocol were not being 
adequately upheld in the host states, and in view of various problems 
facing Palestinian refugees, the Arab League called a meeting of 
the Council of Arab Interior Ministers in December 1982, which 
adopted a “special resolution on the treatment of Palestinians in 
the Arab countries” designed to clarify and confi rm the Protocol’s 
provisions. Paragraph 1 confi rmed that the travel documents 
issued to Palestinians by any Arab country must be granted on an 
equal basis with the national passports issued to its own citizens. 
Paragraph 2 stipulated that bearers of such documents “shall be 
accorded the same treatment as nationals of the state issuing this 
document, as regards freedom of residence, work, and movement.” 
In addition, “special measures needed for the implementation” of 
the fi rst two paragraphs were to be coordinated with the PLO. 
Paragraph 4 contained a provision that had not been included 
in the Casablanca Protocol nor in any previous resolution: “If a 
Palestinian perpetrates a crime in any Arab country, the laws of the 
country of his residence will be applicable.”47
Despite efforts to promote compliance, the Casablanca Protocol 
has at best been implemented partially and intermittently in a 
number of Arab states, and the situation of Palestinians in these 
countries has remained precarious. The 1990–91 Gulf crisis, in 
particular, had a devastating impact on the treatment of Palestinians 
in the Arab world. It was in the shadow of this crisis that the forty-
sixth session of the Conference of Supervisors of Palestinian 
Affairs in the host countries was held in August 1991. As a result of 
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the intense anger in the Gulf over Palestinian support for Saddam 
Hussein during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, one of the resolutions 
passed at the conference was amended at the request of Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia in such a way as to considerably compromise 
the force of the Casablanca Protocol. As amended, paragraph 7 
of Resolution 5093 dated 12 September 1991 reads as follows (the 
added clause being in italics):
Having taken notice of the memorandum presented by the 
delegation of Palestine, the Conference expresses the hope 
that all Arab states, in a spirit of brotherhood and solidarity, 
will seek to abide by the Protocol relating to the Treatment of 
Palestinians in accordance with the rules and laws in force 
in each state, and calls upon the Arab states to overcome 
the negative impact of the Gulf crisis, as regards the 
implementation of this Protocol in respect of the Palestinian 
people.48
Shiblak interprets the added phrase “in accordance with the 
rules and laws in force in each state” as essentially releasing the 
signatories from their obligations under the Casablanca Protocol 
and leaving treatment of the Palestinians up to their discretion.49
Others, including Takkenberg, question whether the obligations of 
member states under an offi cially ratifi ed international agreement 
can be nullifi ed on the basis of a recommendation of the Council.50
It is true that a number of the signatories, including Egypt as of 
the late 1970s, have always applied the Protocol’s provisions “at 
their discretion.” Nonetheless, the fact that the Arab states can 
now claim justifi cation for their failure to comply with the treaty 
they ratifi ed constitutes a very severe blow to Palestinian rights in 
those states.
Politics and the Casablanca Protocol
Despite the obvious good will of the United Nations (and, at least 
in the early years, its lingering sense of responsibility for the plight 
of the Palestinians), and despite a spontaneous sympathy for and 
identifi cation with the Palestinian refugees in the Arab countries, 
Palestinians remain unprotected both under international law and 
under Arab League protocols.
Egypt is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and has ratifi ed both the 1951 Convention on Refugee Status (albeit 
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with reservations) and the Arab League’s Casablanca Protocol 
(without reservations). Accepting Takkenberg’s interpretation that 
Egypt has by policy given priority to the Arab League protection 
regime—and leaving aside the above-mentioned amendment to 
the 1991 Arab League Council resolution—why has Egypt not 
implemented the provisions of the Casablanca Protocol, of which 
it was the chief backer and drafter? Shiblak has suggested that the 
Arab states’ treatment of Palestinians is determined by two main 
factors: the absence of clear and well-defi ned legislation regulating 
the Palestinians’ status, and the infl uence of shifting local politics 
and concerns.51 The refugee rights organization BADIL expresses 
the same idea in different terms: “Political considerations and 
domestic law often trump the standards set forth in Arab League 
resolutions and the Casablanca Protocol.”52
There is no doubt that “raison d’état” and considerations of 
domestic politics almost always take precedence over considera-
tions of justice and human rights. As regards the Palestinians in 
Egypt, however, a good case can be made that fl outing the provisions 
of the Casablanca Protocol does not serve state interests. During 
the Nasser years, the provisions of the Casablanca Protocol were 
effectively observed for the most part even before the Protocol 
was actually formulated, and they continued to be observed for 
a decade thereafter, with no discernible hardship to Egypt. What 
those years demonstrated was that when Palestinians are allowed 
to work unhindered, they are not a burden on the economy but 
productive members of society.
The virtually overnight change in Palestinian legal status in 1978 
was politically, not economically, motivated. In a sense, it was 
aimed as much at the Egyptian as at the Palestinian population 
insofar as it sent a dramatic signal that an entire era of Egyptian 
policy had ended, that a page had been turned, and that a new 
chapter (which climaxed with the signing of the peace treaty 
with Israel two years later) had begun. Thirty years have passed 
since then, and there seems little political reason for continuing to 
maintain the tight restrictions then imposed, especially given the 
high degree of integration of the community.
Egypt has never invoked economic reasons for its continuing 
denial of rights to the Palestinian community and its ongoing 
nonobservance of the Casablanca Protocol. But even from 
the economic standpoint, despite the undeniable problems 
of overpopulation and the huge pressures on scarce jobs and 
resources, Palestinian numbers are too small to make a difference 
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or add to Egypt’s economic burden. The initial policy change was 
political; a new political decision refl ecting new political realities 
can be taken to reverse it.
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Refl ections on Identity 
and the Future
Few in number and scattered throughout the country, 
Palestinians in Egypt were virtually engulfed by 
overwhelming numbers of Egyptians. In order to blend 
in with their surroundings, many Palestinians in Egypt 
adapted their dialect and customs to those of Egypt; and 
marriage to Egyptians, often the only sure route to a more 
secure residency, was most common. Many people lost 
track of where their former compatriots were and often, 
at least in terms of outward indicators, became virtually 
indistinguishable from their Egyptian hosts.
—Laurie Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World, p. 85
In the twenty years since these words were written by American researcher Laurie Brand, another generation of Palestinians in Egypt has been raised, yet another born. The Oslo agreement was 
signed; the PA was established in Gaza and parts of the West Bank. 
Starting from the mid-1990s, tens of thousands of Palestinians have 
left Egypt for Palestine (though some have returned to Egypt under 
the impact of the second intifada), further fragmenting the already 
fragmented community. With Israel’s closure regime drastically 
tightened since 2002, the back-and-forth movement between Gaza 
and Egypt for family visits that had continued almost uninterrupted 
since 1967, and which helped keep the Palestinian identity alive 
for many young people, has all but stopped. The ongoing tragedy 
of the intifada, the deep divisions within Palestine, and the fast-
receding prospects of a Palestinian state with any semblance of 
sovereignty or viability have all taken a toll on the community’s 
hopes for the future. Meanwhile, intermarriage with Egyptians has 
continued unabated (if not accelerated), having become all the 
more necessary as a means of survival.
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In light of these developments, it seems an appropriate way to 
conclude this study by refl ecting briefl y on the state of Palestinian 
identity in Egypt, the factors affecting it, and on where the 
community might be headed in the future.
Factors Affecting Identity and the Pull of 
Assimilation
As has been clear throughout this study, Palestinians in the 
ghurba have always been pulled between two poles—assimilation 
and separateness. The pull toward assimilation is great. Factors 
that facilitate assimilation include the community’s small numbers; 
its dispersal; the absence of any kind of “center” such as a single 
relief institution around which Palestinians could gather; the lack 
of civil society institutions or clubs; and, most important, the sense 
that Palestinians must blend in if they are to have any chance of 
getting ahead. On the “separateness” side are the distrust, fear, and 
suspicion fostered by the Emergency Laws and the experience of 
sudden shifts in political climate and local attitudes.
John Berry has labeled the changes refugees or migrants are 
forced to make when coming to a new country as acculturation, or 
the change resulting from continuous, fi rsthand contact between 
two “distinct cultural groups.” What differs from case to case, 
according to Berry, is the amount of time it takes to move along 
the “continuum of integration” and the reversibility of the changes 
undergone by both the new arrivals and their hosts.1 In the case 
of Egyptians and Palestinians, of course, we are not dealing with 
two distinct cultural groups, so in principle the similarities should 
shorten the distance to integration. Indeed, the very absence of 
distinctive characteristics or beliefs between new arrivals and 
the host community not only makes eventual integration almost 
inevitable, but also makes the long-term maintenance of a separate 
identity more diffi cult to sustain.
The following remarks by a young Palestinian typify the pull of 
assimilation tempered by ambivalence:
I do not feel different from Egyptians. My brothers and I have 
lived here all our lives. We have defi nitely been affected by 
the Egyptian way of life. To a certain extent, we differ from 
our parents in the way we talk, the way we live. We differ 
also from the young people in Palestine. I went to live in Gaza 
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and I felt a great difference. The men there are strong and 
stubborn. They do not talk much and do not make jokes. 
Their lives are serious and hard, the exact opposite of here. 
Yet they are very kind people, and [it may take me time to 
adapt but] I like living in Palestine. (8/13, Shubra al-Khayma, 
11 June 2002)
Many factors have contributed to shaping the identity of Palesti-
nians in Egypt. The more obvious ones are discussed briefl y 
below.
Political Environment
Over time and through intermarriage, it has become diffi cult 
to distinguish between Palestinians and Egyptians based on 
physical appearance, manners, and speech. Part of this is a 
natural consequence of living intermingled with a population 
whose ethnicity, customs, religion, and language were similar to 
begin with. But there is also no doubt that the impulse (conscious 
or otherwise) to “blend in” and adopt the manners of the host 
population is encouraged by the community’s political insecurity 
and vulnerability. Since the mid-1970s, the volatile swings of 
Egyptian opinion with regard to Palestinians, not to mention 
the search campaigns, arrests, and deportations that increased 
during periods of aggravated political tension, contributed to the 
widespread tendency to de-emphasize or conceal characteristics 
readily identifi able as Palestinian. Most obviously, the insecurity 
speeded up the adoption (at least in public) of the Egyptian dialect, 
which the majority of Palestinians in Egypt now speak. This 
linguistic assimilation is a means of becoming accepted within the 
host community and avoiding scrutiny. Some interviewees reported 
that their own family members ask them to lower their voices in 
public when talking about Palestine or Palestinian relatives. Time 
and again we heard things like “I never emphasize who I am” or “I 
try not to say I am Palestinian.” Many told us that “no one knows” 
they are Palestinian, or that “not many people can tell whether 
I am Palestinian or Egyptian.” It should be noted that a number 
of these quotations and others in the same vein are from persons 
who are deeply attached to their Palestinian identity. For many, 
assimilation, even at an unconscious level, is a measure of self-
defense or even a strategy for survival.
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The Generational Factor
As might be expected, we found sharp differences between, 
on the one hand, fi rst-generation Palestinians who had lived in 
Palestine and witnessed the Nakba (the 1948 arrivals) or who came 
of age in its aftermath (the 1967 arrivals) and, on the other hand, 
the generations born and raised in Egypt. Members of the fi rst 
generation very often “looked” more Palestinian and were more 
easily identifi able as such by speech and manner. Their identity 
for the most part was clearly and unambiguously “Palestinian,” 
even if they had close relations with their Egyptian neighbors or 
even had married into Egyptian families. They also tended to be 
more engaged and preoccupied with things Palestinian, expressing 
nostalgia for the homeland and bitterness at Arab and international 
betrayal, and sometimes still entertaining dreams of liberation.
In our interviews with the second and third generations, by 
contrast, we often found considerable ambivalence. Many were 
torn between their loyalty to Palestine and their Palestinian 
identity on the one hand and a sense of being comfortable in—
and even, to an extent, part of—Egyptian society on the other. 
Beyond ambivalence, we also frequently found identity confusion. 
The younger brother of the young man quoted above (who said 
he does “not feel different from Egyptians” but who was also 
attracted by the idea of living in Palestine) is a good example of 
this confusion:
Here in Egypt I am known as ‘Arif al-Filistini [Arif the 
Palestinian]. In Palestine, when I went to visit, I was known as 
‘Arif al-Masri [Arif the Egyptian]. I am quite confused about 
who I should be. Anyway, I am proud of being Palestinian 
and at the same time, I do not hate being Egyptian. Like it or 
not, I live the way they live. Some of them keep making us 
feel different and accuse us of having sold our lands. I try to 
convince them that this isn’t true, but they have rigid ideas 
and don’t want to discuss it. (8/13, Shubra al-Khayma, 11 June 
2002)
We also found second- or third-generation Palestinians who 
expressed indifference to Palestine or even identifi ed more 
strongly with Egypt. More than one person told us that they felt 
Palestinian only when they were reminded of it by having to go 
to the Mugamma‘ to renew their residencies or travel documents. 
How much of this identifi cation with Egypt or turning away 
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from the Palestinian identity is deeply felt, and how much is an 
unconscious response to the uncertain environment is impossible 
to gauge, but in the fi nal analysis the result is the same.
Education
Palestinian children in Egypt receive no information about the 
Palestine issue unless they get it from their parents. Under the 
Emergency Law, Palestinians are not permitted to hold public 
meetings or to have clubs where Palestinian history and events 
can be discussed. Private schools for Palestinians are not allowed.2
Those who benefi ted from PLO exemptions enabling them to attend 
Egyptian public schools learned nothing about Palestine. Arab 
identity itself has been strongly de-emphasized in Egypt’s post-
Nasser school curriculum. A 1981 study of the political education 
of Egyptian children through their school textbooks (history, 
geography, and civic education) noted that “only 16 percent of 
instruction was aimed at promoting the sense of belonging to the 
Arab nation, whereas 54 percent was devoted to Pharaonic Egypt 
and 30 percent to the Egyptian identity per se, above and beyond 
the stress placed on Egyptian citizenship considered independently 
of the Arab or Islamic nation.”3 The result is that most Palestinians 
of the second and third generations have little knowledge of their 
own history. This was demonstrated during the training sessions 
for the fi ve research assistants who worked on this project. All 
were Palestinian, all had university degrees, but in discussions 
about the readings they were given it became clear that except for 
the team member from Gaza, the researchers had no idea about 
the history of the Palestine problem and were not even familiar 
with UNRWA.
The situation in the UNRWA-run schools in the refugee camps 
of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon is very different. Jason Hart,4 an 
anthropologist who worked as a volunteer English teacher at 
UNRWA schools in the Jabal al-Hussein refugee camp in Jordan, 
remarked that the teaching staff, most of whom were Palestinian 
refugees themselves, taught the children about Palestine and 
about their villages of origin. Furthermore, the very fact that the 
children live in refugee camps that are frequently divided into 
sections named after the towns where their parents originated 
encourages them to express their feelings and sense of belonging 
and strengthens their Palestinian identity. Palestinian children in 
Egypt have no such opportunities to learn their history.
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Family
In every culture, the “education” or “upbringing” by the parents 
has a profound infl uence on their children’s sense of who they are. 
The correlation between the parents’ attitudes toward Palestine 
and the extent to which their children identifi ed with Palestine 
was striking in our fi eld research. For example, a man who told 
us that his father had refused to apply for Saudi or Egyptian 
nationality because he worried that the occupied homeland could 
not be liberated if Palestinians took other nationalities, himself 
showed a real attachment to Palestine and tried to participate in 
whatever Palestine-related activities he could fi nd (7/37, Faqus, 14 
July 2002). On the other hand, those whose parents did not talk 
much about Palestine tended to express little interest in their 
country of origin (“Palestine is a place I have never thought of in 
my life.” 7/44, Hehya, 15 July 2002). We also found that in families 
where the father was a PLO fi ghter who spent long periods away 
from his family, or where the father had to work at several jobs 
in the informal sector and came home only to sleep, memories 
of Palestine or the family history were not passed on. Traditional 
authoritarian relations between the father and the children also 
limit the friendly, participatory home environment through which 
an exchange of ideas, stories, and questions can take place to teach 
children about the homeland.
Close ties to relatives in Palestine generally made for a 
stronger Palestinian identity; exchanges of visits were particularly 
signifi cant. Conversely, negative experiences with family members 
in Palestine (for example, disputes over inheritance) caused 
alienation and a turning away not only from the family but from 
Palestine in general. Disrupted marriages also had a powerful 
infl uence on attitudes about Palestine. Many Egyptian women were 
abandoned or divorced by their husbands when they left for Gaza 
after the establishment of the PA, sometimes even taking second 
wives, and this inevitably affected their children.
Marriage
In general, mixed marriage, especially when the mother is 
Egyptian, has an impact on the child’s identity formation. An 
Egyptian mother, whether or not she has an appreciation of 
Palestinian traditions, naturally tends to pass her own Egyptian 
sense of belonging on to her children. In most of the families 
interviewed, second- or third-generation Palestinians expressed 
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stronger ties with their Egyptian family than with their Palestinian 
relations because they knew them better and saw them more 
often. When such marriages end in divorce, especially in the case 
of Palestinian fathers who went back to Gaza in the mid-1990s, 
the identifi cation with the Egyptian side of the family was even 
stronger.
By the same token, a preference for marrying within the 
Palestinian community is often in itself an indicator of a strong 
Palestinian identity having been transmitted to the children. When 
both parents have a shared history as Palestinians and are able to 
expose their children to Palestinian customs and traditions, the 
identity is naturally reinforced.
The few factors mentioned above point to some of the 
reasons why Palestinians in Egypt choose either to emphasize 
or to de-emphasize their identity as Palestinians. However, even 
those who feel strongly about their identity often conceal their 
“Palestinianism.” Revealing one’s Palestinian identity is not always 
prudent, particularly during times of political tension. The fact that 
in many cases Palestinians feel compelled to hide their identity 
in turn affects the construction of social networks and the sense 
of community among Palestinians, and it distorts their feelings of 
belonging to Palestine.
Whither the Community?
One of the defi ning characteristics of Palestinian life in Egypt, 
as we have seen throughout this study, is that there is no cohesive 
Palestinian community as such. There are many reasons for this, 
some of which have already been discussed (especially in chapter 
3). What has perhaps not been suffi ciently addressed is a subtle 
“split,” or at least differentiation, between the 1948 Palestinians 
and the 1967 Palestinians—the two principal waves of Palestinian 
infl ux into Egypt.
1948 and 1967: Community Divides
Without doubt, all Palestinians who came to Egypt, whether 
as refugees, “displaced persons,” or socioeconomic migrants, 
share the common experience of dispossession, a central 
element of Palestinian identity. Notwithstanding this shared core 
identity, however, the 1948 and 1967 waves were shaped by very 
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different experiences. The 1948 arrivals, while they had lived in 
an all-Palestinian environment until the Nakba, were mostly from 
villages or rural areas; despite their strong feelings about what had 
happened to their country, they had not been politicized. Once in 
Egypt, the absence of permanent camps or any centralizing agency 
meant that they more or less had to fend for themselves and fi nd 
their own way. This led to an almost haphazard self-settlement 
based on social and family networks and chance, contributing to 
their wide dispersal. By the time the second great wave arrived in 
1967, and although the anti-Palestinian backlash was still a decade 
in the future, most of the young people born or brought up in Egypt 
had already undergone some assimilation.
By contrast, those who arrived in 1967 (both “displaced” and 
“twice displaced”) had lived for two decades or come of age in the 
intensely and self-consciously Palestinian environment of the Gaza 
Strip, often in refugee camps, in very different conditions from 
those experienced by their compatriots in Egypt. Many had been 
involved in resistance activities against Israel and/or had joined the 
PLO military forces established a few years before the 1967 war. 
For these reasons, it is hardly surprising that for the most part they 
were far more politicized than the Palestinians who had spent the 
last twenty years in Egypt as a small, widely scattered community 
totally intermingled with Egyptians in all spheres of life.
Also signifi cant is that most of those who came with the PLO or 
who had served under Egyptian military command were helped to 
settle by the Egyptian government, which meant that they tended 
to live in the same neighborhoods, which then drew other 1967 
arrivals through family and social networks. Thus, by and large, 
the 1967 infl ux was less dispersed than the earlier wave. Even 
more important in differentiating the 1948 and 1967 communities, 
however, was an effect of Egypt’s changed legislation regarding the 
Palestinians in 1978. From then on, those with PLO connections 
benefi ted from privileges not enjoyed by other Palestinians. Even 
though many of the 1967 arrivals were by no means privileged, the 
widely perceived association between PLO/privilege and the 1967 
community in general continued to stick,5 adding another layer to 
the wider Palestinian community’s fragmentation.
As discussed in chapter 6, virtually all the post-1995 “returnees” 
to Gaza had been part of the 1967 wave, and most of them were 
able to return thanks to their PLO connections. There had always 
been a tendency among PLO fi ghters and former fi ghters in Egypt 
to form a group unto themselves; mingling with other groups was 
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limited. Still, their departure in large numbers as of 1995 could 
only have had a demoralizing effect on the community as a whole, 
especially in Cairo, where the greatest number of the 1967 group 
had lived. The impact of their “return to Palestine” and the thinning 
out of certain neighborhoods was compounded by the dramatic 
reduction of the formerly vast PLO apparatus to little more than 
an embassy occupied primarily with catering to the needs of the 
PA. While the PLO had done little for the community at large, its 
presence up to the 1990s nonetheless provided, by virtue of its high 
visibility, a kind of focal point and even a semblance of protection 
that has since all but disappeared.
While the 1948/1967 divide forms the principal “fault line” within 
the fragmented and dispersed Palestinian community, others can 
be added. Most importantly, the 2004 revision in the Nationality 
Law—which guarantees automatic Egyptian citizenship to all 
children of mixed Palestinian-Egyptian marriages born after the 
law’s passage—promises to develop into a major “divide” as years 
go by, this one cutting across families, with younger siblings having 
Egyptian citizenship and the privileges that go with it, and older 
ones consigned to statelessness.
Rights, Not Citizenship
Under an unwritten policy, Palestinians were the only foreigners 
in Egypt systematically excluded from full coverage under the 2004 
Nationality Law. Without doubt, this has stirred resentment, but it is 
important to emphasize that citizenship has never been a collective 
Palestinian demand. Neither has tawtin—permanent resettlement 
in Arab host countries. No Palestinian human rights group has ever 
declared either naturalization or permanent resettlement as a goal. 
Palestinians are the fi rst to want their right of return to Palestine 
protected and acknowledged.6 The issue for Palestinians in the 
host countries has always been rights.
In fact, citizenship for Palestinians is not even an issue in most 
Arab host countries. Yet too often in Egypt (and certain other Arab 
countries as well) there is a confl ation between citizenship and/
or tawtin, on the one hand, and the provision of basic rights and 
protections on the other. An argument frequently heard in Egyptian 
intellectual and offi cial circles is that granting Palestinians basic 
rights and improving their living conditions would jeopardize their 
right of return (or at the very least, diminish Israel’s responsibility 
for the refugees’ plight). Improving Palestinian conditions and 
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giving them basic rights, it is reasoned, would facilitate their full 
integration into Egyptian society and weaken their Palestinian 
identity, leading them to forget Palestine. In other words, 
Palestinians must be deprived of their rights in order to preserve 
their Palestinian identity.
This is a relatively new argument, and it fl ies in the face of the 
historical record of the Arab states’ Palestine policy. Certainly, 
insistence on the repatriation of refugees to their lands in Palestine 
has always been a cornerstone of Arab policy, regularly expressed 
by individual Arab governments and by the Arab League (including 
in the 1959 protocol cited by Egyptian interior ministry offi cials as 
an explanation as to why Palestinian applications for citizenship 
under the 2004 Nationality Law are not accepted7). But at least 
in theory, the demand for repatriation has always been entirely 
separate from the issue of Palestinian rights in host countries. In 
tandem with the calls for repatriation, an unbroken stream of Arab 
League resolutions from the early 1950s onward, culminating in the 
Casablanca Protocol, has been issued called on Arab governments 
to grant Palestinians residing within their borders a wide range of 
basic rights. It is clear that for the Arab League, at least, there is no 
contradiction between the two policies.
More to the point, the falsity of the supposed linkage between the 
provision of basic rights and the loss or weakening of Palestinian 
identity is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in Egypt itself. 
Our fi eld research demonstrated beyond any doubt that the major 
factor encouraging Palestinians to hide or even lose their sense 
of Palestinian identity is precisely the deprivation of basic rights 
and the uncertainties arising from the precariousness of their 
legal status. Conversely, the small number of wealthy Palestinians 
located mainly in Cairo and Alexandria who are utterly secure, 
thanks to their connections, money, and power in Egyptian society 
(and sometimes having Egyptian nationality from pre-1948 days), 
do not hesitate to speak volubly of their Palestinian identity at 
important Egyptian offi cial functions, to warm applause.8
Looking Ahead
As the fi rst generations (1948 and 1967 arrivals) gradually pass 
from the scene, it is inevitable (assuming the ongoing denial of 
basic rights to Palestinians in Egypt) that assimilation, already 
pronounced among the younger generations fi ve years ago when 
we conducted our research, will not only continue but accelerate, 
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especially in light of the 2004 Nationality Law. Indeed, it is 
impossible to refl ect on the future of the Palestinians in Egypt 
without considering the long-term implications of this law. Because 
it involves the automatic naturalization of children born after 2004 
to Palestinian-Egyptian couples, the incentive for intermarriage in 
present conditions far exceeds anything known to date. Thus, with 
the number of children being born with Egyptian nationality (who 
formerly would have been Palestinian) expanding, and with older 
Palestinians dying off, it does not take a demographer to predict 
that over the next three generations or so, Egypt’s “Palestinian 
problem” will in all likelihood “solve itself.”
One can legitimately ask, however: Is this the best “solution”?
Three generations is a very long time for persons suffering the 
humiliation and hardships of living on goodwill in the only country 
they know. And in the intervening decades before such a long-
term demographic “solution” works itself out, it is not diffi cult 
to imagine what the Palestinian “community” in Egypt will look 
like: still scattered, dwindling in number, rent by the 2004 cross-
family dividing line between citizenship and statelessness, more 
and more indistinguishable from Egyptians, having an increasingly 
diffuse Palestinian identity, but living in a legal limbo. Indeed, the 
very extent of the community’s assimilation only accentuates the 
anomaly of their statelessness. Thus, no matter how “Egyptian” 
Palestinians may appear—and indeed, how “Egyptian” many of 
those born before 2004 (and therefore not covered by the new 
Nationality Law) actually are9—they are on their own, without 
protection. Under current laws, their residencies must be renewed 
regularly; young people no longer in school can be legally deported 
if they have not found work by the time they turn 18 or, if they 
pursued higher education, by the time they turn 21. Even though 
the state tends to turn a blind eye to expired residencies—at least 
in the sense that it does not actively search for persons in that 
situation—any mishap or casual brush with the law can activate 
deportation proceedings. There are unquestionably thousands of 
Palestinian “illegals” in Egypt, many of whom were born there and 
know no other home. Such people can never leave the country 
unless they are prepared to leave for good, and they must live with 
the constant fear of being discovered. This situation is exceedingly 
painful for the Palestinians. It also does no credit to Egypt.
In seeking a more just and palatable alternative to the painfully 
slow “absorption through intermarriage” solution, it might be 
useful to look briefl y at what must have been Egypt’s calculations 
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in determining its stance on the Nationality Law. It seems clear 
that the law was enacted in order to bring the country in step 
with internationally accepted norms of gender equality. Its 
passage presented the country with a dilemma, however: The 
law’s provision mandating that Egyptian nationality be granted 
to the children born of Egyptian women married to foreigners 
went against long-stated national policy concerning Palestinian 
residents. To cut through this dilemma, the government appears 
to have resorted to a compromise. On the one hand, it apparently 
made the conscious decision that it could not decently exclude 
Palestinians from benefi tting from the automatic portion of the 
law (Article 2). On the other hand, in an attempt at balance, it 
simultaneously excluded Palestinians from coverage in the law’s
non-automatic Article 3.10 In this way, Egypt could maintain at 
least the appearance of upholding what has been a core ideological 
position ever since 1948.
In a sense, Egypt’s adherence to offi cial Arab policy on 
the Palestinian right of return could suggest a way out of the 
current impasse with regard to its Palestinian residents. Having 
formally upheld the political commitment, it can now honor 
another commitment almost as old: granting Palestinians basic 
rights as enshrined in numerous Arab League resolutions and 
the Casablanca Protocol. As mentioned above, citizenship has 
traditionally not been a Palestinian demand; if mixed Palestinian-
Egyptian couples want their children to have Egyptian nationality, 
it is only because their children, as Palestinians in Egypt, do not at 
present have even minimal legal protections. If Palestinians enjoyed 
such rights—valid travel documents allowing them to enter and 
leave, education, the right to work—the lure of citizenship would 
surely fade, assimilation (real or simulated) would no longer be 
a coping mechanism, and the push to intermarriage (at least as a 
key strategy for survival) would disappear. Continuing to withhold 
basic rights seems all the more pointless and illogical given the 
long-term prospects of legal absorption that appear inevitable as a 
result of the 2004 Nationality Law.
Among the Arab host populations, there has always been 
a dualism between Palestine, the cause, and the Palestinian 
individuals living in their midst. This dualism, which has been 
especially evident in Egypt, forms an important underlying theme 
of this study. Thus, for all the ups and downs and complexities 
of Egypt’s relationship with Palestine—the enthusiasm and 
recriminations, the passionate support in some periods and 
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bitterness at “unacknowledged sacrifi ces” in others—Palestine 
continues to have the potential for tapping into a huge reservoir 
of emotion. In the popular Egyptian psyche, however, passion for 
Palestine concerns the larger cause: Palestine as the embodiment 
of the struggle against Israel; Palestine as a symbol of injustice 
against the Arab nation aided and abetted by foreign powers; 
Palestine as stubborn resistance in the face of terrible odds.
What this study has tried to do is to refocus attention on the 
“smaller,” more human, and ultimately more easily resolvable 
issue: the plight of the Palestinians in Egypt. Given Egypt’s long 
involvement with and championship of the Palestinian cause, its 
central role in the formation and consolidation of the PLO, and its 
political pre-eminence in the Arab world, it would seem especially 
appropriate for Egypt to take this step. Even leaving aside this rich 
past history, Egypt continues to work closely with the Palestinians 
at the political level, sponsoring efforts to heal rifts between 
factions and acting as mediator between the PA and Israel, not 
to mention the Egyptian media’s role in rallying popular opinion 
against Israeli incursions and actions since the outbreak of the 
second intifada. These factors, coupled with the minuscule size of 
the Palestinian community (eliminating any possibility of threat to 
state interests) and the long-term inevitabilities mentioned above, 
give reason to hope that Egypt may decide at last to put an end to 
the dualism between cause and community and to lead the way in 
reviving the Casablanca Protocol. Such a decision would do honor 
to Egypt, and restore its pre-eminence in the Palestinian issue at 
little cost to itself.
Notes
1. John Berry, “Acculturation and Adaptation in a New Society,” International
Migration 30 (1992), p. 87.
2. A Palestinian school, funded by the Palestinian Businessmen’s Association 
and the PA Ministry of Education, was established in al-‘Arish in the 1990s. After it 
was built, however, it was not allowed to serve Palestinians students exclusively. 
It now shelters sheep belonging to Bedouin in the area. Interview with Ali Jawhar, 
22 October 2001. 
3. Yehia, “The Image of Palestinians in Egypt, 1982–1985,” p. 48.
4. Jason Hart, “UNRWA and Children: Some Thoughts on an Uneasy 
Relationship,” paper presented at UNRWA, A History within History Workshop, 
Amman, Jordan, 1998.
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5. It might bear emphasis that most of the PLO groups in the last analysis 
were also vulnerable and unprotected, as became particularly clear for those who 
returned from Gaza following the outbreak of the second intifada.
 6. Surveys conducted among refugees across the diaspora have repeatedly 
demonstrated that the “right of return” for large numbers of Palestinians is not 
just a symbolic demand. Consistently, refugees have been shown to oppose a 
rhetorical recognition of the principle of return with actual return limited to a 
“Palestinian state” in parts of the West Bank in Gaza. What they want is actual
return to their lands.
7. As explained elsewhere, children born after the passage of the 2004 law 
obtain citizenship automatically, whereas formal applications need to be fi led for 
those born before the law was passed. See especially chapter 2. 
8. It might also be noted that Palestinian identity has shown no signs of abating 
either in Jordan, where most of the Palestinians have citizenship, or in Syria, 
where their rights do not differ signifi cantly from those of Syrian nationals and 
where they have the same access to education and government services.
9. In our fi eld research, three-quarters of our sample had at least one Egyptian 
grandparent, and many in the younger generations had two or even three.
10. See chapter 2.
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Appendix 1
Research Sources and Methodology
Initial Interviews
Many sources of information have been used for this research. 
Initially, Palestinian offi cials were interviewed in Cairo, including 
those working on the Palestinian issue at the Arab League, 
diplomats at the Palestinian embassy and the PLO offi ce, members 
of the Palestinian Women’s Union (General Union of Palestinian 
Women—GUPWom), the Palestinian Labor Union (General Union 
of Palestinian Workers—GUPW), and the heads of the Palestinian 
Charitable Association and the Association of Martyred and 
Injured Palestinians. These interviews were used to collect 
general information on the socioeconomic situation and legal 
status of Palestinians in Egypt. Because of the unavailability of 
offi cial demographic information, the interviews provided various 
“guesstimates” and impressionistic information on geographic 
areas of Palestinian concentration and employment.
In addition to interviewing offi cials, the research team met with 
scholars who had themselves conducted research on Palestinians 
in Egypt. These included Abdul Qader Yassin, who provided a 
number of articles about Palestinians in Egypt; Mohamed Khalid 
al-Az’ar, who studied the conditions of women and children with 
a team of researchers in 19951 and provided a copy of his work 
on the community published in 19862; Sari Hanafi , who shared his 
fi ndings on Palestinian businesspeople in the diaspora, including 
Egypt; and Lamia Raie, who wrote a master’s thesis on the legal 
status of the Palestinians in 1995.
Demographic Information
Reliable sources of information concerning the geographical 
distribution and social and demographic characteristics of the 
Palestinians in Egypt are hard to come by. In the years following 
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the 1948 war, limited information on the numbers of Palestinians 
entering the country as well the population in Gaza was made 
available to the public through the semi-offi cial daily al-Ahram.
But in recent decades, the government has not released overall 
population data on the Palestinians in Egypt, much less the number 
of Palestinians living in the various governorates.
Unoffi cially and off the record, an Egyptian foreign ministry 
source estimated that 70,000 Palestinians lived in Egypt in 2000. The 
estimate for that same year given by the Palestinian ambassador 
to Egypt was 53,000.3 Meanwhile, according to the 2002 report of 
the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, the 
Palestinian population in Egypt “was believed to number 50,000 or 
more persons at the end of 2001, with some estimates placing the 
number as high as 70,000.”4 Earlier estimates varied just as widely: 
The 1988 fi gure given by the PLO’s Central Bureau of Statistics and 
Natural Resources, using projections based on fi gures from a 1976 
Egyptian census, was 41,279.5 A mere six years later, the results 
of a 1995 census conducted by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, 
as reported in al-Wafd (7 July 1995), was more than twice that 
number: approximately 89,000.6
Information concerning the number of foreign employees in the 
Egyptian public sector does exist: The Egyptian Central Agency 
for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), the government 
body responsible for census data, publishes such data in regularly 
issued reports. However, as the fi gures are amalgamated, combining 
Palestinians and other Arab foreigners, we found the CAPMAS 
documents to be of little use.
Attempts to arrange interviews with government offi cials 
for the purpose of obtaining further information on Palestinian 
demographics (as well as government policies toward the 
community) were not successful. A meeting with the director of 
the Administrative Offi ce of the Governor of Gaza (AOGG), Gen. 
Mohammad Mahmoud Marzouk, resulted in promises to “look 
into the matter” of the Palestinian population in Egypt. General 
Marzouk claimed that the fi gures requested, such as the number 
of Palestinians in Egypt and the number of Palestinian students in 
public schools, were not available and that authorities were trying 
to collect more information and make it available. No fi gures were 
provided after that meeting.7
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Secondary Sources
Libraries at the AUC, the Centre des Etudes et de Recherches 
de Moyen Orient Contemporain (CERMOC) in Amman, the 
Documentation Centre of the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford 
University, and the British Library in London, among others, 
were visited to collect material on the Palestinians in Egypt. 
Although there were not many references, some articles did offer 
perspectives on Egypt’s political and national positions and actions 
during and after the 1948 and 1967 wars, and how these shaped 
Egyptian attitudes toward Palestinians and the PLO.8 Palestinian 
diaspora studies have only rarely investigated the Palestinians in 
Egypt, though several sources provided estimates of their numbers 
without investigating their socioeconomic conditions.9 In many 
studies, the period of Egypt’s administration of Gaza was examined, 
including the economic and social conditions of the region.10 The 
manner in which Egypt administered the Gaza Strip was seldom 
examined.
Few scholars have investigated the status of Palestinians in 
Egypt, and most of the studies that do exist date to the second half 
of the 1980s. Nadera al-Sarraj described their situation from 1948 
until 1986, including the demographic, socioeconomic, historical, 
and political dimensions.11 An in-depth study of Palestinian 
organizations in Egypt (and of the Egyptian government’s attitude 
toward them) was written by Maha Dajani. She analyzed how 
Palestinian identity, which she calls “Palestinianism,” generated 
institutions within the Palestinian community in Egypt, viewing 
the formation of these groups as an embodiment of social and 
national consciousness among stateless Palestinians.12  Laurie 
Brand devoted the three chapters of her book on Palestinians in the 
Arab world to Egypt, examining the policy changes of successive 
Egyptian governments toward Palestinians, particularly relevant 
legislation in the fi elds of employment, business, and education, 
and how it affected them. Brand also analyzed the role of the 
Palestinian unions, the construction of Palestinian community in 
Egypt, and the struggle for a Palestinian national identity.13 Lamia 
Raie, in her master’s dissertation at AUC, studied the legal status of 
some twenty Palestinian families in Egypt and the effects of their 
legal status on their socioeconomic conditions.14 Abdul Qader 
Yassin, a Palestinian refugee who experienced displacement 
fi rsthand through a series of deportations from Haifa, Gaza, and 
Egypt, has studied several aspects of Palestinian life in Egypt, 
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including the economic, demographic, political, educational, and 
legal factors affecting their survival.15 Basing many of his statistics 
and fi gures on Sarraj’s study, he updated the data with concrete 
events and stories about Palestinians in Egyptian universities and 
markets. Sari Hanafi  wrote about Palestinian businesspeople in 
the diaspora. He discussed Egypt’s policies toward Palestinians 
during two periods: the Golden Era, (1962–78) and the end of the 
“‘honeymoon” (i.e., 1978 to the present). He briefl y explains the 
effects of these two eras on the employment of Palestinians in 
Egypt.16
The British Public Records Offi ce at Kew Gardens, London, 
was visited to collect material written on Palestinians in Egypt. 
There, the most useful material for our purposes was found in 
the correspondence fi le of the Foreign Offi ce (File 371). Most of 
it concerned Egypt’s administration of Gaza, with a few letters 
shedding light on the conditions of Palestinians in Egypt and 
agreements reached by the Egyptian government to accommodate 
refugees. The majority of the letters were about the infl uxes 
of Palestinians during 1948, 1950, and 1952 as a result of the 
military manoeuvres between the Egyptian and Israeli armies. 
Correspondence also discussed the situation of Palestinians in 
Gaza and UNRWA’s large-scale projects.
Internet Web sites were searched for articles about Palestinian 
refugees and the livelihoods of refugees. In addition, periodicals 
such as the Journal of Palestine Studies, American Anthropo-
logist, and the Journal of Refugee Studies were reviewed. 
Correspondence was conducted with representatives from the 
American Friends Service Committee (Quakers), who were 
unable to provide details concerning their emergency operations 
in Egypt during 1948 and 1949. Correspondence with USAID was 
also unsatisfactory, with the agency claiming to have no record of 
the humanitarian aid they provided in Egypt from 1948–50. The 
only document obtained described aid provided to the Egyptian 
government as a whole and not to a particular community of 
Palestinians in an emergency situation.
Visits were made to the major universities in Egypt to review 
dissertations on the subject. The works found dealt with general 
issues related to Palestinian refugees; none focused on Palestinians 
in Egypt. Although some dealt with the creation of the Palestinian 
refugee problem and its effect on the Middle East, they did not 
focus on Egypt. A study on general theories regarding the right 
to seek asylum in international law analyzed asylum-seeking in 
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general, again with no reference to Palestinians in Egypt. Although 
we did fi nd a dissertation about the health, education, and social 
services provided to Palestinians in refugee camps in Jordan, 
Syria, and Lebanon from 1948 through 1956, it did not refer to 
Palestinians in Egypt.
Articles on Palestinians in Egypt from 1948 until July 2002 in the 
Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram depicted the living conditions of 
Palestinians and the administrative regulations concerning them. 
Many of the articles were found in the al-Ahram archives; however, 
page numbers were not always available. Several articles were 
found in the French language al-Ahram Hebdo and the English-
language al-Ahram Weekly. Articles from other newspapers, 
including al-Akhbar and al-Usbu‘, were also collected. Legal and 
administrative regulations in the government’s monthly offi cial 
gazette Jaridah Rasmiyyah and from Waqa’e‘ Yawmieh (Daily 
Decisions) were also gathered, as were Arab League resolutions 
concerning Palestinian refugees in Arab countries.
For the purpose of this research, unoffi cial translations were 
made of documents, resolutions, and articles from Arabic and 
French originals. I also translated interviews conducted in Arabic 
into English. While translating, I tried to preserve the voice of 
the interviewee as much as possible. Certain Arabic phrases and 
proverbs have been included in italics with an English translation.
Fieldwork Preparation
A qualitative case-study approach was used in this study. 
This approach was necessary because statistical sampling and 
quantitative data collection would have been impossible given that 
the exact number of Palestinian refugees in Egypt is unknown and 
the results of the government’s 1995 census are not available.17 I 
therefore used a combination of data collection methods, including 
interviews, personal experience and observations, and written 
texts.
The general geographical distribution of Palestinians in rural and 
in urban areas was identifi ed based on readings and referrals from 
social workers at the Palestinian Women’s Union and the Labor 
Union. Because I decided to rely on interviews with Palestinians 
in their homes and workplaces, I intended to interview a sample 
from each village, city, and district visited. An attempt was made 
to interview Palestinians from both genders and from a range of 
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age groups, types of households, educational backgrounds, types 
of residency, and social classes. According to the initial work plan, 
some 300 households, including 15 out of the 27 governorates in 
Egypt, were to be covered in the research.18 In fact, as a result of 
the interruption of the research by Egyptian security (see below), 
only 80 households comprising 401 persons in six governorates 
were visited; full interviews were conducted in only three 
governorates (Cairo, Sharqiyyah, and Qalyubiyyah). Of the 401 
persons interviewed, 215 were men and 186 were women.
Research Assistants
Conducting fi eldwork is a challenging responsibility that 
raises a number of moral and methodological questions. How is 
the researcher perceived by the studied community, and how is 
the community perceived by the researcher? Are the subjects, as 
Narayan has suggested, viewed as mere fodder for professionally 
self-serving statements about a generalized “other”? Or are they 
accepted as subjects with their own voices, views, and dilemmas?19
Keeping in mind these kinds of questions and the complex 
relationship between the studied community and the researcher, 
careful attention was paid to selecting research assistants from 
the Palestinian community in Cairo. By word of mouth, potential 
research assistants were located and interviewed with the help of 
several Palestinian scholars and the Women’s Union.
The hope (and expectation) was that the interviewers, being 
Palestinian, would be able to establish a rapport with those being 
interviewed and to build enough trust to solicit detailed information 
about Palestinian livelihoods and the ways Palestinians manage 
to overcome obstacles. It was hoped that interviewees, talking 
to compatriots, would feel more at ease in discussions about the 
diffi culties they face in Egypt, especially if the interviewers shared 
and were familiar with their experiences. Thus, interviewers with 
Palestinian backgrounds and a legal status similar to that of the 
interviewees were preferred as candidates. It should be noted, 
however, that this type of selection also has disadvantages. If the 
interviewer is Palestinian, the Palestinian interviewee may feel 
that he or she should emphasize his/her Palestinian identity in 
order to please the interviewer. Interviewers were instructed to do 
what they could to create an open and comfortable atmosphere, 
including providing examples themselves so as to stimulate ideas 
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and permit the interviewees to answer without fear of being 
judged.
Five research assistants—four women and one man, aged 22 
to 28 years, all Palestinians—were selected from among many 
applicants. Of the four women, three had Egyptian mothers, and 
although both parents of the fourth were Palestinian, the father 
had been employed by the Egyptian government and in many ways 
had been treated like an Egyptian national until 1978. The male 
researcher, a master’s student at the Institute of Arab Research and 
Studies in Cairo, was from Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip. He and 
I, the principal researcher, were the only ones who had not lived 
primarily in Egypt. I am Palestinian-Jordanian, born to Palestinian 
parents and brought up in Amman, Jordan.
All fi ve researchers had university degrees. While I had taken 
care to select assistants from the community being studied for 
the reasons mentioned above, they differed from most of their 
interviewees in several ways. In particular, they had social and 
economic advantages that enabled them to get university degrees 
and employment. Even so, emphasizing similarities rather than the 
social or economic differences was an important way in which to 
gain an “insider’s” approach to the community, to gain trust, and to 
ensure a productive interview.
Training for Fieldwork
Because the primary criterion in choosing the team had been 
membership in and affi nity with the community under study, the 
research assistants had little prior experience in social science 
research and none in fi eldwork. The training period was therefore 
very important, and lasted for two months, during which time they 
were given readings about research methodology and schooled in 
issues concerning approaches to researching refugees. Background 
information about the Palestinian exodus and the legal status of 
Palestinians in Arab host countries were also discussed. Although 
the team members were Palestinian, they were unfamiliar with 
much of the historical background on Palestinian refugees. Their 
lack of background knowledge contrasts sharply with that of 
Palestinian refugees living in camps served by UNRWA, where the 
employees and teachers, generally Palestinian themselves, make 
a point of trying to instil in young people a sense of history of 
the homeland and their villages of origin. Apart from the young 
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man from Gaza, none of the research assistants even knew about 
UNRWA. It was therefore essential to equip them with information 
about various international refugee conventions, details about the 
legal status of Palestinians, and the role of various United Nations 
bodies in serving Palestinians.
The ambiguous legal status of Palestinians in Egypt was 
illustrated in the lives of the research assistants. They were able 
to refl ect on their own dreams that were collapsing as a result 
of this status and the opportunities they had lost in education 
and work due to bureaucratic impediments. For example, one 
research assistant, a musician who played the lute with a musical 
group, could not travel to another African state to perform with 
her colleagues because her Egyptian travel document was not 
recognized by the embassy of that state. The planned engagement 
of another team member to an Egyptian army lieutenant was called 
off when the young man learned that marriage to a Palestinian 
would affect his advancement within the Defense Ministry. A 
third research assistant was unable to apply for scholarships to 
continue her higher education because the application guidelines 
require that Palestinian candidates must be residents either of the 
West Bank or Gaza, and she was neither. These experiences helped 
in formulating the questionnaire.
Preparing the Questionnaire
In framing the questionnaire, we used many samples from 
previous studies. Several questionnaires used in projects by AUC’s 
Social Research Center to study aspects of livelihood in Egypt 
were considered. The questionnaire used in the research that led 
to Barbara Harrell-Bond’s Imposing Aid also provided guidelines 
for the work.20
Preliminary visits to Palestinian households were conducted 
with the assistance of social workers from the Women’s Union. 
These visits brought home to me the major gaps in the research 
relating to the livelihoods of Palestinians in Egypt, and therefore 
helped in drafting the questionnaire. After the initial drafting, a 
brainstorming meeting was held. Community leaders, social service 
NGO members, and academics, including those with particular 
knowledge of Palestinian and Egyptian communities, were invited 
to discuss the questionnaire. During this meeting, some questions 
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were added and others were removed to sharpen the focus and lay 
the ground for later quantitative and qualitative analysis.
The questionnaire covered twelve themes relating to livelihood: 
household composition; arrival in Egypt; social networks; family 
in Palestine and abroad; ownership (business, property, land); 
legal status; education; work (public and private sector); health; 
fi nancial support; expenditures; and identity. Each theme included 
ten to fi fteen questions (see Appendix 2). Answers to these 
questions enabled the researcher to trace changing state policies 
toward Palestinians, from the tight restrictions of the immediate 
post-1948 period through the loosening of restrictions as of the 
mid-1950s, to the important 1962 regulations placing Palestinians 
on a par with Egyptian nationals with regard to education, work, 
and property ownership, and fi nally to the abrupt reversal of policy 
in 1978 that made Palestinians in Egypt foreigners once again. 
Among the goals of the questionnaire was to explore the impact 
of these policy changes on Palestinian legal status, socioeconomic 
situation, education, work, health, fi nancial status, and sources of 
income.
Another goal of the questionnaire was to highlight strategies 
deployed by Palestinians to circumvent the restrictions. To this 
end, the questions were open-ended to enable the interviewees to 
narrate their own ways of getting by (for example, in renewing 
residence permits). The questionnaires were constructed as a 
guide to help the researchers cover all the topics. Questionnaires 
were never distributed to interviewees, and questions were in 
no way restricted to those listed in the questionnaire. Wherever 
possible, the interviews were written up using the words of the 
interviewee.
Locating Palestinians
Palestinians in Egypt are not as easy to locate as they are in 
other host countries, where most tend to live either in Palestinian 
neighborhoods (including squatter areas) or refugee camps. In 
the absence of such patterns, fi nding them—especially in rural or 
urban areas outside of Cairo (where certain districts are known to 
have Palestinian residents)—is a challenge.
With information obtained from readings, and through 
discussions with the Women’s Union and the Labor Union, we were 
able to map out where Palestinians could be found. Preliminary 
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visits to Palestinian households in Cairo were conducted with 
the help of the Women’s Union and the Association of Martyred 
and Injured Palestinians. Two social workers accompanied me to 
Cairo districts such as Wailey, Dar al-Salam, and Madinat al-Salam. 
Meanwhile, the head of the Labor Union offered to put me in 
touch with representatives of the union’s branches outside Cairo. 
However, the contacts had not materialized by the time we were 
ready to begin the fi eld research, and. I decided to go ahead anyway: 
Although the contacts would have facilitated matters, reliance on 
the PLO-affi liated union representatives to identify interviewees 
could have resulted in disproporationate representation of a 
particular population and the exclusion of  circles outside these 
networks.21 Furthermore, our experience in Cairo had already 
shown that some people appeared more reserved in their responses 
if union representatives remained with the research assistants 
during the interview. I therefore decided to depend on a snowball 
method in searching for Palestinians.
In the course of our fi eld research, we visited the following 
districts and towns, arranged below by governorate:
Cairo
The Cairo Governorate, and especially the city of Cairo, has the 
largest Palestinian population in Egypt, mainly in the following 
areas: Shubra, ‘Izbit al-Nakhal, al-Zawiyyah al-Hamra, Imbaba, Dar 
al-Salam, ‘Ayn Shams, Wailey, Helwan, and Hilmiyyat al-Zaytun. 
Even in such neighborhoods, however, Palestinians are not easy 
to fi nd; as almost everywhere in Egypt, they are dispersed among 
and intermingled with the local population. Moreover, many of the 
Palestinians who used to live in Cairo, particularly in areas that 
hosted many PLA offi cers or fi ghters from the Mustafa Hafi z forces 
(for example, ‘Ayn Shams, Wailey, Dar al-Salam), left in 1995 for 
Palestine.
Giza
Giza is a separate governorate bordering on the Cairo 
Governorate, with the city of Cairo spilling into it across the Nile. 
Such integrally Cairene neighborhoods as Dokki are in fact in Giza 
Governorate. Outside the “Cairo” part of Giza, we visited Faysal 
and Bulak al-Dakrur.
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Qalyubiyyah
Qalyubiyyah Governorate is a rural and agricultural area adjacent 
to the Cairo Governorate to the north. We located Palestinians in 
towns, but not in villages, in the districts (marakez) of Shibin al-
Qanatir, Shubra al-Khayma, Khanka, Abu Za‘bal, Banha, Bahtim, 
Kufr Shukr, and Qanatir al-Khairiyyah. Public services were 
available for Palestinians in the towns we visited, as were private 
azhari (religious) schools. Despite the fact that Qalyubiyyah is an 
agricultural area, very few Palestinians work in the agricultural 
sector, undoubtedly because of the tight restrictions on land 
ownership for Palestinians. Most are employed in the tertiary 
sector, especially in the transport business, with many driving 
heavy trucks and semi-tractor trailers.
Sharqiyyah
In Sharqiyyah Governorate, we visited Hehya, Kufr Saqi, Minya 
al-Qamah, Bani Ayub, Abu Hammad, Zaqaziq, Jazirat Abu Fadil, 
Qanayyat, Dyarb Nijim, Manshiyyah, Faqus, Bilbays, Hussiniyyah, 
Salhiyyah, and Abu Kabir. It was not diffi cult to locate Palestinians 
in the towns of Sharqiyyah because they are well known to the 
other residents and are well integrated socially. Many of the 
Palestinians in the governorate had an Egyptian grandparent from 
the pre-1948 period. It was in Sharqiyyah, on the other hand, that 
we encountered the most “isolated” Palestinian community of our 
experience, Jazirat Abu Fadil, which was discussed in chapter 3.
Northern Sinai
Al-‘Arish and Rafah, the most important “Palestinian” areas in 
the Northern Sinai Governorate, were visited very briefl y to get 
the “lay of the land,” to see what general services were available, 
and to determine how the interviewing would best proceed. Al-
‘Arish, some 381 km from Cairo in the Sinai desert not far from 
the Gaza border, was said to host more than 8,000 Palestinians at 
the time of the research.22 They are easily identifi able. During the 
visit, people often directed us to the mukhtar, al-Jawrani, who 
represents Palestinians in the region. The areas of al-‘Arish with 
the largest numbers of Palestinians are Karm Abu Injileh, ‘Izbit 
Mallim, Qarieyyat Atef al-Sadat, al-Mazra‘a/al-Masmi (arable land), 
Hayy al-Safa, al-Dahiyyah, Birket Halimesh, and Salaiemah.
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Not far from Palestine and overlooking the sea, al-‘Arish at the 
time of our research had a booming economy, with Palestinians 
working mainly in trade and skilled professions. During the fi rst 
decade or so of the Israeli occupation, Palestinians “were able to 
work and to travel inside Palestine to make some money” (PP 3, 
al-‘Arish, 25 June 2001).
After 1978, when Palestinians lost their access to public schools, 
two private schools were built in al-‘Arish—Sinai School near 
Busta Road and a school in Dahiyyah/‘Izba. There was also a school 
that local residents said was “built by Arafat” (in fact it had been 
funded by the PLO education department), which is now closed. 
Apparently the idea of a school that would serve a non-Egyptian 
community was not welcomed: According to Ali Jawhar of the 
Palestinian Charitable Association, there had been a dispute with 
the Egyptian Ministry of Education about opening the school.23
The building is still there and is used by Bedouin to shelter their 
animals. There are two university faculties in al-‘Arish, a Faculty 
of Agriculture and a Faculty of Education, linked to the University 
of Suez. A branch of the Palestinian Labor Union is also located in 
al-‘Arish.
We also visited the Rafah area on the Egyptian side of the 
border with Gaza. During the visit, the researcher met some 200 
Bedouin from the Palestinian side who had been living there in 
tents without access to public services. Some had Egyptian travel 
documents and others Palestinian identity cards. At the time of our 
visit we were told that approximately 10,000 Palestinians lived in 
Rafah, Egypt.24
It should be noted that until 2000, Egyptian Rafah was the site 
of the so-called “Canada Camp” 25 for Palestinian refugees. The 
housing that came to constitute the “camp” was built by Israel in the 
early 1970s for the some 5,000 Palestinian refugees whose houses 
in Rafah camp, Gaza, had been bulldozed as part of street-widening 
operations to facilitate the passage of tanks during Ariel Sharon’s 
“iron fi st” counter-insurgency against Palestinian fedayeen in 1970. 
At that time, the entire Sinai Peninsula was under Israeli occupation, 
so even though the Palestinians had been moved to the Egyptian 
side of the border, no barrier separated them from their brethren 
on the Gaza side. But when Israel completed its withdrawal from 
the Sinai in April 1982 following its 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, 
a “Berlin-style” barrier of razor wire was erected, slicing the camp 
in half.26 Though the agreement was that the Palestinians would be 
moved back to the Gaza side as quickly as possible to be reunited 
Research Sources and Methodology  201
with their kinsmen, the relocation did not even begin until 1989, 
with thirty-fi ve households to be moved at a time. After 1991, Egypt 
was unable to continue funding the relocation. The PLO provided 
some funds at fi rst, but with the fi nancial crisis after the Gulf war, 
Egypt sought help from outside donors. Kuwait and Canada both 
contributed, but it took until 2000 for the last ten households to 
be settled in their new houses at Tal al-Sultan.27 In the meantime, 
the refugees had been receiving emergency relief from UNRWA. 
After the last households were transferred to Palestinian Rafah, 
the camp was demolished.
Isma‘iliyyah and Port Said
Brief “reconnaissance” or exploratory visits were made to 
the Isma‘iliyyah and Port Said governorates. In Isma‘iliyyah, we 
were particularly interested to see whether we could fi nd any 
Palestinians at Qantara Sharq on the Sinai side of the Suez Canal, 
where Egypt’s largest temporary camp for Palestinian refugees had 
been set up by the Higher Committee for Palestinian Immigrant 
Affairs in 1948. While the camp was emptied in 1949, with most of 
its residents transferred to the Gaza Strip, a number of Palestinians 
were known to have remained in the area. However, the brief visit 
to Qantara was not suffi cient to assess the extent of a Palestinian 
presence, if any, in the area, which had been occupied by Israel 
in 1967 and was on the front lines during the war of attrition that 
followed. Our visit to the large cities of Isma‘iliyyah and Port Said 
were similarly inconclusive; to have an idea of the size of the 
Palestinian communities there, cooperation with members of the 
Labor Union would have been necessary. However, during the visit 
we did manage to meet several Palestinians who informed us of 
the general situation of their lives.
Minya
Minya is a three-hour train ride south of Cairo. Palestinians are 
said to have gone to the region for jobs with the Egyptian government 
from 1962 to 1967, and we were told that some Palestinians still 
teach in schools there. However, it was not possible to meet with 
any of them. Instead, we interviewed several Egyptian families 
who had lived in Palestine before 1948. Local residents referred to 
them as Palestinian because their parents had been among those 
fl eeing Jaffa in 1948.
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Locating Palestinian Households
The pilot visits targeted households in the Cairo Governorate 
(indicated by a “P” followed by the interview number). Feedback 
from these interviews was used to fi ne-tune the questionnaire. 
While conducting our research in Cairo, the team used several 
ways to locate Palestinian households, principally the snowball 
methodology. When arriving in the area, the researcher would 
ask a shopkeeper about a particular Palestinian who lived in the 
area. Because of close community ties, especially in ‘ashwa’iyyat,
or unplanned housing settlements, it was usually easy to gain 
referrals to Palestinians. Vendors would often say, “I have never 
heard this name, but there is a Palestinian family that lives in the 
next block.” One research assistant found Palestinian residents 
by asking at local barbershops, because barbers are known to 
have close relationships with their clients. In many areas, we 
were helped by people working in a baqqals, or mini-markets, 
usually located on residential streets. In some cases, shopkeepers 
were suspicious of “outsiders” asking about Palestinian families. 
Shopkeepers occasionally denied knowing any Palestinians, 
perhaps in an attempt to protect neighbors. On the other hand, 
because Palestinians and Egyptians live intermingled and are often 
indistinguishable one from the other, a shopkeeper or a laundry 
man, for example, might not be aware that a client is Palestinian 
unless specifi cally told.
In towns outside Cairo, locating Palestinians was often easier, 
because many inhabitants remembered Palestinians joining the 
community in the late 1940s and early 1950s or in the 1960s and 
were more aware of the presence of non-Egyptians. In some cases, 
names provide a clue. Upon arriving in Abu Hammad, in Sharqiyyah 
Governorate, for example, when we asked a vegetable vendor if 
there were Palestinians in the town, he quickly identifi ed Abu Hadi 
al-Shami. When arriving in Shubra al-Khayma, in Qalyubiyyah, we 
saw a big poster on the wall of the railway station advertising the 
shop of Said al-Falastini.
Ideally, the interviews should refl ect the heterogeneity of the 
Palestinian community.28 In this regard, the snowball approach 
has its limitations. First, it does not allow for the compilation of a 
complete and accurate sampling frame, as noted, and it may lead to 
respondents who are all or mostly part of the same social network. 
In an attempt to compensate, the six researchers, working in pairs, 
went to different areas. Even so, we sometimes discovered that 
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two teams had met interviewees in different areas who knew each 
other. Or we learned that one household had talked about the team 
to a household that was visited the next day. Furthermore, areas 
such as Wailey and ‘Ayn Shams in Cairo, which are near military 
bases, have large concentrations of former military personnel from 
the ‘Ayn Jalut Brigade or Mustafa Hafi z forces, which meant that 
the people we met there had similar backgrounds and economic 
situations.
Conducting the Interviews
Face-to-face interviews were conducted using a series of open-
ended questions structured to evoke descriptive qualitative data 
on the survival strategies of refugee households and to gain an 
understanding of the factors infl uencing their livelihoods. The fact 
that research team members were all of Palestinian origin and 
that some spoke the Palestinian dialect facilitated the interviews. 
We had no problem being invited into households to interview 
members. Often, we were quickly welcomed into the living room.
Introductions normally took 30 to 45 minutes. We openly 
answered any questions about the research and its objectives 
and explained why the study was important. Many interviewees 
were very concerned about our aims, worrying in particular about 
whose interests the research would serve. In general, the more 
educated the respondents, the longer the introductions would take. 
We also became accustomed to hearing rhetoric about U.S. and 
Israeli plans and intentions concerning the permanent settlement 
of Palestinians in Arab countries. These preliminary conversations 
were crucial to gaining the trust of those we were interviewing and 
to make sure that they fully understood why we would be asking 
about their personal experiences. On some occasions, particularly 
when I explained my background as a Palestinian from Jordan, 
the conversation would turn to the situation of Palestinians living 
in camps in Jordan. I tried to explain that just as we had learned 
about Palestinians in the camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West 
Bank, and Gaza Strip, so was it important to learn about the survival 
mechanisms employed by Palestinians in Egypt. Frequently, we 
would talk about the interviewees’ relatives in Jordan. Through 
these introductions, we tried to allay any suspicions or misgivings 
that interviewees may initially have had concerning our visit, and 
we ensured that they gave their consent to the interview.
204  Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948
On four or fi ve occasions, after long introductions had been 
made, members of the household declined to be interviewed. This 
can be understood in view of Egypt’s security situation, in which 
people are often suspicious of newcomers and do not easily trust 
others.
In order to maintain confi dentiality, we tried to record 
nicknames rather than proper last names, even in our fi eld notes. 
For instance, we would refer to a father not by his own name but 
by reference to his oldest son. Thus, a man whose oldest son was 
named Ali would be called “Abu Ali,” or “father of Ali.” Likewise, in 
households headed by a woman, we would refer to the mother as 
“Um Ali,” or “mother of Ali.” For other people in the household, we 
recorded fi rst names only. For security reasons, even in our fi eld 
notes we preferred to use numbers both for the researchers and 
the families to ensure that the interview remained confi dential. It 
should be noted that in the few instances in this work where an 
interviewee’s name is mentioned, it is not the real name; aliases 
have been adopted to protect the speaker’s privacy.
The interviews quoted in the text are referenced by code. 
Basically, the interviews/visits fall into three categories: the 
preliminary or pilot interviews and visits both by the author 
individually and the research team; the regular interviews; and the 
handful of interviews conducted by the author after the research 
was interrupted. The “regular” interviews were all carried out in 
the Sharqiyyah and Qalyubiyyah governorates; almost all the pilot 
visits by the research team were in the Cairo Governorate. The 
codes for the various categories are as follows:
PP:   Pilot visits/interviews by the author
P:   Pilot visits/interviews by research team (author and assistants) in 
the Cairo Governorate
AP:   Visits/interviews conducted after termination of fi eldwork
7:   Regular interviews (i.e., part of the main body of the fi eldwork), 
conducted in Sharqiyyah Governorate
8:  Regular interviews conducted in Qalyubiyyah Governorate
The category designation in the code is followed by the number 
within that category of the household visited, the governorate in 
which the interview took place (if not already subsumed in the 
category designation), the name of the district or locale within the 
governorate, and the date of the interview. For example, the code 
“8/8, Abu Za‘bal, 2 July 2002” would mean that the interview took 
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place in the Qalyubiyyah Governorate, that the household was the 
eighth visited by the research team during the main body of the 
fi eldwork (i.e., it was not a pilot), and that it was conducted in the 
town of Abu Za‘bal on 2 July 2002. “P12, ‘Izbit al-Nakhal, 29 May 
2002,” would indicate a pilot interview conducted by the research 
team in the Cairo Governorate (unless otherwise indicated), that 
the household was the twelfth visited by the team in the pilot 
phase, that the household was located in the district of ‘Izbit al-
Nakhal, and that the interview took place on 29 May 2002. “PP9, 
Port Said, 18 June 2002” would indicate the ninth preliminary visit 
by the author, which took place in the governorate of Port Said, 
the city of Port Said, on 18 June 2002. In a few exceptional cases 
where the interviewee shared particularly sensitive information, 
the name of the city or area within the governorate was omitted. 
It bears emphasis that the interviews conducted in Cairo, even 
though they were pilots, were full interviews covering the entire 
range of issues indicated on the questionnaire.
It is important to note that each interview code covers the entire 
household. If, for example, fi ve members are interviewed, they do 
not have separate numbers; the only indication that a different 
person is talking is the context.
After the introductions and preliminaries were completed, we 
asked the members of the household to sit with us and share their 
experiences. In some cases, neighbors would join us. Because the 
questionnaire had many open-ended questions, we tried to have all 
the family members share their experiences with us individually. 
This was not always possible, however. In some households, it 
became obvious that as long as the father was speaking the rest of 
the family did not feel free to express their views. In other cases, 
the mother would answer the questions from her own perspective. 
Still, we did our best to involve as many people as possible when 
asking questions about life in Egypt. Questions relating to education 
were directed primarily at children. We found that young people 
often had diffi culty answering questions relating to identity and 
knowledge about or interest in Palestine. In many situations, we 
sensed that we were introducing topics that had never before been 
discussed in the home. In some cases, the parent took the lead and 
answered the questions on behalf of their children.
Using maximum discretion, we often had to follow up on 
questions pertaining to coping strategies in order to uncover 
the various means used to overcome administrative obstacles. 
Livelihood strategies may involve the illegal processing of papers, 
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for example, a fact that might not be revealed without some subtle 
prompting from the researcher.
The interviews were usually conducted by two researchers, 
both taking notes, but only one asking questions. No tape recorders 
were used so as not to intimidate interviewees. Even writing in 
notebooks sometimes had an inhibiting effect, and in such cases 
we would stop taking notes and simply continue the discussion 
with household members. Conducting interviews in pairs was 
also useful because we could discuss the case after leaving the 
house and record each researcher’s detailed impressions of the 
interview.
Interview sessions generally lasted from two to six hours. The 
time spent with the household sometimes prompted discussions 
of other issues, including the intifada and reactions to events in 
Palestine. In rural areas especially, interviews sometimes included 
lunch breaks, with the family often insisting on sharing their food 
with the researchers. As only one interview was conducted with 
each household, the more time we spent with the family, the more 
we learned about their lives.
Meetings after the interviews among the researchers offered 
a chance to discuss each case. Many factors infl uence household 
interviews, such as the relationship between the researcher 
and the research community, or what Rosemary Sayigh calls 
“intersubjectivity”29: the age and cultural background of the 
researchers; the political-cultural worlds to which each belongs; 
and the ultimate purposes of the research project. The researcher’s 
identity and subjectivity cannot be abstracted from the research 
process.30
Intersubjectivity is a particularly important consideration 
for researchers who are not from the same community as their 
interviewees, even if both are Palestinian. How are the researchers’ 
motivations understood by the communities they study? How 
does their own sense of identity infl uence their fi eldwork?31
Conversely, how are the researcher’s personality, beliefs, and 
sense of Palestinian identity infl uenced by the interviewees and 
their answers? Although the researchers took pains to emphasize 
the importance of the data that the interviewee would reveal as 
a means of focusing attention on their diffi cult situations, people 
often engaged in self-censorship in their replies. Sari Hanafi  has 
noted that this is often evident in countries where the government 
discourages researchers from addressing topics perceived as 
sensitive on a national or regional level and where discussion of 
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such issues may cause problems with state security authorities.32
This self-censorship can also be imposed by other social and 
political bodies, such as the Palestinian unions.
The Perils of Research
My original intention had been to plan the fi eldwork jointly with 
the unions so the research fi ndings could be shared as the basis for 
discussing and exploring the problems and needs of Palestinians 
in Egypt. The hope was that the fi ndings would eventually be 
useful in designing development projects addressing needs not 
being met by NGOS or the host state. The project faced a number 
of diffi culties, however.
The study as conceived involved considerable travel throughout 
Egypt by research teams made up of Palestinians with Egyptian 
travel documents seeking to interview Palestinians in their homes. 
The fi eld research required coordination with Palestinian unions 
and offi cials, and, most crucially, proper authorization from 
offi cials to avoid misunderstandings with security personnel in the 
fi eld.
As already mentioned, the research was conducted under the 
umbrella of the Forced Migration Refugee Studies Program (FMRS) 
of the AUC. Colleagues at the university who had done fi eldwork 
in Egypt warned me of the diffi culties faced by non-Egyptians 
working at American institutions in obtaining security clearance. 
Inquiring about procedures, I learned from the AUC director of 
security that a letter from FMRS, as overseer of the work, should 
be sent to him for forwarding to the state security and to CAPMAS 
to get clearance for the fi eldwork.
Two months before starting the fi eldwork, a document in Arabic 
based on the research proposal and explaining its objectives was 
duly sent to the AUC offi ce of security. Copies of the document 
were sent to the state security and to CAPMAS. In order to issue 
the clearance, copies of the passports and travel documents of all 
of the members of the research team were sent to these bodies.
When the team was ready to begin the interviews, the university 
security offi ce informed us by telephone that we had received 
approval from the state security. Accordingly, a letter for use 
during fi eldwork was written by FMRS clarifying the purpose of 
the research and introducing the members of the research team. 
As the principal researcher, I signed the letter, as did the AUC 
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director of security. Copies of the letter were distributed to the 
research team to use when necessary.
The letter of permission from the university security offi ce 
provided us with credibility in conducting our fi eldwork. We 
showed it whenever we were questioned by interviewees about 
the objectives of the research and why we were focusing only on 
Palestinians, and it helped allay whatever concerns people may 
have had. This procedure worked well until the team arrived in 
a village whose inhabitants were originally from Beersheba. The 
mukhtar did not welcome our visit. He took the copy of the letter 
we showed him, and although he permitted us to remain for some 
time in the village while accompanied, he told us we were expected 
to leave immediately afterward.
Upon our return to Cairo, I was summoned to the offi ce of the 
state security. The security offi cial asked three main questions. 
The fi rst concerned the “true objectives” of my research; I was told 
that Security had not found the objectives set out in my previous 
correspondence convincing. Second, I was asked on what basis 
our team was conducting the fi eldwork. Third, I was asked who 
had given me permission to work in the fi eld.
Understandably, fi eldwork on topics considered sensitive is 
suspect in Egypt.33 Qualitative data can be politicized and used 
to serve various agendas. The analysis of livelihoods, studies of 
the problems of Palestinians in relation to changing state policies, 
and the depiction of poverty and service provision can all serve 
political purposes. In this particular case, there was concern that 
the information collected could be used in ways that might confl ict 
with Egypt’s national interests, especially since the research 
reveals the need for improvements in the legal and socioeconomic 
status of Egypt’s Palestinian community. In light of this, security 
offi cials could have construed the research as serving Western 
or Israeli interests. Security offi cials may also have feared that 
we would take advantage of the time spent with interviewees to 
spread political ideas seen as subversive.
I was impressed by the fact that the security offi cer who 
questioned me had read all the letters and papers I had sent to 
obtain the permission. He also knew where my assistants and I had 
visited while conducting fi eldwork. The meeting lasted an hour and 
a half and ended with an order that the fi eldwork be stopped until 
written approval from Security was obtained. Such approval never 
was granted. My short visit with this offi cer helped me understand 
why Palestinians feared to speak freely.
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Timing
Our initial plan was to conduct a trial run of the questionnaire 
for one month, from mid-May till mid-June, and then to conduct 
home interviews for the next six months, from mid-June until mid-
December. We hoped to cover 15 governorates, mainly in the north 
where most Palestinians live.  By mid-July 2002, when the security 
services halted the fi eldwork, we had visited 26 households in 
the Cairo Governorate and 44 households in Qalyubiyyah and 
Sharqiyyah, in addition to fi ve cases in Port Said and Isma‘iliyyah.
The research took place during a period of heightened political 
tension in the Middle East. The al-Aqsa intifada was a highly 
emotional time not only for the Palestinians in Egypt but also for 
Egyptians. Israel “reoccupied” the West Bank in spring 2002, with 
massive destruction in towns and villages and great loss of life. 
With over 40,000 Palestinians having returned to Palestine after the 
establishment of the PA, many of the households we interviewed 
had family members in the territories, especially Gaza, and feared 
that Gaza would be next. In such conditions, Security may have 
been even more skeptical about a study claiming to focus on legal 
status and socioeconomic circumstances of Palestinians in Egypt.
Moreover, during the preparation for the fi eldwork, Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim, the former director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center and a 
professor of political sociology at AUC, was convicted of charges 
of embezzlement believed to have been linked to the center’s 
acceptance of an allegedly “illegal” grant from the European 
Commission used to produce a fi lm depicting voter intimidation in 
the 1995 Egyptian parliamentary election.34 Ibrahim’s connection to 
AUC, and the fact that he had been funded by international donors, 
had made an impact. For example, several of our interviewees, 
particularly professionals, mentioned him in discussions about 
the livelihood project. Ibrahim’s case strengthened suspicions 
about the objectives and intentions of our study on the part of 
representatives of the Palestinian unions. I was once told by a 
representative of the development projects for Palestine at the 
Arab League that as a Palestinian, I should be ashamed of myself 
for serving imperialist agencies in the Arab world. During the 
research period, the attitudes of many Egyptians and Palestinians 
in Egypt became increasingly anti-American, though fortunately 
we rarely encountered such attitudes in our interviews; even when 
they existed initially, we were able to establish trust. But at the 
more “offi cial” level, the backlash from the Saad Eddin Ibrahim 
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case without doubt affected the reception of the research project 
and the researchers.
Indeed, several people stated directly that that the project was 
poorly timed. A lawyer from the Hisham Mubarak Human Rights 
Center told me, “I would have accepted this research had it been 
done two years ago.” Politics are intertwined with discussions 
of basic human rights of Palestinians. Academics, professionals, 
diplomats, and Palestinian representatives openly suggested that 
a project on Palestinian livelihoods would serve Israel’s agenda 
of ending the Palestinian refugee issue; efforts to improve the 
living conditions of Palestinians in Egypt were seen by many as 
promoting tawtin, the permanent resettlement of Palestinians 
outside their homeland.
Lamia Raie, who conducted her fi eldwork on the Palestinians 
in Egypt in 1993, commented: “It was not the right time. Oslo 
was underway and any approach to the Palestinians was badly 
interpreted.”35 The question can be asked as to whether there will 
ever be a “right time” to talk about the conditions of Palestinians 
in Egypt.
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Appendix 2
Questionnaire for the Study 
on the Livelihood of 
Palestinians in Egypt
Interview
Code of interviewer 
Interview Number / Region/ 
Region ______________ City___________ Area___________
District__________________Street name_______________
Interview Date (indicate if it is a holiday)
Time of the interview (from ___ to ___ )
Number of visits per interviewer per day (until the time this 
interview was conducted).
Anyone refuse to conduct this interview?
1. Household composition (Answer in the table for household 
composition)
1.1 How many people normally live in the household?
1.2 How many units (families)? 
1.3 How many men/women are in this household?
1.4  Who is the head in this household (in making decisions, 
breadwinner)?
1.5 Number in household now present at the interview?
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1.6 Where are the absentees?
1.7 Who is the oldest in this household?
2. Arrival in Egypt 
2.1  When did the fi rst person [member of the family] fi rst arrive 
in Egypt?
2.2  What were you doing before coming to Egypt? What was the 
main source of income for you/your family while you were 
in Palestine? (Specify how rural/urban-oriented their life in 
Palestine had been.) 
2.3  What happened to the house of the family back in Palestine? 
(Specify in what village/area it was.)
2.4  How did you arrive in Egypt (via Gaza, West Bank, Jordan, 
Syria, Lebanon, or elsewhere; by bus, train, car, camel, on 
foot)? How long did you stay in the last country/city you were 
in before your arrival in Egypt (in camps, outside camps)? 
2.5  Have you settled in Egypt since that date (either because you 
could not go back, got married, were in university, or were 
working)?
3. Social networks
3.1  Tell me about your relatives or neighbors who migrated with 
you from Palestine. Are you still in contact with them?
3.2 Do any of these relatives or neighbors live nearby?
3.2  For how long have you been living in this neighborhood? 
Where were you before? How often do/did you change 
houses/areas? Why?
3.4  Are there any Palestinians living in your neighborhood? 
Where?
3.5  Do you meet with them? How often do you see each other? 
Do you arrange activities together?
3.6  How are your relations with the Egyptian neighbors? Do you 
see each other often? Do you borrow food items or anything 
you may need at home from them? 
3.7  On whom do you rely in case you were in need of urgent help 
or support? (Elaborate on examples at sickness, funerals, 
need to borrow money or even weddings.)
3.8  On whom do you count for bureaucratic issues (renewal 
of residency, travel documents, papers for schooling or for 
health, registration of property)? If it happens to be someone 
in an infl uential positions (owners of companies, shops, work 
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in the government or the embassies), clarify if you have a 
wasta that facilitates your paper processing. (When was last 
time you had a problem with bureaucracy, and how did you 
solve it?) 
3.9  If you have any membership in clubs, cultural or social forums, 
unions, political parties: What are the benefi ts you get out of 
this membership? If you are not a member, why not? Is there 
a membership fee that you feel you cannot afford?
4. Family in Palestine and abroad
4.1  Are you in contact with relatives residing in Palestine/
Israel?
4.2  During the most recent events [second intifada], have you 
been able to check on your family in Palestine? (Do you call 
them? Send messages, via Internet?)
4.3  Do you have relatives living in the Gulf, Libya, Yemen, Jordan, 
or in the West?
4.4  Have your relatives ever come to Egypt? How often do they 
come? Where do they stay?
4.5  Through their contacts and work relations, did your relatives 
help any of your family members to visit them (where they 
are)? How? (Describe the procedures of travel, of getting a 
contract for work, of issuing a Palestinian ID.)
4.6  Do you know of people who went to Palestine and applied 
for passports or overstayed in Palestine? Were they able to 
come back to Egypt?
4.7  Do you know what happened to their house in Egypt? Did 
they sell it, rent it, or was it taken away from them?
4.8  Have you ever applied to go and live/work in Gaza? Tell me 
about this experience.
4.9  Would you like to apply for a Palestinian passport yourself? 
Why?
5. Ownership 
5.1 Does anyone take care of your property in Palestine?
5.2  How much do you pay for the rent of your house in Egypt? 
Does a contract exist between you and the owner?
5.3  How did you pay for the property you have in Egypt (e.g., in 
credits, cash, based on your seasonal income)? How did you 
register your property (in your name or the name of any other 
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member of the family)? When did you register the property? 
(Indicate the year.)
5.4  How many houses do you or any member of your family own 
in Egypt? How were they registered?
5.5  Do you own a car, taxi, bus, boat, donkey, horse, water 
buffalo, or any other means of transportation/livelihood?
5.6  Do you have a machine that helps you in your work (e.g., 
sewing machine)?
5.7  Do you have a business of your own (pushcart, street stand, 
company, shop)? How did you purchase this business (paid 
cash, borrowed money, remittances from abroad, a friend 
helped, etc.)?
Questions directed to each member in the household:
6. Legal status
6.1  Tell me about the procedures you go through when you renew 
your travel document. Do you do it yourself or do you count 
on someone to help you out? What diffi culties do you face in 
renewing it?
6.2  How often do you need to renew your residency? (Clarify 
the category of the document.) How much do you pay for 
renewal? (Indicate if the mother is Egyptian.)
6.3  What are the procedures for renewing the residency? What 
are the procedures for men age 21 or older? What is the basis 
for your residency (work, mother, husband, pension, driving 
licence for public transport)?
6.4  Were you ever late in renewing these documents? What did 
you do to get them back again? Did you pay a fi ne?
6.5  Have you ever needed to borrow money to renew your papers 
or the papers of your family?
6.6  Can you travel with the travel document you now hold? Have 
you ever used it to travel? Where to? When?
6.7  If you have traveled, what were the reasons: for work, 
education, or for any other opportunity? How did you pay 
the travel expenses?
6.8  Did the Gulf war (1990–91) or other political events in the 
region (e.g., the 1982 war in Lebanon, the fi rst intifada of 
1987, the Libya-Egypt standoff in 1995) affect any members 
of your family?
6.9  Do you have any problems applying for visas to go abroad?
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6.10  Where you (or any members of the family) ever deported and 
managed to sort it out? How? Where to?
6.11  Do you need a return visa to come back to Egypt? Did you 
have any diffi culties getting one?
6.12  Do you think you are entitled to an UNRWA registration card? 
Were your parents registered with UNRWA when they were 
in Gaza or the West Bank, before coming to Egypt?
6.13  Do you know of UNHCR? Have you ever tried to seek help or 
protection from them?
6.14  Have you ever been stopped by the Egyptian police? Why?
6.15  Were you ever in dispute with an Egyptian person who tried 
to sue you where you had to go to court (e.g., for rent)?
6.16  Were you ever in need of suing someone but you felt you 
couldn’t because you are Palestinian? 
6.17  Have you ever been arrested? Why?
Socioeconomic conditions
7.1 Education
7.1.1  Talk about any diffi culties you had in your education: 
paying fees, being unable to catch up with the level of 
the class, being in need of money, having to leave in 
order to work, e.g. 
7.1.2  Have you ever attended vocational training/short skill 
courses?
7.1.3  What was your parents’ role in your attending school? 
What are your parents’ plans for your education?
7.1.4  Were/are you paying fees? How did you manage to pay 
the fees?
7.1.5  What is the importance of education, in your opinion?
7.1.6  Have you ever been discriminated against in the 
Egyptian educational system (e.g., deprived of an award, 
scholarship, book fees, social class, ID, food ration)? 
How did this discrimination affect you?
7.1.7  Do you have any plans to go for further education? 
Did you ever try to apply for scholarships reserved for 
Palestinians?
7.1.8  How did you choose your university major (if 
applicable)?
7.2 Work 
7.2.1  How old were you when you fi rst became employed? 
What did you do?
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7.2.2  How many times have you changed the type work you 
do?
7.2.3  What was your main activity in the last fi ve years (part 
time job/full time job)?
7.2.4  In the past 12 months, how did you search for a job?
7.2.5  Did your qualifi cations, skills, background help/ prevent 
you from fi nding a job?
7.2.6  What were the available jobs for you (in terms of your 
qualifi cations; as a Palestinian)?
7.2.7  How easy/diffi cult is it to obtain a work permit? For how 
long does it last? (Regarding residency:) How much does 
it cost to renew the permit? Tell me about the procedures 
to get it.
7.2.8  Have you had any experiences with the work permit 
issuance and your residency permit?
7.2.9  Have you ever lost a job opportunity because of the 
work permit procedures?
7.2.10  Have you ever stopped working for more than a week for 
an illness? How were you treated at your work for this 
(granted sick leave, penaized for not coming to work)?
7.2.11  In your opinion, are you disadvantaged at work (for 
example, paid less, not given insurance, badly treated) 
because you are Palestinian?
7.2.12  Have you worked/ever applied to work in the Gulf 
market?
7.3  Government/PLO/Army employees
7.3.1  Where do/did you work? When?
7.3.2  How were you recruited? (Under what conditions did 
you start your job?)
7.3.3 What is/was your job?
7.3.4  Do/did you have a contract? Is it regular or on work 
basis?
7.3.5  Do you get any pension/award at the end of the period 
of your service? Do you receive any medical insurance 
from the Palestine Red Crescent Society or government 
health services?
7.3.6  Do/did you have another job, in addition to your 
government job?
7.3.7  What do you think are the advantages of working in the 
government?
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7.4 Private work, wage labor, seasonal work (table to help 
in specifying the work)
Self-employed income a. Profi t from household 
nonagricultural enterprise
b. Profi t from hh agricultural 
enterprise (sale of eggs, meat 
produced at hh)
c. Payment from home production 
for sale such as embroidery, food 
preparation, and so on
d. Income from street vending such as 
lottery or cigarettes 
e. Income of informal taxi or other 
transport services, building repair, 
work painting, plumbing, and so on
7.4.1 What is your work?
7.4.2 Where do you work?
7.4.3 How did you fi nd this work?
7.4.4  How many hours do you work a week? How much do 
you make?
7.4.5  Do you expect to have your children take over the same 
work you are currently doing when they grow up?
7.4.6  Have you ever been stopped by the police and asked for 
a work permit?
7.4.7  Do you know of any Palestinian businessmen who 
recruited fellow Palestinians? Did you try to approach 
any of them for a job?
7.4.8  How are you able to make use of your skills and resources 
(that you have acquired or inherited) or the potentials of 
your house or location to make a living?
7.4.9  What do you do to improve your income? What other 
informal jobs do you do?
7.4.10  Do you own any livestock here? How does it affect your 
revenue?
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7.5   Health and chronic illnesses
7.5.1 Do you have any health problems?
7.5.2  (If so:) How did this health problem affect your life: going 
to school, getting married, choice of work, expenses? 
7.5.3  Has there ever been a need for a family member to stay 
beside an ill person to take care of her or him? How did 
this affect the caregiver (schooling, work, aspirations)?
7.5.4  Do you benefi t from medical insurance? (Elaborate.)
7.5.5  Where do you go for medical exams or consultations?
7.5.6 Are there appropriate medical facilities nearby?
7.5.7 How much do you pay per doctor’s visit?
7.5.8 How much do you spend on medicine?
7.5.9  Have you ever treated yourself with traditional 
methods?
7.5.10 Questions for mothers: 
7.5.11  For child delivery: Where did you deliver your children? 
Do you remember how much it cost?
7.5.12  Is there any child and maternity care in your area? Were 
you taking vitamins and going for regular visits during 
the pregnancy?
7.5.13  How many miscarriages/abortions have you had in your 
life?
8. Financial support
8.1  Do all those in your household who work contribute to 
covering household expenses?
8.2  How long does the income last?
8.3  Do you have a ration card and/or subsidy from the Ministry 
of Social Development? (Is it full subsidized or half 
subsidized?)
8.4  Are you part of any fi nancial cooperative among neighbors 
or relatives? What do you do with the money? (Emphasize 
planning/sustainability.)
8.5  Do you save money? If so, how (bank, postal savings, gold, 
livestock, stock market)?
8.6  Did you have any problems opening an account at the bank?
8.7  Do you get any fi nancial support from zakat committees or 
charity people during seasonal feasts or other occasions? 
Talk about this.
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8.8  Have you ever had a major fi nancial problem? Have you ever 
needed to sell your properties, gold, or anything else?
8.9  What do you do when you are in fi nancial trouble? (Arrange 
according to the priority of approach.) 
8.10  If you have family in the Gulf/Libya/Palestine, how did adverse 
events there affect your family, from a fi nancial perspective? 
(Elaborate on the effect of the recent intifada/war.)
8.11  How do you develop your skills to make your income 
better?
8.12  Have you ever tried to approach an NGO, a charitable 
association, the Arab League, or the Palestinian embassy for 
help? What help do you expect from such bodies?
9. Expenses
9.1 Talk about how you spend your income.
9.2 How much do you spend on [household] expenses?1
9.3  Does your household ever run out of money to buy food to 
make a meal?
9.4  Do you reduce the size of meals or skip meals because there 
is not enough money for food? 
9.5  What do you make or prepare at home to cut down on 
expenses (zabadi, pickles)?
9.6  Have you had any recent fi nancial crisis that affected your 
expenses?
10. Marital status
10.1  How many times have you been married? How old were you 
when you fi rst married?
10.2  Are you related to your spouse (cousin, neighbors, from the 
same village)?
10.3  How is your family’s relationship with your in-laws? Talk 
about your relations with and support of one another.
10.4  When married to an Egyptian woman: How did the fact of 
your marrying an Egyptian woman helped you in your life in 
Egypt?
10.5  Does your wife work? How so?
10.6  Did she work before marriage?
10.7  Has your wife ever been obliged to work, e.g, if you have 
been sick, in prison, away, etc.? 
10.8  How do you feel about your wife or daughters working?
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10.9  What are methods of advancement for daughters and the 
wife who are not active in the labor market?
10.10  For women at home: What are your aspirations for the 
future? (Are any of your girls married/divorced/widowed/
living living in the same household?)
10.11  Why do you prefer to see your children marrying Egyptian 
or Palestinian?
10.12  Do you think it is diffi cult to have your sons marrying 
Egyptian women? Are there any obstacles for this kind of 
marriage?
10.13  Do you think your children feel part of the Egyptian 
society?
11. Identity
11.1  Do you feel it is better to appear Egyptian?
11.2  In what situations do you feel different from Egyptians?
11.3  Do you use a different dialect at home from what you use on 
the street?
11.4  Are there particularly Palestinian ceremonies, activities, 
communities that you like to be involved with?
11.5  Do you think Egyptians perceive you as an Egyptian, or do 
some make you feel different?
11.6 Do you follow Palestinian news (radio/TV)?
11.7 Do you read the newspaper? How often do you buy it?
11.8 What are your near plans for the future?
11.9  If you had a choice, would you prefer to spend the rest of 
your life back in Gaza/the West Bank or remain in Egypt as 
you now know it?
Notes
1. Question originally read: “How much do you spend on such expenses? 




The 1965 Casablanca Protocol on the 
Treatment of Palestinian Refugees
[This is an unoffi cial translation provided by Badil Resource Center 
for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, available at http://
www.badil.org/Documents/Protection/LAS/Casablanca-Protocol.
htm]
On the basis of the Charter of the League of Arab States and its 
special annex pertaining to Palestine, and of the LAS Council 
resolution concerning the Palestinian issue, and, in particular, 
of the special resolution pertaining to safeguarding Palestinian 
existence,
The Council of Foreign Ministers of Member States agreed, in its 
meeting in Casablanca on 10 September 1965, upon the following 
regulations, and called upon member states to take the necessary 
measures to put them into the sphere of implementation:
(1) Whilst retaining their Palestinian nationality, Palestinians 
currently residing in the land of ___________ have the right of 
employment on part with its citizens.
(2) Palestinians residing at the moment in ____________, in 
accordance with the dictates of their interests, have the right to 
leave and return to this state.
(3) Palestinians residing in other Arab states have the right to enter 
the land of ____________ and to depart from it, in accordance 
with their interests. Their right of entry only gives them the right 
to stay for the permitted period and for their declared purpose of 
entry, provided the authorities do not agree to the contrary.
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(4) Palestinians who are at the moment in __________, as well 
as those who were residing and left to the Diaspora, are given, 
upon request, valid travel documents. The concerned authorities 
must, wherever they may be, issue these documents or renew 
them without delay.
(5) Bearers of these travel documents residing in LAS states 
receive the same treatment as all other LAS state citizens 
regarding visa and residency applications.
On behalf of:                                     The Secretary General




Note on the Applicability of Article 1D
of the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees
To Palestinian Refugees
Article 1D of the 1951 Convention:
This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at 
present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations 
other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
protection or assistance.
When such protection or assistance has ceased for any 
reason, without the position of such persons being defi nitively 
settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall 
ipso facto be entitled to the benefi ts of this Convention.
A. Introduction
1.  The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
(hereinafter “the 1951 Convention”) contains certain provisions 
whereby persons otherwise having the characteristics of 
refugees, as defi ned in Article 1A, are excluded from the 
benefi ts of this Convention.* One such provision, paragraph 
1 of Article 1D, applies to a special category of refugees for 
whom separate arrangements have been made to receive 
protection or assistance from organs or agencies of the United 
Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). In today’s context, this excludes from the 
benefi ts of the 1951 Convention those Palestinians who are 
refugees as a result of the 1948 or 1967 Arab-Israeli confl icts, 
226  Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948
and who are receiving protection or assistance from the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA).
2.  While paragraph 1 of Article 1D is in effect an exclusion 
clause, this does not mean that certain groups of Palestinian 
refugees can never benefi t from the protection of the 1951 
Convention. Paragraph 2 of Article 1D contains an inclusion 
clause ensuring the automatic entitlement of such refugees 
to the protection of the 1951 Convention if, without their 
position being defi nitively settled in accordance with the 
relevant UN General Assembly resolutions, protection or 
assistance from UNRWA has ceased for any reason. The 1951 
Convention hence avoids overlapping competencies between 
UNRWA and UNHCR, but also, in conjunction with UNHCR’s 
Statute, ensures the continuity of protection and assistance of 
Palestinian refugees as necessary.1
B. Palestinian Refugees within the Scope of 
Article 1D of the 1951 Convention
3.  UNHCR considers that two groups of Palestinian refugees fall 
within the scope of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention:
(i)  Palestinians who are “Palestine refugees” within the sense 
of UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 
1948 and other UN General Assembly Resolutions,2 who 
were displaced from that part of Palestine which became 
Israel, and who have been unable to return there.3
(ii)  Palestinians who are “displaced persons” within the sense 
of UN General Assembly Resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 
1967 and subsequent UN General Assembly Resolutions, 
and who have been unable to return to the Palestinian 
territories occupied by Israel since 1967.4
  For the purposes of the application of the 1951 Convention, 
both of these groups include persons who were displaced at 
the time of hostilities, plus the descendants of such persons.5
On the other hand, those individuals to whom Articles 1C, 1E 
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or 1F of the Convention apply do not fall within the scope 
of Article 1D, even if they remain “Palestine refugees” and/
or “displaced persons” whose position is yet to be settled 
defi nitively in accordance with the relevant UN General 
Assembly resolutions.6
4.  A third category of Palestinian refugees includes individuals 
who are neither “Palestine refugees” nor “displaced persons,” 
but who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, are outside the 
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and are 
unable or, owing to such fear, are unwilling to return there. 
Such Palestinians do not fall within the scope of Article 1D 
of the 1951 Convention but qualify as refugees under Article 
1A(2) of the Convention, providing that they have neither 
ceased to be refugees under Article 1C nor are excluded from 
refugee status under Articles 1E or 1F.7
C. The Application of Article 1D of the 1951 
Convention
5.  If it is determined that a Palestinian refugee falls within 
the scope of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention, it needs to 
be assessed whether he or she falls within paragraph 1 or 
paragraph 2 of that Article.
6.  If the person concerned is inside UNRWA’s area of operations 
and is registered, or is eligible to be registered, with UNRWA, 
he or she should be considered as receiving protection or 
assistance within the sense of paragraph 1 of Article 1D, and 
hence is excluded from the benefi ts of the 1951 Convention 
and from the protection and assistance of UNHCR.
7.  If, however, the person is outside UNRWA’s area of operations, 
he or she no longer enjoys the protection or assistance of 
UNRWA and therefore falls within paragraph 2 of Article 1D, 
providing of course that Articles 1C, 1E and 1F do not apply. 
Such a person is automatically entitled to the benefi ts of the 
1951 Convention and falls within the competence of UNHCR. 
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This would also be the case even if the person has never 
resided inside UNRWA’s area of operations.8
8.  The fact that such a person falls within paragraph 2 of Article 
1D does not necessarily mean that he or she cannot be returned 
to UNRWA’s area of operations, in which case, once returned, 
the person would fall within paragraph 1 of Article 1D and 
thereby cease to benefi t from the 1951 Convention. There may, 
however, be reasons why the person cannot be returned to 
UNRWA’s area of operations. In particular:
(i)  He or she may be unwilling to return to that area because 
of threats to his or her physical safety or freedom, or other 
serious protection-related problems; or
(ii)  He or she may be unable to return to that area because, for 
instance, the authorities of the country concerned refuse 
his or her re-admission or the renewal of his or her travel 
documents.
9.  The rationale behind “returnability” to effective protection 
has been developed in the context of addressing irregular 
movements of refugees, including through Executive 
Committee Conclusion No. 15 (XXX) (1979) on Refugees 
Without an Asylum Country and Executive Committee 
Conclusion No. 58 (XL) (1989) on the Problem of Refugees 
and Asylum-Seekers Who Move in an Irregular Manner from a 
Country in Which They Had Already Found Protection.
D. Registration with UNRWA
10.  UNRWA was established pursuant to UN General Assembly 
Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to “carry out in 
collaboration with local governments [. . .] direct relief and 
works programs” for Palestine refugees and to “consult with the 
interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to 
be taken by them preparatory to the time when international 
assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available.”9
Since 1967, UNRWA has also been authorized to assist certain 
other persons in addition to Palestine refugees. In particular, 
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UN General Assembly Resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 
endorsed the efforts of UNRWA to “provide humanitarian 
assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and 
as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are 
at present displaced and are in serious need of immediate 
assistance as a result of the recent hostilities”. Subsequent 
UN General Assembly Resolutions have endorsed on an 
annual basis UNRWA’s efforts to continue to provide such 
assistance.10
11.  UNRWA has decided, for its working purposes, that a “Palestine 
refugee” is any person “whose normal place of residence was 
Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and 
who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 
1948 confl ict.”11 This “working defi nition” has evolved over 
the years,12 and is without prejudice to the implementation 
of relevant UN General Assembly Resolutions, in particular 
paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.13
12.  Persons registered with UNRWA include: “Palestine refugees” 
as defi ned by the Agency for its working purposes; persons 
currently displaced and in serious need of continued assistance 
as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities; 
descendants by the male line of the aforementioned persons; 
and certain other persons.14 UNRWA’s operations are currently 
limited to fi ve areas, namely, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip.15
13.  The question [of] whether a Palestinian is registered, or 
is eligible to be registered, with UNRWA will need to be 
determined individually. In cases where this is unclear, further 
information can be sought from UNRWA.16
E. Conclusion
14.  UNHCR hopes that this Note clarifi es some pertinent aspects 
of the position of Palestinian refugees under international 
refugee law, and that it serves as useful guidance for decision-
makers in asylum proceedings.
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Offi ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) October 2002
Notes
1. A similar provision to Article 1D of the 1951 Convention is contained in 
UNHCR’s Statute, paragraph 7(c) of which stipulates that the competence of the 
High Commissioner shall not extend to a person who “continues to receive from 
other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or assistance.”
2. The term “Palestine refugees,” while never explicitly defi ned by the UN 
General Assembly, almost certainly also encompasses what would nowadays be 
called internally displaced persons. See, for example, UN Doc. A/AC.25/W.45, 
Analysis of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly’s Resolution of 11 December 
1948, 15 May 1950, Part One, paragraph 1: “During the debate preceding the 
adoption of [UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948], the 
United Kingdom delegation, which had sponsored the draft resolution, stated in 
reply to a question that the term ‘refugees’ referred to all refugees, irrespective 
of race or nationality, provided they had been displaced from their homes in 
Palestine. That the General Assembly accepted this interpretation becomes almost 
certain if it is considered that the word ‘Arab’, which had preceded the word 
‘refugees’ in the fi rst two texts of the United Kingdom draft resolution […] was 
omitted in the fi nal text which was approved by the Assembly. […] According to 
the above interpretation the term ‘refugees’ applies to all persons, Arabs, Jews and 
others who have been displaced from their homes in Palestine. This would include 
Arabs in Israel who have been shifted from their normal places of residence. 
It would also include Jews who had their homes in Arab Palestine, such as the 
inhabitants of the Jewish quarter of the Old City. It would not include Arabs who 
had lost their lands but not their houses, such as the inhabitants of Tulkarm.” For 
further analysis of the term “Palestine refugees,” see, for example, UN Doc. W/61/
Add.1, Addendum to Defi nition of a “Refugee” Under paragraph 11 of the General 
Assembly Resolution of 11 December 1948, 29 May 1951; UN Doc. A/AC.25/W.81/
Rev.2, Historical Survey of Efforts of the United Nations Commission for Palestine 
to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 
(III). Question of Compensation, 2 October 1961, section III.
3. The UN General Assembly resolved in paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) 
that “the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date” and that 
“compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return 
and for loss of or damage to property.” In the same paragraph, the General 
Assembly instructed the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine 
(UNCCP) to “facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social 
rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation.” The General 
Assembly has since noted on an annual basis that UNCCP has been unable to 
fi nd a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of 
Resolution 194 (III). See, most recently, General Assembly Resolution 56/52 of 10 
December 2001, which notes that the situation of the Palestine refugees continues 
to be a matter of concern and requests UNCCP to exert continued efforts toward 
the implementation of that paragraph.
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4. Essentially two groups of Palestinians have been displaced from the 
territories occupied by Israel in 1967: (i) Palestinians originating from East 
Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; (ii) “Palestine refugees” who had 
taken refuge in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. UN General 
Assembly Resolution 2452 (XXIII) A of 19 December 1968 and subsequent General 
Assembly resolutions have called for the return of these “displaced persons.” 
Most recently, General Assembly Resolution 56/54 of 10 December 2001 reaffi rms 
the “right of all persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent 
hostilities to return to their homes or former places of residence in the territories 
occupied by Israel since 1967,” expresses deep concern that “the mechanism 
agreed upon by the parties in Article XII of the Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements on the return of displaced persons has 
not been effected”; and expresses the hope for “an accelerated return of displaced 
persons.”
5. The concern of the UN General Assembly with the descendants both of 
“Palestine refugees” and of “displaced persons” was expressed in UN General 
Assembly Resolution 37/120 I of 16 December 1982, which requested the UN 
Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, to 
issue identity cards to “all Palestine refugees and their descendants […] as well 
as to all displaced persons and to those who have been prevented from returning 
to their home as a result of the 1967 hostilities, and their descendants”. In 1983, 
the UN Secretary-General reported on the steps that he had taken to implement 
this resolution, but said that he was “unable, at this stage, to proceed further with 
the implementation of the resolution” without “signifi cant additional information 
[becoming] available through further replies from Governments” (paragraph 9, UN 
Doc. A/38/382, Special Identifi cation cards for all Palestine refugees. Report of the 
Secretary-General, 12 September 1983).
6. For example, a Palestinian referred to in paragraph 3 of this Note may be 
considered by the competent authorities of the country in which he or she has 
taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the 
possession of the nationality of that country, in which case he or she would be 
excluded from the benefi ts of the 1951 Convention in accordance with Article 1E. 
Moreover, many Palestinians have acquired the nationality of a third country and 
any claim they make for recognition as a refugee should, therefore, be examined 
under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention in relation to the country of their 
new nationality. In certain cases, the Palestinian origins of such persons may be 
relevant to the assessment of whether they are outside the country of their new 
nationality owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted “for reasons of” race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.
7. There is no consensus whether Palestinians who have not acquired the 
nationality of a third country are stateless, but many States consider that such 
Palestinians are stateless in the sense of Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and assess their claims for refugee 
status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention accordingly. It should be 
noted that Article 1(2)(i) of the 1954 Statelessness Convention provides that the 
1954 Convention shall not apply to “persons who are at present receiving from 
organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance so long as they are receiving 
such protection or assistance.”
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8. For example, a descendant of a “Palestine refugee” or of a Palestinian 
“displaced person” may never have resided in UNRWA’s area of operations, and 
also not fall under Articles 1C or 1E of the 1951 Convention.
9. UN General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 directs 
UNRWA to consult with the UNCCP “in the best interests of [UNRWA’s and 
UNCCP’s] respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of General 
Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.” UN General Assembly 
Resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 further instructed UNRWA to “establish 
a reintegration fund which shall be utilized for projects requested by any 
government in the Near East and approved by the Agency for the permanent re-
establishment of refugees and their removal from relief.” The same resolution 
authorized UNRWA, as circumstances permit, to “transfer funds available for the 
current relief and works programs [and for direct relief to Palestine refugees in 
need] to reintegration projects.” Neither UN General Assembly Resolution 302 
(IV) of 8 December 1949 nor any subsequent UN General Assembly Resolution 
has specifi cally limited the scope of UNRWA’s mandate. Accordingly, UNRWA’s 
mandate has evolved, over the years, with the endorsement of the UN General 
Assembly. For example, UN General Assembly resolutions between 1982 and 1993 
on the Protection of Palestine refugees called upon UNRWA to play a protection 
role in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The last such resolution 
was Resolution 48/40 H of 10 December 1993, which urged “the [UN] Secretary-
General and the Commissioner-General [of UNRWA] to continue their efforts in 
support of the upholding of the safety and security and the legal and human rights 
of the Palestine refugees in all the territories under Israeli occupation since 1967.” 
Subsequent resolutions, including most recently UN General Assembly Resolution 
56/56 of 10 December 2001, refer to the “valuable work done by the refugee 
affairs offi cers [of UNRWA] in providing protection to the Palestinian people, in 
particular Palestine refugees.”
10. Most recently, UN General Assembly Resolution 56/54 of 10 December 2001 
endorses the efforts of UNRWA to “continue to provide humanitarian assistance, 
as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to 
persons in the area who are currently displaced and in serious need of continued 
assistance as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities.”
11. Information provided by UNRWA. As mentioned in endnote 2 above, the 
UN General Assembly has never explicitly defi ned the term “Palestine refugees.”
12. See, for example, UN Doc. A/1451/Rev.1, Interim Report of the Director 
of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East, 6 October 1950, paragraph 15: “For working purposes, the Agency 
has decided that a refugee is a needy person, who, as a result of the war in 
Palestine, has lost his home and his means of livelihood”; UN Doc. A/2717/Add.1, 
Special Report of the Director of the Advisory Commission of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 30 June 1954, 
paragraph 19: “The defi nition of a person eligible for relief, as used by the Agency 
for some years, is one ‘whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum 
period of two years preceding the outbreak of the confl ict in 1948 and who, as a 
result of this confl ict, has lost both his home and means of livelihood’”; UN Doc. 
A/8413, Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 30 June 1971, footnote 1: 
“A Palestine refugee, by UNRWA’s working defi nition, is a person whose normal 
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residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the confl ict in 1948 
and who, as a result of this confl ict, lost both his home and means of livelihood 
and took refuge, in 1948, in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief.”
13. In establishing UNRWA and in prolonging its mandate, the UN General 
Assembly has consistently specifi ed that the Agency’s activities are without 
prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 
1948. See, most recently, UN General Assembly Resolution 56/52 of 10 December 
2001, extending the mandate of UNRWA until 30 June 2005.
14. Information provided by UNRWA. 
15. Currently, UNRWA’s operations are limited to the fi ve areas listed in 
paragraph 12 of this Note. However, at times, UNRWA has provided assistance to 
Palestine refugees and other Palestinians registered with the Agency in additional 
areas of the Near East, including Kuwait, the Gulf States, and Egypt.
16. It should be noted that not all “Palestine refugees” residing in UNRWA’s 
area of operations are registered with UNRWA. It should also be noted that 
Palestinians satisfying UNRWA’s eligibility criteria do not necessarily cease to 
be eligible for UNRWA services if they acquire the nationality of a third country. 
In fact, many such persons continue to receive UNRWA services, particularly in 
Jordan.
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